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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is organized in six chapters. The first chapter provides a synopsis of the
four research articles that are comprised in this manuscript. It outlines the goals of each
article and connects them to specific Ostromian insights to shed light on the empirical
findings. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 are based on a field study that I conducted in
Sindhupalchowk, Nepal following the devastating earthquake in 2015. Chapter 4 uses
case studies from Chicago, New Orleans, Nepal, and Indonesia. The final chapter
summarizes major lessons from the four papers.

The second chapter investigates household-level coping responses to the 7.8 magnitude
earthquake in Nepal and their role in post-disaster recovery. I measure post-disaster
recovery using composite resilience-indices that capture both economic and psychosocial
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aspects of post-disaster recovery. Because household responses are potentially
endogenous, I use a full-information multi-equation regression framework that allows for
contemporaneous correlation across equations to account for the processes that determine
households’ choices. I find strong evidence to suggest that increasing financial access and
labor adjustment choices has positive and significant impact on post-disaster economic
resilience. On the other hand, while the adoption of financial coping strategies enhances
psychosocial resilience, I find that labor adjustment choices can disturb family and social
dynamics, thereby negatively impacting psychosocial resilience. My secondary findings
indicate that government assistance can have unintended detrimental impacts on
economic resilience, hinting at the subpar quality of political institutions in Nepal. These
results underscore the importance of mobilizing and expanding market and non-market
alternatives in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The third chapter delves into post-disaster collective action. First-generation theories of
collective action suggest that self-utility maximizing individuals in a setting characterized
by high degrees of non-excludability and non-rivalry prefer the dominant strategy to
evade cooperative choices and instead opt to free-ride. However, an overwhelming
number of successful and unsuccessful collective action efforts documented worldwide in
the aftermath of natural disasters contradicts this notion. This paper argues that secondgeneration theories of collective action forwarded by Elinor Ostrom and others bridge
this theoretical-empirical divide. I posit that a social norm-based model of human
behavior, not confined within a purely atomistic, material payoff maximizing mindset,
provides a more consistent analytical framework to explain post-disaster collective
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activities. Using primary data from Sindhupalchowk, Nepal, I empirically demonstrate
that bonding social capital fosters mutual trust, which in turn creates a milieu conducive
to collective action efforts. Besides this mediated effect, I find that both bonding and
bridging/linking social capital also have direct effects on post-disaster collective action.
This paper presents social capital as the key determinant of self-governance and
resilience in post-disaster situations that require concerted efforts from citizens, the
private sector, and public institutions towards overcoming the common challenges of
rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The fourth chapter makes a case for the dynamic nature of post-disaster goods and
services. A post-disaster situation can be characterized as one filled with turmoil of all
scales. The standard approach to post-disaster policymaking and academic thinking,
particularly concerning post-disaster foreign aid in developing countries, tends to lump
all aspects of relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and recovery as a single mega-project,
— one that can be efficiently operationalized only under a Gargantua central planning
body that is able to control all aspects of post-disaster recovery. This paper refutes such
convenient assumptions as myopic and inconsistent with reality. Using insights from
Ostroms’ analyses of the nature of goods and public choice, I unpack the elements of
post-disaster package and analyze how institutional changes following a disaster can lead
to changes in the nature of each element. To that end, I present four cases from Chicago,
New Orleans, Nepal, and Indonesia to discuss the dynamic nature of post-disaster goods
and services and the shuffling of goods-classification based on their shifting natures. The
goal of this exercise is to highlight the diversity, heterogeneity, and fluidity of goods and
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services that are needed in any post-disaster scenario. This approach to reconceptualizing
post-disaster aid is particularly relevant in developing countries that have poor-quality
public institutions and are often mired in political corruption and bureaucratic
inefficiencies.

The fifth chapter examines the role of social entrepreneurs in post-disaster contexts. I
argue that social entrepreneurship has a distinct role to play within the non-profit or thirdsector. That is, its role is in no way residual, accidental, or tertiary – that of a temporary
filler until the private sector and public institutions step in. This is especially true in the
context of a post-disaster scenario where both the private and public enterprises have
confined roles to play in the provision of private or public goods. It is the sector that lies
within this ‘third’ domain that can contribute towards civic engagement, maintain the
social fabric, and promote solidarity. Moreover, in post-disaster scenarios where
infrastructures and institutions facilitating operations of markets and functioning of
public institutions are hindered, social entrepreneurs often engage in the provision of
goods and services whose production and provision are typically done by the private
and/or public sectors. Their role, however, transcends the mere provision of goods, –
private or public – and includes the promotion of active citizenship through coproduction processes. Using a quasi-experimental set up from the case of Dhurmus
Suntali Foundation’s Namuna village project in Nepal following the 2015 earthquake, I
empirically demonstrate this critical role of the third sector in post-disaster contexts. My
findings show that social entrepreneurs’ involvement increases citizens’ participation in
volunteering activities, community engagement, and post-disaster reconstruction efforts.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
The dissertation comprises of four research articles that apply theories from Public
Choice and New Institutional Economics to understand household and community
responses to natural disaster shocks. I draw heavily on Elinor Ostrom’s and the
Bloomington School’s insights on Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), public
goods and public choice, resilience, co-production, and polycentricity to disentangle
complexities related to post-disaster recovery. Papers 1, 2, and 4 are based on a field
study that I conducted in Sindhupalchowk, Nepal following the 7.8 magnitude earthquake
in 2015 that claimed over 9000 lives. Paper 3 draws on case studies from different
manmade and natural disasters in Chicago, New Orleans, Nepal, and Indonesia.

The first paper investigates the role that households’ choice of coping strategies plays in
their post-disaster recovery. I find strong evidence to suggest that increasing financial
access and labor adjustment choices has positive impact on post-disaster economic
resilience. On the other hand, while the adoption of financial coping strategies enhances
psychosocial resilience, I find that labor adjustment choices can disturb family and social
dynamics, thereby negatively impacting psychosocial resilience. My findings highlight
the critical tradeoff between economic and psychosocial aspects of wellbeing and the
challenges surrounding policies that aim at addressing one or more of such aspects. The
paper presents arguments for the adoption of resilience thinking in post-disaster
management that shifts focus away from one-maximization-problem-one-equilibrium-
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approach to a polycentric framework that accommodates multiple agents, multiple
institutions, multiple problems, multiple approaches, and multiple solutions.

The second paper explores the determinants of collective action in post-disaster contexts
in an attempt to answer why individuals choose to cooperate for collective activities
when there are abundant opportunities to free-ride on the efforts of others. Using insights
from the second-generation collective action theories forwarded by Elinor Ostrom and
the scholars of the New Institutionalist tradition, I empirically demonstrate that
communities can mobilize their social capital to build mutual trust that can help
overcome free-riding problems. The paper sheds light into the social dimension of human
behavior that frequently interacts with, and occasionally even dominates, the strictly
economic pay-off maximizing behavior. I provide further evidence to support the
Ostromian thesis that a configural approach, which allows for multiple non-contradictory,
situational theories of human behavior and social organization to co-exist, is more
consistent with cooperative, collective behavior in post-disaster contexts.

The third paper uses the typology of goods as an “analytical entry-point” to make a case
for the dynamic nature of post-disaster goods and services. I highlight the institutional
contingency of categories of goods (private, public, club, or common pool) and argue that
post-disaster institutional changes can lead to changes in the specific typology of each
good. To that end, I present four case studies from different manmade and natural
disasters in Chicago, New Orleans, Nepal, and Indonesia, where institutional changes led
to shuffling of the classification of goods and services. By highlighting the diversity,
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heterogeneity, and fluidity of goods and services that are needed in any post-disaster
scenario, I show that the Gargantua approach, – one that treats post-disaster relief,
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery as one mega-project – that is pervasive in
many developing countries, is incentive-incompatible and lacks theoretical and empirical
basis.

The final paper exploits a quasi-experimental set up from the case of Dhurmus Suntali
Foundation’s Giranchaur Namuna village project in Nepal following the 2015 earthquake
to examine the distinctly neither-market-nor-state role of social entrepreneurs in a postdisaster setting. The chapter delves into the foundation’s role in fostering active
citizenship and community engagement to argue that, although social entrepreneurs often
engage in the provision of goods and services whose production and provision are
typically done by the private and/or public sectors, their roles transcend the mere
provision of such goods/services and include the promotion of active citizenship through
co-production processes. This paper uses Ostromian insights on co-production and
institutional diversity to situate social entrepreneurship within the neither-market-norstate domain where its role is not secondary or temporary until the private or public
sector steps in.

The four papers expand the scope of Bloomington School’s theoretical insights, which
has so far been limited to the analysis of local economies and common pool resource
management, into the study of post-disaster recovery. In her decades of investigation of
community forests and irrigation systems in Nepal, Elinor Ostrom never failed to account
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for the complexity, richness, and heterogeneity of Nepali communities. Somehow, postdisaster studies following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal have managed to ignore most of
the valuable insights from the Bloomington School. Among the central goals of this
dissertation is to remedy that.

4

CHAPTER 2
Natural Disasters, ex-post coping strategies, and post-disaster resilience:
Evidence from the 2015 earthquake in Nepal
Introduction
The past few decades have witnessed unprecedented number of natural disasters, both in
terms of frequency of occurrences and their impacts on human lives. Between 1994 and
2013, 6873 natural disasters have been reported worldwide that impacted 218 million
people on average per year and have cumulatively claimed 1.3 million lives. Along with
the frequency of natural disasters, disaster-related death rates have also been rising
steadily. The paper centers around the single worst natural disaster since 1900 in Nepal,
one of the poorest countries in the world. The devastating 7.8 magnitude quake on April
25, 2015 and dozens of aftershocks that followed, including one of 7.3 magnitude on 12th
May, caused destruction to a scale comparable to that of the decade long Maoist
insurgency –in terms of lives lost, population affected, and economic costs (CRED,
2015a; Joshi, 2014). The event claimed over 9,000 lives, affected another 8 million, and
resulted in estimated direct and indirect economic losses amounting to 10 billion USD
(ibid.). Unlike that of neighboring China, where the government-led response to the 2008
earthquake was reported as being “rapid and massive,” Nepali government’s response
was slow and ineffective, and often hindered multi-agency recovery and relief efforts
through bureaucratic hurdles (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018b; Shi et al., 2013). As
Rayamajhee and Bohara (2018b) note, the post-disaster situation in Nepal can be
described as one embroiled in political instability, poor institutional quality, and
inadequate governmental response to remedy disaster losses.
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As is often the trend with most low-frequency high-impact disasters, earthquakes in
Nepal garnered overwhelming initial attention that gradually faded away as priorities
shifted to other issues. Any residual discussions surrounding the earthquake centers
around appraisal or critique of public policies and interventions in the aftermath of the
shocks. While such evaluation and critical analyses at the upper echelons of policymaking may help prevent bureaucratic blunders in future shocks, the fact remains that
geophysical shocks can neither be predicted nor prevented. In that regard, we deem that a
sensible alternative is to refocus our attention to enhancing disaster preparedness and
mitigation strategies at the local level. This sentiment mirrors that of the United Nations’
Sendai Framework whose key priorities include “enhancing disaster preparedness for
effective response and to build back better in recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction.”1 To that end, we shift our emphasis from disaster responses at high-level
institutions to understanding how agrarian households respond ex-post to such covariate
shocks and how those responses influence their paths to [household] recovery,
particularly in developing economies with weak political institutions.
We postulate that, in absence of reliable public institutions, the post-disaster recovery of
households largely hinges on their own post-disaster coping strategy choices and
localized efforts to tackle post-disaster challenges. To examine such mechanisms, we use
the resilience framework that social scientists have borrowed from ecologists (Barrett and
Constas, 2014). As noted by many, social science adaptations of resilience are often too
vague and its applications too discordant and unsystematic to render them meaningful

1

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–203. United Nations (UNISDR, 2015: 21).
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(Klein et al., 2003; Rose, 2007). We address that concern by providing a systematic,
quantifiable definition of household resilience that captures both economic and
psychosocial dimensions of post-disaster recovery. We retain its original ecology
interpretation (Gunderson et al., 2012; Holling, 1973; Walker and Salt, 2012) but adapt it
to a disaster context to reflect household perspective. We define disaster resilience as
following:
In the face of an exogenous shock and the consequential loss in wellbeing,
resilience is the ability of a household to bounce back to the original level of
wellbeing (or better) relative to the intensity of the initial impact of shocks.
As such, a household that has suffered a disaster and rebounded from that disaster is a
household that, on our definition, has exhibited resilience. This treatment of resilience as
an exhibited characteristic rather than a latent property allows for an unambiguous
interpretation of our empirical findings, since the ‘bouncing back’ process is an
observable and measurable feature relative to the abstract resilience stock.2

This paper makes two important contribution to the literature of disaster resilience and
recovery as well as the literature on the ability of households in the poorest communities
to overcome negative shocks.3 First, we provide the first household-survey based

2

Although not applicable to our case, this treatment of resilience implies that a household that has not
undergone a disaster shock cannot be included in our analysis. In other words, households that may
otherwise be deemed resilient based on observable disaster-preparedness measures and other unobservable
characteristics cannot be deemed resilient for our analysis. This can be viewed as a shortcoming of our
treatment. Nonetheless, this shortcoming is a reasonable tradeoff as it allows for an unambiguous analysis
based on the variation in household recovery across multiple dimensions of well-being.
3
Notable recent contributions to the literature on this topic include (Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright and
Storr, 2009; N. M. Storr et al., 2015; V. H. Storr and Haeffele-Balch, 2012).
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quantitative analysis of the impact of the 2015 earthquake on agrarian households in rural
Nepal, and track their responses to cope with post-disaster challenges.4 Secondly, using
retrospective questions about post-disaster recovery, we evaluate the role of ex-post
coping responses in their post-disaster economic and psychosocial resilience. Unlike
previous studies that view resilience exclusively as a collective, community-level feature,
this microeconomic treatment allows us to exploit household level variation in recovery
measures to identify factors that lead to post-disaster resilience.

Our descriptive results show that reduction in household consumption of food and nonfood items, short-term loans, and mutual assistance are the most common strategies
adopted. Although 86% and 68% of households we interviewed report receiving
assistance from governmental and non-governmental sources, such assistance remained
nominal. In our subsequent analysis, we categorize all household responses into three
broader bins: financial coping strategies, labor adjustment choices, and seeking external
assistance. Our empirical findings indicate that both financial and labor adjustment
coping methods significantly contribute to higher economic resilience. However, when
juxtaposing their relative magnitudes, we find that financial coping is relatively more
effective. We find strong evidence to suggest that adoption of a financial coping strategy
also enhances psychosocial wellbeing of households. On the other hand, labor
adjustment, while lucrative from an economic standpoint, severely disturbs family and
social dynamics, thereby negatively affecting psychosocial resilience outcomes. Our

4

Using a mixed methods approach, Epstein et al. (2018) provide an analysis of post-disaster impacts and
adaptation among smallholder communities in Dolakha, Nepal. The study employs disaster resilience of
place (DROP) framework to assess community resilience (Cutter et al., 2008).
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secondary findings are somewhat bleak: government assistance has statistically
significant and negative impact on economic resilience. Moreover, the pervasive network
of non-governmental organizations that has proliferated across the country seems to have
no significant impact on either economic or psychosocial resilience. This may point to the
lack of accountability, and institutionalized corruption that have long penetrated public
and quasi-public sectors in Nepal.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief survey
of literature, section 3 discusses data and provides descriptive analysis, section 4 presents
empirical analysis, section 5 discusses results and implications, and section 6 concludes.

Previous Studies on Disaster Resilience
A comprehensive investigation of shocks, natural or manmade, requires consideration of
all static and dynamic elements. The traditional cost-benefit approach, while important,
does not fully incorporate all moving parts. Moreover, momentary but consequential nature
of disaster shocks as well as the pervasiveness of non-monetary and intangible yet crucial
factors associated with recovery from such shocks have led social scientists to seek out for
a broader, dynamic conceptual framework to account for complex feedback-loops and
multidimensional nature of human wellbeing. This need for understanding the complexity
and multidimensionality of disaster impact and recovery processes has led to a widespread
embrace of the concept of ‘resilience’(Rose, 2007). Even though no consensus exists on

5

Transparency International consistently ranks Nepal among the most corrupt countries in the world. 2017
TI data gives Nepal a score of 31 (0=highly corrupt, 100=clean) ranking it 122/180 (Transparency
International, 2018). Truex (2011) points out that behaviors such as “petty corruption,” “gift-giving,” and
“favoritism” are deemed acceptable in situations when seeking access to deserved services.
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the theory of development resilience, the use of the concept of “resilience” to discuss policy
objectives is getting increasingly popular (Barrett and Constas, 2014). While this has
allowed for a flexible, contextual adaptation of the concept, its divergent use in both
academic and policy circles has engendered substantial ambiguity and inhibited consistent
interpretation.
Extant studies on disaster resilience focus overwhelmingly at the meso- or macro-levels,
with an emphasis on cross- community, regional and national differences (Briguglio et
al., 2009; Cannon, 2008; Marto et al., 2018; Rose, 2004). Although micro-level variables
such as household income and assets, livelihood strategy, private and public transfers and
credit access all play important roles in post-disaster recovery (Bruneau et al., 2003;
Davies et al., 2013; Sawada, 2007), resilience is often treated as a community feature. A
seminal study by Cutter et al. (2008) advances the Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP)
model to assess disaster resilience. The study uses thirty-six indicators for measuring and
monitoring social, economic, institutional, infrastructure, and community capital, which
are then used to quantify resilience. The tacit assumption that motivates this approach is
that household-level differences, although they can explain micro-level variation, are less
important than community level forces that determine post-disaster resilience. While this
view can provide important post-disaster policy guidelines in homogeneous communities
with well-functioning public institutions, we contend that heterogenous communities in
developing countries with weak public institutions require a more granular approach to
understanding disaster resilience. This is especially relevant in the context of postearthquake Nepal characterized by ethnic/caste-based, religious, economic, cultural, and
political cleavages (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018a). Moreover, even a covariate shock
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(of the same magnitude) affects each household differently and poses unique challenges
to each household, which a community-level analysis fails to account for (Rayamajhee
and Bohara, 2018b).
Rose (2004) proposes a three-tier analytical framework for disaster resilience and
highlights the need to conduct studies at all three levels: the micro-level (individuals,
households or firms), the meso/mid-level (groups and sectors), and the macro-level
(regions, nations). This paper takes the micro-approach and focuses exclusively at the
household-level. This approach has a unique advantage in that it provides us detailed
insights into households’ post-disaster responses, the factors that influence those
responses, and the results of specific coping strategies adopted. An extensive body of
literature exists that evaluate disaster impacts at the household-level (Gignoux and
Menéndez 2016; Halliday, 2006; Halliday, 2012; Park and Wang, 2017). Another strand
of microeconomic literature exists that focus on specific coping strategies employed to
tackle post-disaster challenges (Del Ninno et al., 2003; Mozumder et al., 2009; Novella
and Zanuso, 2018; Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018b; Sawada and Shimizutani, 2008). An
adjacent line of research on the poverty trap in development economics shares strong
parallels with the notion of disaster resilience (Barrett and Constas, 2014; Carter and
Barrett, 2006). Nonetheless, very few microeconomic studies on natural disasters use the
resilience framework explicitly to evaluate household dynamics (Arouri et al., 2015).
Furthermore, empirical studies that combine these three themes – that is, microeconomic
studies at the household level that evaluate ex-post coping strategies and their role in
post-disaster recovery using the resilience framework – are virtually non-existent. This
paper fills that gap in the literature by using primary survey data from post-earthquake
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Nepal. The survey asked retrospective questions to gather detailed information on ex-post
coping strategies and multi-dimensional resilience measures.
Utilizing resilience thinking to frame discussions on disaster recovery serves two distinct
purposes. First, it helps reorient discussions on post-disaster policies away from “highly
optimized” solutions to adaptability, diversity, and entrepreneurship (Tarko, 2017). Rather
than pursuing panacea solutions that are optimized to known sources of danger, resilience
thinking allows us to look broadly into complex interconnectivities and multidimensionality and empowers individuals and communities to adopt flexible strategies that
are robust against side effects and unknown sources of danger. Second, it fosters
discussions about a multi-tiered, polycentric approach to post-disaster policies that allows
for experimentation by multiple actors who can employ competitive and/or cooperative
strategies to meet multi-dimensional, intertwined goals (Ostrom, 2010). The solutions that
emerge from such discourse are diverse, and adaptable to account for interconnected
problems and multiple potential outcomes (Smith et al., 2017). In other words, a solution
that is deemed ‘optimal’ based on an evaluation of economic outcomes is not resilient if it
increases fragility in psychosocial or other dimensions. For empirical applications to
disaster recovery, resilience thinking entails not only evaluating ‘bouncing back’ processes
in terms of multiple-causes-multiple-outcomes framework, but also devising “participatory
approach” to institutional design with “multiplicity of institutional arrangements and
practices” (Mustafa, 2003; Ostrom, 1976). In other words, simply cloaking the usual
suspect variables using resilience merely as a rhetorical device to reframe old discussions
only serves as a distraction.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, we provide a systematic,
12

empirically tractable treatment of household disaster resilience. Second, the study adds to
the thin body of literature on the microeconomic treatment of disaster resilience. Third, it
takes a multidimensional approach to quantifying disaster resilience that accounts for both
economic and psychosocial dimensions of post-disaster recovery.

Conceptual Framework

The links that our study examines comes from Sawada and Takasaki (2017), who provide
a comprehensive framework for microeconomic analysis of the disaster-poverty nexus.6
The framework highlights the centrality of time-frame and duration in situating
discussions of policies and strategies to address disaster issues. As such, disaster
preparedness and ex-ante risk management (pre-disaster policies) need to be
distinguished from impact assessment, disaster aid and relief (short-run policies), and
from reconstruction and rebuilding policies (long-run policies). The poor tend to
underinvest in ex-ante measures; and, public institutions in developing countries tend to
be underprioritize ex-ante risk management (p. 9). Moreover, because developing
economies also face dire short-term problems, long-run planning generally remains
confined within the pages of policy reports and vision statements. What all this means is
that any disaster-related policies in such vulnerable countries inevitably overemphasize
immediate/short-run challenges. Our best hope is to expand the policy purview ever so
slightly to include some elements of long-term preparedness through an expansion of
market and non-market institutions. While disaster-specific components may still receive

6

For a detailed diagrammatic depiction of the conceptual framework, please refer to Figure 4 of the paper
(Sawada and Takasaki, 2017: 8).
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limited attention, expansion of general components that overlap with disaster-specific
ones may increase our chances of addressing some of the bigger challenges.
Among the five disaster-specific components that Sawada and Takasaki (2017) describe,
– i.e. disaster damage, aggregate impacts, recovery, pre-disaster management, and
disaster aid – studies conducted in developing countries focus overwhelming on disaster
aid (Morris and Wodon, 2003; Takasaki, 2011a, 2011b). On the other hand, systematic
studies that focus on how these disaster-specific components interact with private coping
decisions and their outcomes are scarce (ibid.). In the case of Nepal, such studies are nonexistent. This gap in the empirical literature is alarming considering the critical role that
private coping decisions play in household-recovery, particularly in Nepal where public
institutions have generally failed to provide basic post-disaster public goods and services.
This paper’s central contribution lies in filling that gap in the empirical literature. The
focus on [relatively short-term] ex-post coping strategies, and specifically on private
ones, is grounded on the political reality of Nepal, where grand teleological visions [of
society and politics] have only led to destabilization and polarization.

The conceptual framework that we employ for empirical analysis is represented in Figure
1. A household’s private coping decisions after a disaster are similar in many ways to
those after any non-disaster shocks (Sawada & Takasaki, 2017). However, there are
additional factors such as asset damages, injuries and death from a disaster can influence
the range of choices within the household’s feasibility set (Rayamajhee and Bohara,
2018b). Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2010) find that community members adopted selfreliant recovery strategies when people did not believe that government could help them.
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Other influencers include household characteristics and pre-disaster asset levels
(particularly financial assets). Subsequently, the choice of private coping strategy is a
major determinant of their post-disaster resilience. Where we slightly deviate from
Sawada and Takasaki (2017) framework is that we do not restrict our empirical analysis
to economic outcomes. Because there are trade-offs associated with choices of different
strategies, an overinvestment in one strategy aimed at a specific outcome inevitably may
lead to underinvestment in another strategy. On the other hand, it may be the case that an
investment in one strategy with specific aims may also facilitate in the other aim. The
precise direction of effects is an empirical question that requires contextual interpretation.

1. Pre-disaster asset
levels
2. Magnitude of LOSS
3. Household
characteristics

Choice of
Coping
Strategies

Level of
Recovery
• Economic
• Psychosocial

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework adapted from Sawada and Takasaki (2017)

Nepal Earthquake and The Data
Nepal consistently ranks among the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world. To
date, disasters have killed more people in Nepal than in any other South Asian countries
(Shakya, 2016). The 2015 earthquake in Nepal is the single worst natural disaster since
1900, and Sindhupalchowk is the worst affected district. Shakya (2016) reports that the
earthquake claimed 3440 lives in Sindhupalchowk alone, and almost all of the houses in
major towns were decimated. The choice of Basbari as the study location was motivated
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by the fact that many village wards in Basbari have little to no government presence and
that post-disaster national reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives are somewhat of a
fairy tale for Basbari residents. International donors and non-governmental organizations
also paid very little attention to Basbari as some of the wards (particularly 3, 8, and 9) are
among the remotest in the entire administrative district. Apart from basic relief goods and
nominal funds to rebuild their homes (USD 500 to 1000), no household has, up to this
point, received any substantive external assistance from any private or public agencies. In
many informal conversations with local health workers and some village elders, we heard
many tales about the cobweb of bureaucratic hurdles that villagers had to go through even
to acquire the limited funds that was already assured to them. This is not surprising
considering the post-earthquake situation described as one “embroiled in political
turmoil, instability, poor institutional quality, and inadequate government response,” and
filled with “political wrangling” over leadership of reconstruction agencies (Mishra,
2016; Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018b).

The quantitative analyses presented in this paper are based on the data collected by the
lead author in May-July 2017, with logistical support from the [institution name omitted
for peer review purposes] and [institution name omitted].7 The field study was conducted
across all nine wards in Basbari, exactly two years after the 2015 earthquake. Over 500
households were selected based on stratified randomized sampling procedure, and
extensive face-to-face interviews were conducted. As reported by another study in

7

This study was conducted to assess the short-run impacts of the 2015 earthquake on rural households in
Sindhupalchowk, Nepal, as well as to track their recovery processes. The field survey study also gathered
information on food security and health measures.
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Sindhupalchowk, public infrastructures in rural villages, even two years after the
earthquake, are still in shambles (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018b). During the time of the
study, we observed that rural health clinics were forced to operate in dilapidated
buildings with no doors and windows; primary schools conducted their classes in nearby
chautaris.8

Table 2 (last section) reports demographic information. Most Basbari households (68%)
rely on agricultural production for sustenance, with maize and rice as their major staple
foods. Basbari is a predominantly Hindu (71%) constituency with Buddhism being the
second most dominant religion (27%). 40% of the population identify as Janajatis
(indigenous groups); 12% belong to Dalit-caste (lowest category in the Hindu caste
hierarchy). 55% of our respondents are female, and the average household size is 5.6.
Compared to regular (extreme weather-related) shocks that Basbari residents face, the
2015 earthquake caused exceptionally high levels of house, property, and health
damages. The collected information includes data on self-reported damages caused by the
earthquake, household coping strategies after the earthquake, and their recovery status on
various wellbeing measures relative to the damage each household suffered.

Earthquake Impacts and Recovery
Bishnu Pokharel [name altered for anonymity reasons], a Basbari resident, notes, “Before
the earthquake, many of us were poor and a few were rich, but God does not

8

Chautaris refers to peepal-tree shade. They are common meeting places for public discussions in rural
Nepal.
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discriminate…. Whatever differences we may have had in the past, the earthquake
evened them all.” The earthquake did not spare any households. 89.41% households
reported that the earthquake partially to fully damaged their homes. 81% of all homes
were completely affected, i.e. they were unlivable without (or even with) major repairs.
More than 92% reported having lost physical assets. Although 83% did not face direct
bodily harm, results show that 70% lost their earning potential and 94% were emotionally
distressed that hampered their economic lives. 34% and 44% households reported that the
earthquake hindered access to food and water. The earthquake also impacted social
dimensions of wellbeing. 18% households noted an increase in domestic violence
attributable to the earthquake; 43% households felt that the earthquake affected their
community engagement roles.

Two years after the earthquake, we found that access to water had not improved
significantly. Villagers in many remote wards had to commute daily up to several hours
to Sindhukhola and Indrawati rivers to fetch water. While the purpose of this paper is not
to appropriately test the full consumption insurance hypothesis, we have enough
observational evidence to suggest that most Basbari households have been unable to
markedly smooth their food and non-food consumption patterns. Figure 1-5 illustrates
recovery trends.9 The vertical line at time t=24 represents the cut-off point when the data
collection took place: towards the left-side of the line are real (stated) recovery rates,
whereas towards the right are expected recovery rates. Information on real recovery rates

9

The estimates presented in figure 1-5 are based on Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis. For interpretational
purposes, survival analysis plots are inverted and presented as failure function graphs – that is, fail to not
recover. However, to avoid confusion, we avoid the use of the term ‘failure’ to discuss recovery rates.
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are gathered using retrospective questions. At t=24, only 25% had recovered their predisaster level incomes. Asset recovery rates at t=24 is even lower at just 12%. For those
households that had not recovered by the time of the study, we asked questions about
their expected recovery rates on various wellbeing measures. Figure 1 shows that
recovery rates at each time period (including t>24) is higher for income than assets,
which indicates that asset shocks tend to have more persistent effects than income shocks
for rural, agrarian households. 30.41% and 27% households report that they will not be
able to recover their pre-disaster level incomes by 2027. On the other hand, Figure 2
shows that 70% of those who suffered physical injuries from the earthquake (excluding
those who died) have fully recovered, and almost all households report that they will
recover from physical injuries by 2027.
[Insert Figure 1]
[Insert Figure 2]
Coping strategy choices
Table 1 reports various coping strategies that Basbari households adopted in the
aftermath of the earthquake to overcome post-disaster challenges. The use of the word
“choice” warrants further qualification. As reported before, one of the most common
household coping responses is to reduce consumption of food and non-food items.
However, such responses cannot be justifiably called ‘choices’ in that households do not
choose to consume less food or other household goods. We deem that it is more
appropriate to view such responses as outcomes rather than choices. Moreover, public
and quasi-public transfers are not necessarily “choices” as agrarian households in rural
Nepal do not have much influence over public programs. That is why, for the empirical
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estimation in the succeeding section, we treat them as being exogenous from the
households’ perspective. Among the responses that reasonably qualify as coping
strategies, borrowing is the most common response adopted by 57% of all households,
followed by mutual assistance (43%), use of savings (35%), and child labor (18%); 14%
households resorted to sale of liquid assets; 14% used advance labor, and 7% households
reported having to send more members in labor force because of the earthquake. About
8% households were able to mobilize remittance revenue to cope with disasters. 86%
households received government assistance, and 68% received some help from nongovernmental organizations. Almost all households adopted one or many forms of coping
strategies (including help).
[Insert Table 1]
Descriptive Results
For descriptive analysis (and subsequent econometric analysis), we categorize coping
responses into financial and labor adjustment strategies. Financial coping strategies
include use of savings, borrowing, and sale of assets, whereas labor adjustment involves
advance labor (working in advance with an assurance of a later payment), sending more
family members in labor force, and out-migrating for work. Although we consider
external assistance from governmental and non-governmental agencies, we do not
classify them as coping strategies. In Figures 3 and 4, we divide the sample based on
different coping strategies adopted. Figure 3 shows differences in income and asset
recovery rates between households that adopted financial coping strategies and those that
did not. Results show that those who adopted at least one financial coping strategy
attained their pre-disaster level incomes at a faster pace than those who did not. Among
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those who have not yet been able to do so, we find that those who adopted financial
strategies have higher expectations of faster recovery rates. We find similar trends for
asset recovery rates, however the differences are not statistically significant at t<24.
[Insert Figure 3]
Figure 4 presents survival analysis results for income and asset recovery rates by labor
adjustment strategy. We observe similar trends as that of financial coping strategies.
Households that adopted at least one labor adjustment coping strategy have higher
income and asset recovery rates (both real and expected). Although the real differences in
observed recovery rates is not as pronounced, we find that those who are able to use labor
adjustment strategies have higher expectations about income and asset recovery. These
differences diverge dramatically after t=60.
[Insert Figure 4]
Survival analysis estimates based on government help reveals interesting results. In terms
of income recovery, we observe that there is no consistent difference between households
that received government assistance and those that did not. However, we see that at t=36,
the trends diverge. This indicates that households that received any form of government
assistance are more optimistic about their prospects of being able to recover their assets
after a year or so. On the other hand, the trend for asset recovery by government
assistance reveals interesting results. Households that received government assistance
report consistently lower recovery rates compared to those that did not receive any aid.
This difference is especially more pronounced from periods 12<t<84. The trend reverses
at t>84. One possible explanation of this reversal could be that there is still hope among
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Basbari residents that enough government aid will reach to rural Basbari in the next five
years or so.
[Insert Figure 5]

The Econometric Model
The conceptual framework employed in the empirical analysis is represented using a
multi-equation system in a recursive modeling set up, where we allow for
contemporaneous correlation across equations. The equations employed for empirical
evaluation are:

Outcome Equation:
!"#$%% = '( + '* +,-$./012%% + '3 4567%% + '8 9%% + :%%

(1)

Decision Equation(s):
+,-$./012%% = g( + +g* ;<<"##%% + g3 =>?>/"%% + g8 9%% + @%%

(2)

In the first equation, !"#$%% represents Economic Resilience (5!%% ) and Psychosocial
Resilience (7!%% ) of a household. Both ER and PR are continuous variables ranging from
0 to 20 with higher value representing higher ability to bounce back to the pre-disaster
level of economic well-being. !"#$%% is determined by a vector of endogenously
determined coping strategies (+,-$./012%% ), along with exogenous variables including
external assistance (4567%% ) and other control variables (9%% ) such as initial disaster
impact10, household characteristics, etc. The coping strategy decision equation in (2) can

10

We suspect that initial disaster impact is likely to also affect resilience. However, we do not find
statistically significant results for house and property damage. Only injury/death seems to hurt recovery,
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be thought of as two separate equations for financial coping (FinCopinghh)and labor
adjustment (LaborCopinghh) strategies. The choice(s) of these coping strategies are
determined by disaster damage (=>?>/"%% ), access to market (;<<"##%% 11), and the
same set of household characteristics from equation (1). =>?>/"%% is a matrix of
variables representing house, property, and health damages by the earthquake. Vector
;<<"##%% includes two variables: distance to the nearest market, and membership in local
finance groups. Note that including the vector ;<<"##%% makes the multi-equation system
identified. @%% =[B%% , C%% ] are error terms for FinCopinghh and LaborCopinghh equations
(referred below as equations 2 and 3). bs, gs, and ds are parameters that are to be
estimated. The empirical framework employed for this analysis allows for
contemporaneous correlation across equations, although we suspect that equations (2)
and (3) may not have strong correlations relative to equations (1) and (2) or (1) and (3).
These two categories of coping strategies do not contemporaneously covary.12 Moreover,
estimating equations 1-3 jointly versus separately (that is, equations 1 and 2, and
equations 1 and 3) does not meaningfully alter our results. This validates our assumption
that these coping strategy choices are independently determined (albeit by some
overlapping covariates), thereby justifying our use of the term decision. As the processes

but it is not clear from our analysis if there is a direct channel other than through coping strategy choices.
Because we have already controlled for household assets/wealth and other characteristics, they at least
partly account for house/property damage. That is, the more assets/property a household owns, the higher
the earthquake damage. Our results in the subsequent section are robust to inclusion or exclusion of initial
disaster impact in equation (1). We report results without it based on model fitness comparison.
11
It is assumed (and statistically verified) that ;<<"##%% is correlated with +,-$./012%% and uncorrelated
with !"#$%% . F-test validates the strength of these variables. Also, rank and order conditions are satisfied
for identification.
12
Fisher’s z-transformed correlation parameter value for equations 2 and 3 (inverse hyperbolic tangent of
rho, ρ23) is not statistically significant. We reject the null hypothesis that ρ23=0. Although not reported in
the paper, full-parameter estimates for all models (tables 3-8) can be made available in the online appendix.
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represented in these equations occur concurrently, we simultaneously estimate all three
equations, assuming error terms follow a multivariate normal distribution such that:

∈= [:%% , @%% ] = [:%% , B%% , C%% ]~I(0, Σ) where, Σ

s211
= Ns21
s31

s12
1

s13
s23 R

s32

1

(4)

Results
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of variables employed for econometric analysis in
this section. We define economic resilience as a composite score based on four indicators
of economic recovery: income recovery, asset recovery, rebuilt houses, and regained preearthquake consumption levels. Psychosocial resilience variable is constructed similarly
using four indicators: recovery from emotional distress, recovery from EQ-induced
domestic violence/aggressive tendencies, re-able to socialize, able to reengage in
community. Both economic and psychosocial resilience variables have values that range
from 1-20.13
[Insert Table 2]
Economic Resilience
Table 3 provides simultaneous equation model estimates of the impact of household
coping mechanisms on economic resilience. To confirm that robustness of our estimates,
we employ five different model specifications. Model 1 includes results for financial
coping methods, while also controlling for household characteristics. Results indicate that
adoption of financial coping mechanisms results to an increase in economic resilience of

13

Alternate measures of aggregating ER and PR are employed for robustness purposes (not reported in the
paper). Results remain consistent.
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households by 4.74 points. In model 2, when labor adjustment coping is added to the
baseline model, we find that the impact of financial coping strategy remains consistent.
Labor adjustment coping mechanism also has a significant and positive impact on
economic resilience, albeit the impact is lower than that of financial method.14 Model 3
further includes government assistance. We find that it has negative impact of economic
resilience. This result remains consistent when more controls are added in the subsequent
model specifications. Model 4 also considers non-governmental organization (NGO)
assistance. We find that NGOs have no significant role in enhancing economic resilience.
This can be because of a host of reasons. There is a systemic lack of oversight on NGO
operations and regulations on NGO programs are virtually non-existent. Moreover, local
NGOs have minimal resources and their scopes are limited to a narrow subgroup. Model
5 further includes remittance as an additional control. We find that it has positive (and
significant) impact on economic resilience. Inclusion of remittance does not affect the
consistency of our results. Throughout all specifications (Models 1-5), results remain
consistent. We can safely ascertain that strengthening financial access and availability of
labor market opportunities can enrich economic lives of households in the face of
covariate shocks such as earthquakes. The role of government, although crucial in most
cases, is highly sensitive to the quality of political institutions and norms. Centralized
rehabilitation policies with inadequate considerations of local dynamics can engender

14

For robustness purposes, an additional interaction variable for both coping strategy types
(FinCoping*LaborAdjustment) is included. Results remain consistent. Magnitude for financial coping
variable changes slightly, but the narrative still holds. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative
(and significant at the 0.1 level) suggesting that there may be a cost to adopting diverse types of strategies.
We do not delve into this further.
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false hopes among households that can wrongly incentivize vulnerable households and
preclude them from adopting other self-reliant measures.
[Insert Table 3]
In Table 4, we look at each financial coping strategy to evaluate their relative impacts on
economic resilience. Model 1 presents results for any total financial coping strategies
adopted, whereas models 2-4 reports results for sale of assets, borrowing, and use of
savings respectively. We find that all three financial coping strategies (sale of assets,
borrowing, and use of savings) have comparable impacts on the economic recovery of
households. The fact that the joint impact of all three strategies is significantly higher
than that of each strategy indicates the cumulative contribution of such strategies is
positive. That is, if households are able to adopt a variety of financial coping strategies,
that seems to positively impact economic resilience. Table 5 reports findings on labor
adjustment coping strategies. Unlike financial coping strategies that have consistent (and
positive) effects on economic resilience, labor adjustment impacts vary by types.
Households that send more members to labor force for additional income seem to have
higher levels of economic resilience. On the other hand, advance labor (working in
advance with an assurance of a later cash or in-kind payment) has negative impacts on
economic resilience. To explain this, one needs to first understand the in-kind laborexchange system prevalent in rural Nepal. Because modern property rights and market
mechanisms are not well established in agrarian communities, khetala-pratha, a form of
traditional labor-exchange system is in place. In such system, a household will send one
or more members to work for their neighbors in farming and agriculture, who will later
also work for them in return. This in-kind labor exchange system is facilitated by social
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norms of reciprocity and mutual assistance, which in times of disasters dictate that a lessaffected (but affected nonetheless) household would have to assist those who are moreaffected. This can have detrimental short-term impacts on their own economic recovery.
On the other hand, promises of later payment is not credible when almost everyone
involved in contracts have been severely affected by the earthquake. Therefore, by
participating in advance labor, a household may be making a bad investment of human
capital (or ‘wasting’ so to speak). We do not observe significant impacts of out-migration
for work on economic resilience. First, out-migration takes financial resources, which
takes away resources that could be directly used for economic recovery. Secondly, it can
take a year or two to start saving enough to contribute towards economic recovery. Outmigration is often a long-term labor adjustment strategy, the effects of which may take
several years to manifest.
[Insert Table 4]
[Insert Table 5]
Psychosocial Resilience
Estimates of the impact of various household coping mechanisms on psychosocial
resilience are reported in Table 6. Following similar strategy, we employ multiple model
specifications to test the sensitivity of financial and labor adjustment coping strategies.
Model 1 only includes financial coping strategy as an explanatory variable, while also
controlling for various household characteristics. In addition to enhancing economic
resilience (as discussed earlier), we find that financial coping also enriches psychosocial
lives of households. Results from Model 1 indicate that adoption of financial coping
measures leads to an increase in psychosocial resilience by 3.1 points. In model 2, labor
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adjustment coping is added to the baseline model. We find that the impact of financial
coping remains stable, and that of labor adjustment is negative and significant. Since
psychosocial resilience reflects the emotional and social aspect of wellbeing, this
negative impact is not unexpected. Having to adjust family’s labor market involvement
constraints social involvement. As more household members join the labor force for more
time, social lives are detrimentally impacted. Within the household, this can disturb the
pre-disaster level harmony and can cause emotional distress. Note that when we
gradually add other variables in models 3 to 5, this result remains consistent. In Model 3,
we add government assistance to the model specification in column 3. We find that
government assistance has no significant impact on psychosocial lives of rural
households. Model 4 further considers NGO assistance. Similar to government, NGOs
also do not have any significant impact. Furthermore, remittance, while helpful from
economic point of view, does not contribute to psychosocial wellbeing in households
struggling with post-disaster challenges (Model 5).
[Insert Table 6]
Table 7 breaks down results by different types of financial coping strategies. Results are
consistent across all three financial strategies, namely sale of assets, borrowing, and use
of savings. Comparison of these three strategies show that households that (are able to)
use savings to cope with post-disaster challenges have the highest psychosocial recovery
levels, whereas those that (have to) borrow money have the lowest (but positive)
psychosocial recovery levels. In table 8, we present results by different labor adjustment
strategies. Findings show that sending more family members to labor force negatively
impacts psychosocial recovery. This is consistent with our findings reported in table 6.
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On the other hand, we do not find statistically significant relations between the other
types of labor adjustment strategies and psychosocial resilience.
[Insert Table 7]
[Insert Table 8]

Discussion of Results
This is among the first microeconomic studies that use the resilience framework to
understand post-disaster recovery processes in Nepal. The analyses presented in this
study reveals disconcerting realities about the role of government’s post-disaster policies
in Nepal. The government accumulated billions of dollars in assistance from international
donors for post-disaster reconstruction, recovery, and rehabilitation efforts (Bhujel,
2017). However, our observation in the field and findings from data analysis shows that
post-disaster public policies and aid dissemination have only served to decelerate
economic recovery of households. Descriptive results in Table 4 shows that disaster aid
dissemination has been haphazard with no accounting of earthquake damages and
household needs. Government’s approach has been towards centralizing all efforts, as
reflected in the mandate to “channel [all] external assistance through the Prime Minister’s
Relief Fund” (Nelson, 2015). When we consider the fact that Nepal consistently ranks
among the most corrupt countries in Asia, the creation of a centralized
National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) to control all aspects of post-disaster policies
with the purported intent of “streamlining national and international non-governmental
organizations regulation by placing it under a single framework” can hardly be evaluated
optimistically (Pradhan, 2018).
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Our findings highlight the importance of financial access in enhancing post-disaster
resilience. If households are able to borrow money from formal and informal sources
and/or sell their liquid assets, they are not constrained into adopting ‘bad’ coping
alternatives such as reducing consumption or sale of productive assets. That is not to say
that all forms of financial institutions are uniformly beneficial. Post-disaster policies
should remain vigilant against predatory financial institutions that can push agrarian
households to adopt measures that can further exacerbate disaster impacts. Moreover,
labor market alternatives open up new possibilities of exchanging their knowledge and
skills for resources needed for economic recovery. However, our findings indicate that
labor adjust involves a critical trade-off between economic and psychosocial wellbeing.
When additional household members participate in the labor force or current members in
the labor force work longer hours, family and social dynamics are affected. This can
happen because of two possible reasons. First, the traditional norms built on caste-based
hierarchy stigmatizes Brahmin or Chettri households from taking jobs that are
traditionally perceived as belonging to Dalits. Second, these communities are governed
by Hindu-patriarchal norms where adult males are breadwinners. Anecdotal stories about
household members out-migrating to many Gulf countries to take these inferior jobs and
adult females entering labor force are abundant. This can have serious negative
consequences on their psychosocial recovery. Whether or not this trade-off is worthwhile
can only be determined by the specific household. Any post-disaster public policy that
attempts to influence those decisions suffers from “the knowledge problem” (Sobel and
Leeson, 2007). The more complex the challenge, the more difficult the tasks of prediction
and top-down control become. As a consequence, the very solution to one problem ends
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up increasing vulnerability in other aspects (Holling, 1996).
In the face of massive public institutional failure to address post-disaster challenges, the
sustenance and recovery of Nepalese households rest primarily on their own choice of
coping strategies – especially so in rural districts that are largely invisible to international
donors, government agencies, and journalists. In that regard, understanding households’
choice of coping strategies at both at both individual and collective levels is crucial in
that it provides us a window into their recovery processes. Our findings serve an
important purpose of informing what ex-post coping strategies households adopted, what
worked, and what did not work. By considering both economic and psychosocial lives of
households in assessing resilience, we are able to demonstrate that strategies that are
deemed effective in enhancing one aspect of wellbeing do not necessarily translate into
other dimensions. These inherent trade-offs are highly idiosyncratic and correspond to
each household’s unique circumstances. Therefore, our findings should not be interpreted
to conclude that a specific coping strategy or a set of strategies is/are the panacea(s). In
fact, our recommendation is precisely the opposite. The purpose of identifying coping
strategies and their relative efficacies in enhancing post-disaster resilience is to present a
case for expanding market and nonmarket choices that are available to households. Any
policies directed towards that goal need to emphasize on a) establishing and
strengthening institutions that facilitate market exchanges, and b) cultivating political
culture that fosters the coexistence of a multitude of formal and informal institutions and
agencies – private, public, or quasi-public – that compete and/or cooperate for the
production and provision of various goods and services.

31

Conclusion
From a purely academic point of view, natural disasters provide exogeneous sources of
variation that naturally interests all social scientists. When existing infrastructures and
institutions collapse, there are economic, social, and political ramifications that not only
permeate through all sectors of human society but also penetrate into cultural and
psychological dimensions. We are then forced to rethink our intellectual frameworks,
dissolve our disciplinary walls, and reengage in ways that transcend narrow disciplinary
theorizing so as to understand and overcome existential threats. The adoption of
resilience thinking from ecology into disaster studies stems from an explicit or implicit
acknowledgement of such interactive and dynamic nature of social, political, and
economic institutions and the natural world under which humans make decisions (Smith
et al., 2017). In that regard, one distinctive feature of resilience thinking is that it cannot
be confined within disciplinary constraints. By shifting focus away from one
maximization problem-one equilibrium approach to a framework that accommodates
multiple agents, multiple institutions, multiple problems, multiple approaches, and
multiple solutions, resilience thinking can open up new avenues of intellectual discourse
and policymaking.

Resilience thinking of disaster policies has two implications. First, instead of the thin
model of rationality frequently often employed to characterize individuals, it [resilience
thinking] compels us to elevate them to “fallible but capable” adaptive beings incessantly
engaging in continuous learning and error-correcting processes (Aligica and Boettke,
2011) and continually adapting to changing circumstances and new risks (Mechler,
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2016). This dignified treatment of individuals calls for a participatory approach to postdisaster policy formulation and implementation with inbuilt provisions of revisions and
reformulations to fit changing needs (Mustafa, 2003). Second, in the face of
interconnected problems and multiple potential outcomes, solutions must be flexible and
adjustable to account for their unintended externality effects (Smith et al., 2017).
Gunderson and Holling (2002) emphasize “adaptive management” for the governance of
a socioecological system. Such governance requires a political culture that fosters coexistence and collaboration across multiple agents and organizations representing private,
public, and quasi-public sectors. Just like a thriving ecological system that emerges from
numerous interactions across multiple species competing and cooperating to adapt to the
external environment, a human society based on adaptive management is necessarily
polycentric, with multiple loci of power at differing scales (Ostrom, 1998).

This polycentric approach to public policy is especially relevant in the context of postearthquake Nepal characterized by ethnic/caste-based, religious, economic, cultural, and
political cleavages (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018a). Moreover, even the same covariate
shock affects each household differently and poses unique challenges to each household
(Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018b). If we consider our findings that a) the same coping
strategy that has positive impact on one outcome (economic resilience) can have adverse
effects on the other outcome (psychosocial resilience), and b) haphazard government
policies can hurt, then we are led to conclude that lump-sum policies funneled through
one bureaucratic channel can hinder overall post-disaster recovery. That can be
devastating to the poor who are particularly susceptible to natural disasters (World Bank
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and United Nations, 2010) and face disproportionate disaster damages (Sakai et al.,
2017). Even though there is an overwhelming consensus that better post-disaster policies
can significantly improve people’s welfare (Skoufias, 2003), what constitutes a ‘better’
policy in countries that are mired in institutionalized corruption and inefficiencies is not
clear. The direction that this paper recommends is not one that involves further
consolidation of the already ineffective monolithic National Reconstruction Authority
(NRA) but one that fosters cooperation and/or competition among multiple autonomous
agencies across private, public, or quasi-public domains with varying, even overlapping
jurisdictions. Within such polycentric arrangements, policy makers and stakeholders can
experiment with diverse approaches within their independent jurisdictions. When one
small system fails, another can still operate; and when all small systems fail, larger
systems can be called upon (Elinor Ostrom 2003, interviewed by Aligica). Only such
people-oriented recalibration of post-disaster policies is consistent with the disaster
resilience framework, and can foster adaptive mechanisms that are immune to sudden
changes in local conditions.
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Table 1: Households by ex-post coping strategies adopted
(N=510)
Coping Strategies adopted
Percentage of
households
Financial Coping Strategies
Sale of assets
Use of savings
Borrowing
Any

14.31
34.71
56.86
70.58

Labor Adjustment Strategies
Advance Labor
More members in Labor force
Household member migrated for work
Any

13.53
6.86
10.39
23.73

Private Transfers
Family/neighbor/patron help
Remittance help

42.75
7.84

Public (and quasi-public) Transfers
Government help
NGO help
Any

85.88
67.65
91.37

Household adopted ANY coping strategy (incl. help)

99.61
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
VARIABLES
Dependent Variables
Economic Resilience
(ER)
Components of ER*

Psychosocial Resilience
(PR)
Components of PR*

Explanatory variables
Ex-post Coping
Mechanisms
Financial Coping (total)
Sale of assets
Use of savings
Borrowing
Labor Adjustment
Private Transfers

Description

Mean

S.D.

Composite Index representing ability to bounce back to
the original level of economic wellbeing [range 4 to 20]
Regained pre-disaster level income? [1-5]
Recovered lost assets or equivalent? [1-5]
Rebuilt house? [1-5]
Regained pre-EQ level food consumption level? [1-5]
Composite Index representing ability to bounce back to
the original level of psychosocial wellbeing [range 4 to
20]
Recovered from emotional distress? [1-5]
Recovered from domestic violence/aggressive
tendencies? [1-5]
Re-able to socialize with family, friends, neighbors? [15]
Re-able to engage in community? [1-5]

13.05

(2.384)

3.771
2.039
3.186
4.059
14.81

(0.995)
(1.037)
(1.383)
(0.837)
(2.438)

3.143
3.699

(1.283)
(0.993)

4.259

(0.695)

3.709

(1.057)

Total number of financial coping strategies adopted (0, 1,
2, 3)
Sale of productive and non-productive assets
Use of pre-disaster Savings
Borrowing from institutional and personal sources

1.058

(0.857)

0.143
0.347
0.569

(0.351)
(0.477)
(0.496)

More household members in the labor force; Advance
labor
Receive help from friends/relatives/neighbors;
Remittance help
Receive help from government, NGOs

0.151

(0.358)

0.490

(0.500)

0.925

(0.263)

0.808
0.788
0.114

(0.394)
(0.409)
(0.318)

0.493

(0.500)

5.606
47.95
0.555
1.580

(2.265)
(14.13)
(0.497)
(0.592)

0.839
0.714
0.420
0.688

(0.368)
(0.452)
(0.494)
(0.464)

2.862

(1.435)

Binary Variables unless indicated otherwise

External help (Govt,
NGOs)
Disaster Damages
House Damage
Equals 1 if household experienced major house damage
Property Damage
Equals 1 if hh experienced major property damage
Health Damage
Equals 1 if hh experienced major health injury/death
Social Participation
Microfinance
Participation in microfinance group (1 if yes)
Household Characteristics
Household size
Number of members in the household
Age of household head
Age of the household head
Female
Gender=1 if female
HH Head Education
Education Level of household head
None =1; Primary=2; Secondary and Higher=3
Marital Status-married
Equals 1 if married
Religion-Hindu
Equals 1 if Hindu
Caste-Brahmin/Chhetri Equals 1 if Brahmin or Chhetri
Occupation-Agriculture Equals 1 if the household head’s occupation is
agriculture
Asset
Asset index based on household assets owned (PCA
generated)
Observations

510
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Table 3: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Economic Resilience
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Financial Coping Strategies

4.743***
(1.219)

4.351***
(0.690)

4.253***
(0.762)

4.246*** 4.315***
(0.766)
(0.774)

2.079***
(0.688)

2.172***
(0.637)
-0.557***
(0.207)

2.220***
(0.618)
-0.496**
(0.195)
-0.198
(0.160)

8.783***
(1.390)
Yes
508

9.157***
(1.447)
Yes
508

Labor Adjustment Coping
Strategies
Government help
NGO help
Remittance
Constant
Controls
Observations

9.005***
(1.548)
Yes
508

Model 5

1.861**
(0.767)
-0.496**
(0.195)
-0.199
(0.156)
0.582**
(0.280)
9.187*** 9.253***
(1.456)
(1.507)
Yes
Yes
508
508

Controls included in the model are: age of household head, education level of household head,
Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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Table 4: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Economic Resilience by different
financial coping strategies
VARIABLES
Financial Coping Strategies (total)

Model 1
ER

Model 2
ER

Model 3
ER

Model 4
ER

4.031***
(0.766)

Sale of assets

2.946***
(0.488)

Borrowing

2.838***
(0.869)

Use of savings

2.982***
(0.503)
Labor Adjustment Strategies
1.880**
2.677***
2.648***
2.518***
(0.778)
(0.327)
(0.592)
(0.356)
Government help
-0.458**
-0.576**
-0.545***
-0.573***
(0.189)
(0.228)
(0.200)
(0.193)
NGO help
-0.184
-0.176
-0.229
-0.188
(0.166)
(0.140)
(0.158)
(0.146)
Remittance
0.551*
0.501**
0.479
0.401
(0.291)
(0.224)
(0.299)
(0.258)
Constant
9.457***
12.21***
12.00***
11.42***
(1.435)
(0.972)
(0.838)
(0.639)
Observations
508
508
508
508
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model
are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion,
Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Economic Resilience by different
labor adjustment coping strategies
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
VARIABLES
ER
ER
ER
ER
Labor Adjustment Coping Strategies

1.880**
(0.778)

More family members in labor

1.602*
(0.930)

Advance labor
Household member migrated for work
Financial Coping Strategies
Government help
NGO help
Remittance
Constant

-1.824*
(1.100)
0.334
(1.309)
4.031*** 4.494*** 4.152*** 4.329***
(0.766)
(1.261)
(1.372)
(1.199)
-0.458** -0.427** -0.422** -0.449**
(0.189)
(0.187)
(0.202)
(0.197)
-0.184
-0.198
-0.177
-0.178
(0.166)
(0.168)
(0.181)
(0.182)
0.551*
0.552**
0.558*
0.593**
(0.291)
(0.263)
(0.291)
(0.285)
9.457*** 9.333*** 10.56*** 9.721***
(1.435)
(1.562)
(1.946)
(1.718)

Observations
508
508
508
508
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model
are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion,
Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Psychosocial Resilience
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Financial Coping Strategies

3.080***
(0.746)

3.077***
(0.665)
2.568***
(0.959)

3.053***
(0.674)

11.99***
(1.239)
Yes
508

12.05***
(1.228)
Yes
508

Labor Adjustment Coping Strategies
Government help

-2.541**
(1.002)
-0.0866
(0.356)

NGO help

Model 4
3.020**
*
(0.667)
2.600**
(1.030)
-0.217
(0.291)
0.420
(0.310)

Remittance

Constant
Controls
Observations

11.31***
(1.106)
Yes
508

12.02**
*
(1.259)
Yes
508

Model 5

2.998***
(0.668)
-2.555**
(1.039)
-0.223
(0.292)
0.416
(0.303)
0.289
(0.287)
12.04***
(1.260)
Yes
508

Controls included in the model are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital
Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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Table 7: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Psychosocial Resilience by
different financial coping strategies
VARIABLES
Financial Coping Strategies

Model 1
PR

Model 2
PR

Model 3
PR

3.763***
(0.631)

Sale of assets

3.835***
(0.337)

Borrowing

2.947***
(0.345)

Use of savings
Labor Adjustment Strategies
Government help
NGO help
Remittance
Constant

Model 4
PR

-2.558***
(0.945)
-0.116
(0.301)
0.436
(0.304)
0.223
(0.291)
11.33***
(1.302)

-3.968***
(0.761)
-0.163
(0.271)
0.503*
(0.285)
0.245
(0.281)
14.25***
(1.319)

-2.948***
(0.911)
-0.164
(0.314)
0.466
(0.323)
0.295
(0.281)
13.90***
(1.184)

4.166***
(0.459)
0.264
(6.218)
-0.243
(0.321)
0.421
(0.261)
0.204
(0.224)
11.99***
(2.253)

Observations
508
508
508
508
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model
are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion,
Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Psychosocial Resilience by
labor adjustment strategies
VARIABLES
Labor Adjustment Strategies

Model 1
PR

Model 2
PR

Model 3
PR

-2.558***
(0.945)

More family members in labor

-2.351*
(1.245)

Advance labor

-2.550
(1.744)

Household members moved away
Financial Coping Strategies
Government help
NGO help
Remittance
Constant

Model 4
PR

3.763***
(0.631)
-0.116
(0.301)
0.436
(0.304)
0.223
(0.291)
11.33***
(1.302)

3.876***
(0.530)
-0.125
(0.278)
0.406
(0.285)
0.127
(0.237)
10.90***
(1.402)

3.374***
(0.735)
-0.0847
(0.311)
0.394
(0.288)
0.130
(0.242)
11.99***
(1.825)

1.628
(2.546)
3.687***
(0.645)
-0.110
(0.310)
0.414
(0.287)
0.201
(0.321)
10.83***
(1.630)

Observations
508
508
508
508
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model
are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion,
Occupation of household head, household assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Kaplan Meier Survival Analysis Graphs

Figure 1: Kaplan Meier Survival Analysis for Income and Asset Recovery
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Figure 2: Kaplan Meier Survival Analysis for Recovery from Injuries
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Figure 3: Income and Asset Recovery by Financial Coping Strategy Adoption
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Figure 4: Income and Asset Recovery by Labor Adjustment Coping Strategy Adoption
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Figure 5: Income and Asset Recovery by Government Assistance
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CHAPTER 3
Social Capital, Trust, and Collective Action in Post-earthquake Nepal
Until a theoretical explanation – based on human choice – for self-organized and selfgoverned enterprises is fully developed and accepted, major policy decisions will
continue to be undertaken with a presumption that individuals cannot organize
themselves and always need to be organized by external authorities.

Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990)

Introduction
The issue of post-disaster recovery is a complex one, requiring concerted efforts from
public institutions, private firms, and, most importantly, from citizens. The recovery rests
on the synchronicity of multiple factors: timely return of residents to the devastated
community, coordination of public and private institutions in recovery efforts, readiness
of the private enterprise to reopen businesses and organizations, and so on, all of which
are directly or indirectly determined by the community’s social capital endowment. In
that sense, both household and community recovery can be characterized as collective
action problems (CAPs) that require multi-level collaboration. However, in communities
characterized by low levels of social capital, such collaboration can prove to be an
elusive quest. Extant scholarship on disaster resilience has established social capital as a
potential driver of post-disaster resilience (Aldrich, 2012a; Buckland and Rahman, 1999;
Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; N. M. Storr et al., 2015). In fact, Aldrich (2012b) argues that
social capital serves as a core determinant of post-disaster recovery— more so than a
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multitude of commonly referenced socioeconomic factors, magnitudes of disaster
damage, population density, and external assistance. This is especially true in many
developing economies mired in rampant poverty and institutionalized corruption, where
public institutions hurt rather than help the recovery process by crowding out internal
resources and external assistance. In such cases, social capital plays an even more central
role in post-disaster relief, rehabilitation, and recovery processes (Chamlee-Wright and
Storr, 2010; Wetterberg, 2004). However, if the overarching goal is to develop a
thorough understanding of the workings of social capital, we ought to move away from
its black-box characterization and further scrutinize the causal chain that connects it to
post-disaster resilience.

Since extant scholarship establishes that (a) post-disaster recovery can be characterized as
a collective action problem, and that (b) social capital is a core determinant of postdisaster recovery, from (a) and (b), it follows that social capital can contribute to postdisaster recovery by overcoming collective action problems. While it is intuitive that
working as a collective unit rather than as atomized individuals makes recovery efforts
exponentially more impactful, rigorous empirical demonstration of this causal channel is
scarce. In an effort to illustrate this causal link, Aldrich, (2012a) postulates three channels
by which social capital can foster collective action: establishing new norms about
compliance and participation; providing information; and enhancing trust. In a different
but related work, Aldrich (2012b) argues that neighbors with high levels of trust are able
to share information about bureaucratic procedures and upcoming deadlines as well as
deter post-disaster crimes. On the other hand, higher levels of general trust also increases
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chances of organization and resource-pooling (Olshansky et a., 2006), which can improve
access to loans, supplies, and other resources (Dow, 1999). Isolating each of these causal
channels is an empirical nightmare. Clean laboratory experiments can resolve many
identification issues, but the transferability of laboratory findings to real world postdisaster scenarios is easily controvertible. All these challenges are further exacerbated by
concerns surrounding the allegedly abstract nature of the notion of social capital. As a
result, this potentially important causal link has only received a cursory attention in the
current disaster studies scholarship.

In this paper, we leave aside inquiries into the broader social capital-recovery link.
Instead, taking Aldrich's (2012b) hypothesis as an axiomatic premise, we focus on
illustrating one of the causal mechanisms by which this link is materialized in a postdisaster setting. We employ Ostrom & Ahn's (2008) social capital-collective action
framework, – in which trust is presented as “the core link” that connects social capital to
collective action – as a theoretical motivation and proceed to empirically illustrate this
mediatory role. For the empirical demonstration, we employ primary household data that
we gathered from Sindhupalchowk, Nepal following the devastating 7.8 magnitude
earthquake in 2015. Because this study concerns itself with individual-level motivators of
collective action, we envision social capital as endowment that is not confined to mesoor macro- levels of analysis, but rather defined by an individual’s access and participation
in different types of voluntary associations and social networks. We employ a series of
econometric techniques, including structural equation models and mediation analysis, and
demonstrate that [bonding] social capital, mediated by mutual trust, can create an
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environment where individuals can voluntarily engage in collective action efforts to
overcome post-disaster challenges. In doing so, we provide evidence against Mancur
Olson’s pessimistic portrayal of atomistic individuals, who, in following their individual
self-interest, fail to achieve their common or group interest and thereby get perpetually
entrapped in a post-disaster dilapidation (Olson, 1965). The purpose of our empirical
demonstration is to present social capital as an adhesive that individuals can, under
certain institutional contexts, employ to build mutual trust among one another, which in
turn can be mobilized through collective action to elevate themselves from their
otherwise “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” lives (Hobbes, 1651).

Previous Research
How can atomized, self-interested, and rational beings, who are primarily motivated by
their own immediate payoffs, rise above their parochial individual interests and
collaborate for joint benefits if each has ample opportunities to free-ride on the efforts of
others? The first generation collective action theorists suggest that they cannot – that is,
unless we employ an external, often coercive external authority to change the underlying
incentive structures or privatize the whole enterprise (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965).
Influential works of second generation collective action theorists, including prominent
scholars like Elinor Ostrom, have definitively refuted the first generation conclusions. If
the underlying institutional rules are incentive compatible and a broad set of ‘design
principles’ are rigorously applied, individuals can and do successfully coordinate
(Ostrom, [1990] 2015 ). Through a series of extensive case studies and systematic metastudies, Ostrom debunks the naïve either-market-or-state dichotomy, and makes a
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convincing case for self-governance (Aligica, 2016). But, as a meticulous empiricist
whose works are reflections of her “learning from the people” principle, she is careful to
specify the type of “organism” that she is studying, namely the common-pool resource
(CPR), and even warns against “policies based on metaphors” (Ostrom, [1990] 2015, p.
23-26). In that sense, extending Ostrom’s ‘design principles’ to a natural disaster setting
constitutes a violation of the very foundations that her principles are based on.
Nonetheless, her conclusions concerning individuals’ ability to consolidate their
collective efforts and resolve many common challenges are not unique to CPRs, and are
pervasive in diverse settings including in post-disaster scenarios.

Recent decades have seen a surge of literature on collective action and public goods
provision, particularly coming from laboratory-based applications of game theory
(Chaudhuri, 2011; Poteete et al., 2010). These experimental games have largely
debunked the textbook model of self-utility maximizing Homo economicus wo/man that
occupied the core of standard economic theories. Contrary to the blackboard economic
theories, individuals willingly offer money to strangers even when presented with
hoarding opportunities (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Oosterbeek et al., 2004); they
sacrifice strict economic payoffs over values such as fairness (Hoffman et al., 2007),
cultural norms (Henrich, 2004), and cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Henrich,
2004). However, when studying the role of social capital, of interconnectivity between
individuals, experimental studies that typically presuppose conditions of anonymity and
randomness hit the wall. Gurven and Winking (2008), in a study concerning prosocialness, show that human behavior within a game of experimental studies bears little
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or no resemblance to the “context-rich environment” of the real world where people
make decisions. Post-disaster scenario is one such “context-rich environment,” whose
conditions are near-impossible to replicate in a laboratory setting. Moreover, when the
study pertains to both prosocial behavior and a post-disaster context, the transferability of
such laboratory findings to the real world requires a major leap of faith, which we do not
dare take.

Reports on post-disaster collective action for evacuation, provision of public goods,
restoration of public utilities, and increasing access to resources are ubiquitous. Aldrich
(2012a) lists a series of cases from across the globe where communities have engaged in
collective action following major disasters: locals in some neighborhoods organized to
plan cooperative, fireproof housing following the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan
(Olshansky et al., 2005); residents organized watch communities to prevent theft after the
2010 Haiti earthquakes (Burnett, 2010); In Manitoba, Canada, many coordinated
communities engaged in evacuation activities following the Red River Flood (Buckland
and Rahman, 1999); In Mexico, los damnificados (victims) formed collective union to
pressure the government to provide housing (Ovalle, 2010); in New Orleans, following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, some residents mobilized the local church to provide club
goods to encourage others to return to their communities (Chamlee-Wright and Storr,
2009). In light of these cases, one may incontrovertibly say that individuals often engage
in many post-disaster collective activities defying all Homo economicus orthodoxies: they
often forgo direct economic benefits, engage in charitable efforts that do not directly
benefit themselves, and choose not to free-ride even when presented with ample
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opportunities to do so. Although appealing to an altruistic model of human behavior is
one way we could rationalize these phenomena, doing so puts us in a blind-spot since we
do see a rise in illegal and disruptive activities in many instances (Lee and Bartkowski,
2004). Social capital, on the other, allows us to explain such prosocial behaviors during
post-disaster contexts without appealing to a stringent model of human behavior.

Field survey studies on the socioeconomics of natural disasters are abundant (e.g. Alam
& Rahman, 2014; De Mel et al., 2012). A similarly large body of literature exists on
social capital (Dasgupta, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Thöni et al., 2012). However, studies
connecting these two strands of literature, on both theoretical and quantitative-empirical
levels, was mostly absent until recently (Aldrich, 2010, 2011, 2012a; Aldrich and Meyer,
2015). Scholars across disciplines have issued and repeated calls for detailed
investigations into “quantitative assessments of social capital as applied to
disasters”(Aldrich, 2012a; Chandra et al., 2010; Koh and Cadigan, 2008). In a way, this
paper is a response to those calls. However, rather than simply providing additional proof
of social capital’s role in a post-disaster scenario, we attempt to fill in the gap in literature
by answering the “how” question: that is, we provide an answer to the question “how
does social capital enhance post-disaster resilience?”. Expanding on Ostrom & Ahn's
(2008) hypothesis, we present trust as the connector that establishes the causal link
between social capital and post-disaster collective action. In other words, we demonstrate
that social capital increases trust among individuals, which, in times of crises such as
natural disasters, can foster collective action activities. To do so, we take a quantitative
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approach with hopes of providing a more generalizable narrative to the otherwise rich but
mostly qualitative literature connecting social capital and post-disaster resilience.

Analytical Framework
Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s approach can be described as one that aims “not so much at
grand theory building but rather at specific problems of collective action, governance,
and social dilemmas” (Aligica and Boettke, 2011). In that sense, all theories of collective
action are context specific, and that a fuller understanding of collective action requires
investigating into the broader institutional framework under which the theory itself is
realized. Figure 1 provides an analytical framework that paves way for rest of the paper.
The arrows that connect variables inside the box relate to pay-off functions in a
cooperative game-theoretic framework15, whereas institutional rules are the ‘invisible
forces’ that shape these pay-off structures in the first place. Different structural and
contextual variables can also influence each of these pieces in many ways, which are
represented by variables outside the box.
[Insert Figure 1]

This analytical framework is based on institutional rules that allow for reciprocal norms
to exist and operate in the realm of collective action. We postulate that, in communities
governed by norms of reciprocity, social capital builds trust among members, which in
turn increases the likelihood of participation in collective action. That is, the

15

Theoretical framework for collective action based on reciprocal norms is consigned to online appendix-

1.
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interconnectivity between members in a community creates conditions such that mutual
trust can be built and strengthened based on a common understanding of what constitutes
socially laudable and/or reprehensive behaviors. It is through the incorporation of these
norms into each individual’s pay-off function that the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game of public-good provision is transformed into a game of assurance such that the
possibility of a successful collective action emerges (see Fig. 2). It should be borne in
mind, however, that under an alternate set of institutions characterized by restrictions on
voluntary collective action and other congregations, these relationships may manifest
differently. Our attempt here is not to theorize but to ground empirical analyses in
institutional and contextual realities of post-earthquake rural Nepal.
[Insert Figure 2]

Data and Measures
Data Collection
The dataset employed for this study was collected by the lead author with support from
the [institution name omitted for peer review purposes] and [institution name omitted].16
The field survey took place in May-July 2017 in Sindhupalchowk, Nepal with the
primary objectives of assessing household level impacts of the 2015 earthquakes and
evaluating household responses to the quakes. The fact that Sindhupalchowk was the
worst affected district with around 3440 casualties motivated our location choice for the
study. The study period was carefully determined to allow for enough variation in

16

The data collection was part of a research project titled “Determinants of household resilience against
natural disaster shocks: pre-post and ex-post analyses of the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal.” The project aimed
at assessing the immediate household impacts of the 2015 Nepal earthquakes and investigating households’
coping responses.
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household and community level coping responses as well as recovery processes. During
the time of the field survey, most village towns and public infrastructures decimated by
the earthquake had not been rebuilt, particularly in remote areas that were only accessible
by feet. Wards 8 and 9, which represent the remotest villages included in our analysis,
were accessibly only after three to four hours of uphill hike from the closest bazaar with
paved road. The lead author and enumerators spent two months in the earthquake
devastated villages collecting quantitative data, listening to verbal testimonies, and
reaching out to public authorities and village chiefs. The data collection was done using
face-to-face interviews with representatives from households selected using stratified
random sampling procedure. In each village (denoted in the dataset as wards), the sample
size was proportional to the overall population size. The effective response rate was over
97%.

A brief overview of the study area (Summary Statistics)
We interviewed over 500 households in Basbari, Sindhupalchowk. At the time of the
field study, Basbari had just been merged into the greater Melamchi municipality under
the jurisdiction of the municipal government after having recently restructured as a
separate Basbari Village Development Committee (VDC, i.e. a cluster of multiple village
units under the administrative jurisdiction of a VDC chief/chairperson). There was a
significant confusion among people (and surprisingly among local administrative
officials) regarding the final administrative boundaries, as there were rumors about
further restructuring. To avoid ambiguity, we retained the original (2011) administrative
boundaries. Henceforth, wards will refer to the pre-2011 administrative boundaries.
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Basbari comprises of nine wards, which represent the lowest level of administrative units
in Nepal. Our respondents belong to diverse socioeconomic, ethnic and cultural
backgrounds, with their shared earthquake experiences being the unifying characteristic.
55% of the respondents are female with an average age of 39 years; 83% are married;
34% live in non-nuclear family settings; 41% of our respondents have not receive any
formal schooling, and 23% have only attained primary school (grades 1-5) level
education. The majority of households (68%) engage in agriculture as their primary
occupation. Over 12% of Basbari residents belong to Dalit (lowest in the caste hierarchy)
40% belong to one of the Janajati (marginalized indigenous) groups. 71% are Hindus,
and 27% are Buddhists (see Table 1). To put in perspective, our study area comprises of
heterogeneous communities characterized by religious and ethnic (caste-based) cleavages
in a rural setting in a developing country.
As a result of the 2015 earthquakes, roughly 12% of Basbari residents suffered from
severe bodily harm (injury, death), whereas over 80% lost their homes and another 8.6%
experienced some damages (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018). By the time of the field
study, over 93% still suffered from emotional distress from the earthquake (ibid.). In a
post-disaster context characterized by loss and distress, households still manage to
participate overwhelmingly in collective action efforts. Figure 3 shows that 51.57% of
Basbari residents actively engaged in post-disaster collective action efforts, with an
astounding 24.02% reporting very high degrees of participation. This leads us to inquire
into the underlying factors that motivate such high rates of collective action efforts.
[Insert Figure 3]

58

Variables for Empirical Estimation
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of households.
a. Post-earthquake Collective Action
Each household representative was asked the following question: Following the
earthquake, how actively did you participate in disaster recovery/reconstruction
projects? To ensure that the respondent understood the question, each enumerator was
trained and instructed to elaborate using tangible examples what such projects included:
examples include rebuilding a local shrine, participating in community programs, and
taking leadership efforts to rebuild schools and roads. Responses were recorded on a
likert-scale ranging from ‘very inactive (1)’ to ‘very active(4).’ The mean score was 2.43
and the standard deviation was 1.173.

b. Trust
A conceptual distinction between trust, trustworthiness, and reciprocity is apparent. We
trust those who we deem to be trustworthy, as simple as that. In other words, trust refers
to one’s perception pertaining to the “reliability of others’ dispositions and motivations”
(Ferguson, 2013). As Ostrom and Ahn (2008) suggest, trustworthiness can be understood
as a component of one’s social capital endowment, whereas trust is a product of that
endowment (p. 27). However, when we attempt to untangle these concepts empirically,
most measures we employ to quantify them end up measuring similar or closely related
concepts. In other words, the quantification of trust, trustworthiness, or reciprocity, at
least in most observational settings, is prone to duplication and measurement errors.
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To account for such operationalization issues and definitional ambiguities concerning
trust, we use measurement model to ‘distill out’ trust. To do so, we employ three separate
measures of trust: a) Trust in people, b) Generalized Trust, and c) Reciprocal ties. Trust
in people (S* ) is a variable that captures one’s ability to trust people in the village. S* can
take three numerical values ranging from 1 (none) to 3 (high). Generalized trust (S3 ) is a
binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the respondent thinks that “Most people can
be trusted” and a value of 0 if s/he thinks that “You can’t be too careful in dealing with
people.” Finally, Reciprocal ties (S8 ) measures one’s perception about the likelihood that
friends and/or relatives will reciprocate financially in times of need. Like S* , S8 can take
three values ranging from 1 (none) to 3 (high). In other words, these three measures of
trust (S* , S3 , S8 ) are used to estimate Trust (T*), which therefore is a latent variable.
c. Social Capital
The task of pinning down the concept of social capital and/or quantifying it with
precision is not an easy one. As many before us have highlighted, social capital, despite
its powerful, intuitive appeal, “can take on many different forms,” and is “fiendishly
difficult to measure” (Dasgupta, 2000; Ostrom, 2000). However, despite these
challenges, as Ostrom (2000) points out, there are “underlying similarities among all of
the diverse forms” in that those who dedicate resources into “constructing patterns of
relationships among humans are building assets whether consciously or unconsciously”
(p. 178). This asset that relates to human connectivity is what social capital aims to
encapsulate. For our empirical estimation, we use participation in community activities
through formally registered membership-based and loosely organized groups. Based on
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several focus group interviews, we revised and expanded our original list to include all
possible voluntary associations and divided them into 11 categories. Principle
Component Analysis is conducted to reduce these potentially multicollinear categories
into two orthogonal components each representing bonding and bridging/linking social
capital17; the former pertains to bond across homogeneous, like-minded individuals
within a community, whereas the latter relates to inter-group or across hierarchy links
respectively ( Storr and Haeffele-Balch, 2012; Woolcock, 2001).

d. Contextual variables and socioeconomic controls
While the temptation to craft a unified theory of human behavior is pervasive across
social sciences, a recognition that individual behavior responds and adapts to contexts in
which interactions take place, and that it [individual behavior] is not simply a function of
individual differences is crucial if we are to make any progress in understanding how
individuals make decisions (Ostrom, 2010; Walker and Ostrom, 2009). The context of
our study is one of an ethnically diverse, rural post-disaster setting in a developing
country. To account for disaster impacts on households, we include two variables: Health
damage and Property damage. Because subjective perceptions of similar future events
influence one’s collective behavior, we also include Next EQ variable. Many other
structural variables are found to affect individual behavior in social dilemmas: size of the
group, heterogeneity of participants, their dependence of the benefits received, among
others (Aligica and Boettke, 2011). Admittedly, a detailed accounting of the institutional
context encompassing cultural and historical considerations under which individuals

17

See Appendix-4.
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make economic and political decisions is beyond the scope of a quantitative, empirical
investigation. So, as Boettke (2018) frames it, for the purpose of analytical tractability,
we simply take many of them as “part of the background conditions” (p. 944).
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that these are crucial considerations, so we try to
empirically account for them by including variables such as Community size, Generations
in Community (i.e. how long the family has lived in the community is a proxy for
historical roots), Caste-Dalit (traditionally marginalized caste treated as ‘untouchables’),
Caste-Janajati (traditionally marginalized, indigenous groups not categorized as
‘untouchables’), and Religion-Hindu in our analyses. Additional controls include gender,
age, marital status, education, and occupation. Further details on how these contextual
and socioeconomic variables are coded, and their means and standard deviation values
are presented in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]

Empirical Estimation and Results
The Empirical Model
We take the analytical framework from the previous section and translate it into a general
mixed (latent and observed) structural equation model (SEM) system. Structural equation
models have been extensively used to formalize complex relationships involving latent
and observed variables in econometrics (see e.g., Di Tommaso et. al., 2007;
Krishnakumar, 2007), and development economics (see e.g., Ballon, 2018; Krishnakumar
and Ballon, 2008), among other fields. The use of SEM serves our purpose in multiple
ways: first, its illustrative simplicity allows us to consider all potential channels of
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influence into a single comprehensive system, second, it allows us to incorporate
measurement model for trust within the same analytical structure, third, it allows us to
evaluate both the mediated effects (through trust) as well as direct effects of social
capital, and finally, it allows us to specify appropriate variance-covariance structure for
the system of equations. While a reduced form equation may be a natural way to
illustrative the causal channel, doing so will mask the underlying channels and
complexities that are central to our narrative. The SEM system employed for our
empirical analysis can be represented by the following multi-equation model:

STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL:
+; = T( + T* S ∗ + T3 0+VWXY + T8 0+VZ[Y\][X^ + T_ +@* + T` 9* + Ta 93 + b*
S ∗ = '( + '* 0+VWXY + '3 0+VZ[Y\][X^ + '8 c* + b3
0+VWXY = d( + d* 9* + d3 93 + d8 98 + d_ 9_ + b8
0+VZ[Y\][X^ = e( + e* 9* + e3 93 + e8 98 + e_ 9_ + b_

Measurement Model for Trust:
S* = f( + f* S ∗ + b` , f* = 1
S3 = j( + j* S ∗ + ba
S8 = q( + q* S ∗ + bf

In the above set up, the relationships between post-disaster collective action (CA), trust
(T*), bonding social capital (0+VWXY ) and bridging/linking social capital (0+VZ[Y\][X^ ) are
represented by the first two equations. Equations 3 and 4 account for the endogenous
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processes that determine households’ social capital endowment. The remaining equations
5-7 represent different measures of trust: Trust in People (S* ), Generalized Trust (S3 ),
and Reciprocal Ties (S8 ). Because all variables of trust (S* , S3 , S8 ) can suffer from
measurement issues, we model them as functions of the actual trust (T*), which, as
discussed in the previous section, is a latent variable. Note further that the coefficient for
actual trust in equation 5 (f* ) is normalized to 1 so that its magnitude is pegged against
S* . We assume block-independence between the two systems, i.e. equations 1-4 and 5-7.
Moreover, we allow for contemporaneous correlation across trust (2), and bonding (3)
and bridging/linking (4) social capital equations to account for potential interdependency
and/or simultaneity. Doing so is vital to our analysis as there could be unobserved
determinants of participation in community groups that could also influence levels of
trust and vice versa. For robustness purposes, we test multiple variance-covariance
structures to see if that impacts our findings in any way; they do not.18 Rank and order
condition are examined to ensure econometric identification.19

Results
Asserting causality using a SEM approach alone can trigger contentious debates
(Mueller, 1999). Nonetheless, it [SEM] is a powerful tool to assess the accuracy of
complicated causal relationships that are a priori identified in the literature (Toma et al.,
2012). In that regard, we employ SEM not to ascertain causality but to test the validity of
the conceptual framework for understanding collective action postulated by Ostrom and

18
19

See Appendix Table A-5
See Appendix-2.
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her co-authors (see Ostrom and Ahn, 2008; Walker and Ostrom, 2009) and further
expanded and/or examined by social scientists in many post disaster scenarios (e.g.
Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2009; Storr and Haeffele-Balch, 2012). For
internal validity purposes, we employ traditional econometric techniques using
instrumental variables that are conventionally employed to make causal claims and
compare them against the SEM models under different variance-covariance structures.
Table 2 provides a comparison of results from OLS, two-stage least squares, and threestage least square methods against those of the SEM approach. Coefficients remain
robust to alternate modeling approaches. The statistical package (STATA) uses to
generate estimates employs iterative generalized least squares (i-GLS) method for the
two-stage and three-stage least squares methods, whereas maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) is used in the case of SEM. Notwithstanding differences in convergence
approaches, our results across models 2-4 are near-identical. Compared to models 2-4, we
find that OLS underestimates the role of trust and overestimates the role of social capital.
Results from two- and three- stage approaches are identical because the model is exactly
identified. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that SEM is essentially
equivalent to multi-stage regression methods (2-sls and 3-sls) under specific variancecovariance structures: under limited information assumption, SEM yields results
equivalent to those of two-stage regressions, whereas under full-information assumption,
it yields results equivalent to that of three-stage regressions. This is not to say that we are
able to successfully establish causality, but that the same concerns with traditional
instrumental variable (IV) techniques, that is, those pertaining to the satisfaction of
exclusion and relevance criteria of applied instruments (particularly weak instruments)
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and to the identification issues, are also prevalent in SEM approaches. However, SEM,
with its added functionality of integrating measurement models within, enables us to
account for measurement issues, which is one potential source of endogeneity. In that
regard, our choice of SEM, especially considering its illustrative superiority over the
2SLS approach, is a sensible one.
[Insert Table 2]
[Insert Table 3]
Table 3 reports our main SEM results. Column 1 presents findings on the determinants of
post-disaster collective action. An individual with high trust scores, that is, one whose
subjective perception about the trustworthiness of his fellow-citizens, neighbors, and
friends/relatives is high, is significantly more likely to participate in post-disaster
collective action efforts. The coefficients for bonding and bridging/linking social capital
indicate that participation in community-based organizations is significantly and
positively associated with CA efforts. The mechanisms by which this can happen are
many, which we shall delineate in the next section. As we discussed earlier, household
decisions regarding participation in post-shock collective action (CA) are influenced by a
host of factors, including socioeconomic, demographic, and contextual variables. We find
that households in which members have suffered from major health damage as a result of
the earthquake are less likely to participate in CA efforts. Moreover, one’s expectations
regarding future earthquakes also impact CA participation. We find that those who think
that the next big catastrophe will occur much later in the future are encouraged to engage
in such efforts. This is an intuitive finding in a sense that one might consider it futile to
engage in any rebuilding or reconstruction projects if they think that the next big
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earthquake is impending. Results indicate that males are more likely than females to
participate in post-disaster CA, reflecting the patriarchal household dynamics in rural
Nepal. The negative and significant coefficient for age reveals that younger cohorts are
more likely to participate in post-disaster CA efforts.

On the other hand, participation in these community-based groups can enhance mutual
trust among its membership, and can also help establish relationships with similar groups
in other communities. This relationship is presented in Column 2. Interestingly, we find
that, among the two categories of social capital included in the model, only bonding
social capital (proxied by participation score in community-based user groups) have a
significant (and positive) impact on trust. Because bonding social capital represents social
ties among homogeneous individuals/groups, it can bring members with shared interests
and background together and can amplify mutual trust. On the other hand, while bridging
and/or linking social capital can bring people together for collective efforts (as described
before), they do not necessarily build mutual trust. On the contrary, the negative sign
(although not significant) of the coefficient indicate that participation in religious, civic,
political affairs can be divisive. This is not surprising in the current context of globally
ubiquitous political and religious polarization. In Nepal’s national context, the decade
long Maoist insurgency (1996 to 2006) and a series of political upheavals following the
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed in November, 2006, testifies to that fact. Lastly, we
find that past history of Family Abandonment within a family negatively influences trust.
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Note that many of the factors that impact post-disaster collective action also influence
individual participation in community-based organizations and/or groups (Columns 3 and
4). Furthermore, owing to Nepal’s Hindu traditions and their influence on many aspects
of social and political lives, we take into account the impact that religion and caste can
have in encouraging or precluding entry to many community-based organizations. For
example, someone belonging to Majhi (Dalit) may face significant barriers if s/he
attempts to join a forest user-group, since Majhis have been traditionally confined to
fishing-related occupations, whereas a Kami (another Dalit caste) household, in some
cases, may not be allowed to join water user group, because a Brahmin-dominated group
may treat her/him as an untouchable; similarly, an adherent of Kirat faith may not be able
to join a Guthi-Samaj (a religion-based welfare group). As suspected, results reveal that
being a Dalit is a major barrier to entry for both user groups and civic/political groups.
Janajatis on the other hand, do not face as dire levels of discrimination as do the Dalits.
Note, however, that the coefficient signs for Caste-Janajati in columns 3 and 4 are
negative, indicative of its negative (but not statistically significant) association with
community group participation. The bottom heavy caste system in Nepal, with more
pronounced and numerous sub-caste classifications towards of the bottom of the
hierarchy leads to weak social capital towards the bottom at both intra- and inter- caste
levels. This weaker social capital among ethnic minorities or marginalized groups is
prevalent in other Asian countries20. On the other hand, Hindus have higher levels of
bonding as well as bridging/linking social capital, reflecting the cultural and political

20

Arouri et al. (2015) observe a similar relationship in their disaster resilience study in Vietnam.
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dominance that they [Hindus] continue to enjoy, relative to non-Hindus, in the former
Hindu kingdom of Nepal. Coefficients for other controls show that being a female is
associated with lower levels of social capital (of both categories); Joint-family
households, perhaps owing to their bigger family sizes, tend to have higher levels of
bonding social capital, but this does not lead to higher levels of bridging/linking social
capital; Households whose primary source of income is agriculture tend to have higher
levels of participation in user groups; Educated households tend to have higher levels of
social capital (both categories).

Columns 5, 6, and 7 show results from the measurement model. As discussed earlier, the
coefficient for reciprocal ties (T3) is pegged at 1. The significant (and positive)
coefficients for Trust mean that the relationship between the latent variable and its
measures is consistent and that the chosen indicator variables are relevant.

All of the these models are estimated using linear regressions with robust standard errors
where the processes (equations) that predict trust and social capital are allowed to
contemporaneously correlate. The path diagram for the specified SEM model (Table 3) is
presented in Figure 4.

The Mediatory Role of Trust
Table 4 displays results from the mediation analysis. Following SEM estimation, we
compute direct and mediated effects that the two categories of social capital have on post-
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disaster collective action21. Panel A presents direct and indirect effects of bonding social
capital, whereas Panel B reports those of bridging/linking social capital. We find that
bonding social capita has both direct and indirect (that is, mediated through trust) effects.
Roughly 40% of the total effect that bonding social capital has on collective action is
mediated through trust. In other words, trust explains 40% of the association between
bonding social capital and collective action. This is crucial from a policy perspective,
because any measures that aim at enhancing bonding social capital but somehow ends up
depleting mutual trust through misaligned incentives does disservice to the community.
On the other hand, while bridging/linking social capital has direct effects on collective
action, we find that no (significant) effect is mediated through trust in this case. In fact,
the negative (but not significant) sign points to the opposite direction.

While this study does not delve into the innerworkings of the direct (non-mediated)
impacts of social capital, many of these effects have been extensively investigated. Some
of these effects occur through increased access to informal and social-resources (Beggs et
al., 1996), social-learning (Storr et al., 2017), provision of club goods (Chamlee-Wright
and Storr, 2009), increased solidarity and civicmindedness (Tatsuki, 2007), and so on.
[Insert Table 4]
Sensitivity Analysis

21

The adjacent flow-diagram helps us understand how these effects are calculated. Path A represents the
causal effect of social capital (any type) on trust, path B links trust to collective action, and path C is the
direct link between social capital and collective action. Indirect effect of the specific form of social capital
occurs through paths A-B and is calculated as the product of these two effects (Direct effect=A*B). Total
effect is the sum of direct (C) and indirect (A*B) effects, that is: Total effect=A*B+C.
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A number of robustness checks were implemented to evaluate the sensitivity of our
results to alternate modeling approaches and specifications22. Our findings hold.

Discussion and implications
Our results underscore the central role that social capital plays in resolving collective
action problems, which is critical for post-disaster recovery. Our findings that both a)
strong ties among homogeneous members in a group (bonding social capital), and b)
weak ties among heterogeneous groups or vertical ties across hierarchies (bridging and
linking social capital) lead to higher levels of post-disaster collective action corroborate
the claim by Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) that social capital is indeed the “missing link to
disaster recovery.” We provide further evidence that bonding social capital also has
indirect effects, in that, it results in a higher degree of mutual trust among members in
homogeneous groups, thereby increasing probabilities of cooperation for collective
action. On the other hand, secondary findings reveal some disconcerting realities. Caste
and religion are strong (negative) predictors of both bonding and bridging/linking social
capital. This suggests that caste- and religion-based discrimination continue to preclude
membership in community-based organizations. Even though Article 24 of the newly
promulgated constitution of Nepal has established the Right against Untouchability and
Discrimination (Const. of Nepal, 2015), constitutional guarantees alone are insufficient.
Perhaps formal rules that reward inclusion in many facets of social life would be a step
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Detailed description and results from robustness checks are provided in appendix-3.
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forward. Education also seems to positively impact social capital, so that nudges us to
remain hopeful.

These results contribute to both theoretical and policy discussions. First, we shed light
into the social dimension of human behavior that frequently interacts with, and
occasionally even dominates, the strictly (economic) pay-off maximizing behavior. This
further emphasizes Ostrom's (2010) point that “a more general theory of individual
choice that recognizes the central role of trust in coping with social dilemmas” is needed.
The theoretical challenge, however, is not to be misunderstood as one of developing an
all-encompassing theory of human behavior, but rather one of fitting multiple configural
approaches that enable researchers to investigate factors that “enhance or detract from the
emergence and robustness of self-organized efforts within multilevel, polycentric
systems” (p. 642). Only such theory or a cluster of non-contradictory, situational theories
can satisfactorily reconcile the competitive, (economic) pay-off maximizing behavior in
one setting with the cooperative, trust-building, social norm abiding, reflective behavior
in a different setting (Ostrom, 2007). Such theoretical framework may take us a step
closer towards explaining how a common individual acting solely on his rational will,
when facing extraordinary post-disaster challenges, is often willing to subdue his/her
strictly atomistic volitions and ‘cash-out’ the accumulated social capital. In such
situations, s/he not only trusts others, but yearns to become trustworthy. To that end, s/he
chooses to extend benefit of the doubt to her/his neighbors and naturally elevates the suboptimal social equilibrium to better optima.
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Secondly, on the policy side, this paper provides a more cautionary message than a
prescriptive one. By presenting a post-disaster scenario where individuals mobilize their
social capital to build mutual trust among one another and participate in collective action,
we provide an insight into the domain of human behavior that post-disaster public
policies often fail to account for. The implication is rather straightforward: Any policy
aimed at overcoming post-disaster challenges or regulating invidious activities should not
hinder mutual trust, or tear down the social fabric that is in place. As shown by a recent
laboratory based study, any externally imposed minimum standard rules that aim to
promote cooperation, although prevent egregious trust violations, end up inhibiting trust
formation and depleting levels of trust and reciprocity irreversibly (Rietz et al., 2018).
Therefore, rather than introducing new rules directed at precluding “bad” behaviors in the
aftermath of disasters, a prudent choice could be do let the community’s social capital
play out its process uninterruptedly.

Our findings should not be extrapolated to conclude that social capital alone can solve
first and second order collective action problems. Resolutions of larger CAPs, including
many post-disaster recovery challenges, require formal or informal institutions and
organizations that, in many instances, bring in ideas, resources, policies, and methods
from the outside without an adequate understanding of local environment and social
conditions. This paper presents no arguments or evidence to suggest that such programs
cannot reach their goals or are somehow less effective. However, if the resolution of
CAPs are to go hand in hand with the preservation and advancement of democratic
values, norms of self-governance, and more importantly, sustainable development, our
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findings are important in that they unequivocally establish that enrichment of social
capital and furtherance of local trust are necessary intermediaries to that end. Therefore,
any institutions and organizations, that have, as parts of their mission the resolution of
CAPs, should strengthen and mobilize existing social capital, and work locally towards
building trust and reciprocal norms conducive to economic recovery.

Conclusion
Elinor Ostrom spent several decades resolutely seeking to answer the following question:
What are the conditions under which individuals can organize as a collective unit to
overcome CAPs associated with the use and preservation of common pool resources? At
the heart of her design principles aimed at resolving CPR problems is the quest for a
sustainable mechanism of honoring and enforcing commitments (Ferguson, 2013). Such
mechanism is virtually impossible to create and maintain without the community’s
“ability to develop a shared sense of trust” among its members – that is, a sort of a mutual
bond and shared understanding that transcends the economic (in its strictest sense) sphere
(ibid.). As Ferguson (2013) puts it, “the group needs to develop sufficient social capital to
create mutual trust, and thus render cooperative commitments credible” (p. 203).
However, developing social capital is a rather elusive quest, especially when we think of
it as a policy to be crafted and implemented; there is no deus-ex-machina solution to
generating it [social capital]. In other words, context matters. A solution that works in
one scenario in one community may inhibit resolution in a different scenario in a
different community. So, we should be cautious about not transporting Ostrom’s CPR
findings into a natural disaster setting without a full consideration of the local
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institutional context. However, one unequivocal message from her work that we can
apply ubiquitously is this: wo/men are not perpetually locked into a prisoner’s dilemma
puzzle. They are able to come up with solutions to their problems in ways that often
puzzle the most omniscient experts, if indeed they exist.

The objectives and findings of this paper are rather modest. Insofar as the metric is the
formulation of an effective ‘policy solution’ to post-disaster recovery, we fail decisively.
Instead, what we set forth to do is to illuminate one of the many possible mechanisms by
which individuals in a post-disaster setting can come together to rebuild their families
and communities. The domain that this paper explores can be categorized as one of
institutional design, of ‘continuous knowledge process,’ where ‘fallible but capable
beings’ incessantly engage in continuous learning and error-correcting processes at
operational as well as collective-choice levels (Aligica and Boettke, 2011). It is within
the scope of these interactions across different levels that social capital facilitates
collective action by altering beliefs and expectations regarding trust and trustworthiness
of other agents. If this is forgotten or ignored, our findings serve merely as distractions
(p. 57). The paper also refrains from providing in bullet points the determinants of
successful post-disaster collective action. In fact, we do not know whether or not these
collective action efforts were successful. Success or failure of any post-disaster collective
action efforts depends on an array of contextual factors, the determination of which is
beyond the scope of this paper. By demonstrating that individuals can mobilize their
social capital to build trust among one another and engage in mutually beneficial
collective action efforts, we show that citizens, even in the direst and rugged corners of
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the world, can mobilize their networks for bettering their conditions. The presumption
that “individuals cannot organize themselves and always need to be organized by external
authorities,” which was pervasive then and still remains the dominant dogma influencing
post-disaster policies in Nepal and elsewhere, is ill-informed and needs to be
extinguished if enhancing disaster-resilience is the goal (Ostrom [1990], 2015).
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Table 2. 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
VARIABLES

Description

Mean

S.D.

Following the earthquake, how actively did
you participate in disaster
recovery/reconstruction projects?
(1 very inactive,….4 very active)

2.431

(1.173)

Level of trust among people in the village
(1 none, 2 low, 3 high)
General view about people’s trustworthiness
(Equals 1 if trustworthy, 0 otherwise)
Likelihood that friends/relatives will
financially reciprocate in times of need
(1 none, …3 high)

2.202

(0.718)

0.536

(0.499)

2.566

(0.695)

Participation scores for Forest, Agricultural,
Water groups
Participation scores for civic, political,
religious and sports groups

-3.49e-09

(1.361)

-5.04e-09

(1.531)

1.869

(0.815)

0.839

(0.368)

0.114

(0.318)

0.788

(0.409)

139.5

(272.0)

.1294

(.3359)

CONTROL VARIABLES
Female
Gender=1 if female, 0 if male

0.555

(0.497)

Age

Age of the respondent

39.75

(14.70)

Married

Marital Status=1 if married, 0 otherwise

0.839

(0.368)

Family type-Joint

Equals 1 if joint family

0.343

(.4752)

Education

Highest level of education attained (1-6)

2.308

(1.460)

Occupation-Agriculture

0.688

(0.464)

Caste-Dalit

Equals 1 if the household head’s occupation
is agriculture
Equals 1 if Dalit, 0 otherwise

0.127

(0.334)

Caste-Janajati

Equals 1 if Janajati, 0 otherwise

0.406

(0.492)

Religion-Hindu

Equals 1 if Hindu, 0 otherwise

0.714

(0.452)

Dependent Variable
Post-EQ Collective
Action
Measures of Trust
Trust in People
Generalized Trust
Reciprocal ties
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Bonding
Bridging-linking

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Community size
Size of the ward (1=small, … 3 large)
Generations in
Community
Health damage from EQ
Property damage from
EQ
Next EQ
Family Abandonment

Equals 1 if households have lived in the
community for more than a generation, 0
otherwise.
Equals 1 if household experienced major
health injury/death, 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if household experienced major
property damage, 0 otherwise
In how many years do you think the next big
earthquake will occur?
Equals 1 if incident(s) of abandonment in the
family

Observations
1

510

Participation scores generated using Principle Component Analysis varimax rotation-Appendix 1
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Table 2. 2: Model Comparison
Model 1

Model 2

OLS

2SLS

Model 3

Model 4

3SLS (Full-information)

SEM (Full-information)

Collective
Action

First-stage
Trust in
People (T1)

2nd-Stage
Collective
Action

First-stage
Trust in
People (T1)

2nd-stage
Collective
Action

Trust in
People (T1)

Collective
Action

Trust in People (T1)

0.167**

-

0.854*

-

0.854*

-

0.854*

Bonding Social Capital

0.148***

0.0515**

0.108**

0.0515**

0.108**

0.0515**

0.108**

(0.0397)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

0.139***

0.0533**

0.108**

0.0533**

0.108**

0.0533**

0.108**

(0.0355)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

-

-0.345***

-

-0.345***

-

-0.345***

-

VARIABLES

(0.0682)

Bridging-Linking Social Capital
Family Abandon. (instrument)

(0.452)

(0.0926)

(0.452)

(0.0926)

(0.452)

(0.0926)

Contextual Variables

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Household demographics

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Socioeconomic factors

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

2.648***

2.067***

1.252

2.067***

1.252

2.067***

1.252

(0.409)

(0.247)

(1.009)

(0.247)

(1.009)

(0.247)

(1.009)

508

509

508

508

508

508

508

0.206

0.096

0.043

0.098

0.043

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full parameter estimates for Models 1-4 are provided in appendix Table 9.
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Table 2. 3: Structural Equation Model Results
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

VARIABLES

(1)
Post-EQ
Collective
act.

Trust§

Bonding
SC

BridgLink SC

Reciprocal
ties

Generalized
trust

Trust in
people

Trust (T*)

0.775***

-

-

-

1

1.277***

3.057***

(0)

(0.250)

(0.795)

(0.294)
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Bonding (SCbond)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.116***

-

-

-

-

-

-0.265**

-0.449***

-

-

-

(0.118)

(0.148)

0.00590

0.00150

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.144***

0.129**

(0.0394)

(0.0552)

Bridging-Linking

0.136***

-0.0543

(SCbrid-link)

(0.0347)

(0.0462)

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (CV1)
Community size

-0.0118
(0.0591)

Generations in commty.

0.0249
(0.138)

Health damage from
EQ

-0.243*
(0.138)

Propt. damage from EQ

0.0212
(0.116)

Next EQ (expected)

0.000448***
(0.000155)

Family Abandonment
(Z1)

-

(0.0448)
Household demographics (X1)
Female

-0.503***

-

(0.112)
Age

-0.0111***

-

(0.00420)
Married

-0.105

Family type-Joint

-0.0130

(0.00512)

(0.00577)

-

0.115

-0.0802

(0.162)

(0.202)

-

0.249**

0.00613

(0.115)

(0.143)

0.0869*

0.203***

(0.0503)

(0.0618)

0.226*

0.0892

(0.116)

(0.133)

-0.343*

-0.443**

(0.188)

(0.176)

-0.261

-0.0351

(0.173)

(0.208)

(0.132)
(0.102)
Socioeconomic factors (X2)
Education

0.0186

-

(0.0434)
Occupation-Agri

0.161

-

(0.106)
Cultural/Religious factors
Caste-Dalit (X3)

-

-

Caste-Janajati (X3)

-

-
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Religion-Hindu (X4)
Constant

-

-

-

-

-

-0.615

2.584***

0.554***

2.240***

(0.528)

(0.0305)

(0.0241)

(0.0372)

0.574***

0.580***

(0.169)

(0.185)

3.050***

-0.881*

(0.384)

(0.455)

Observations
506
506
506
506
506
506
506
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Equations (2), (3) and (4) are allowed to have
contemporaneous correlation. §Trust is a latent variable measured by three indicator variables: reciprocal ties, generalized
trust, subjective trust on people.
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Table 2. 4: Mediation Analysis
Panel A
Mediator Variable: Trust
Treatment Variable: Participation Score for Bonding Social Capital
Effect

Coef.

Robust
SE

Average Causal Mediation Effect
(A1*B1)
Direct Effect (C1)
Total Effect (A1*B1+C1)

.0999**
.1438***
.2438***

(.0427)
(.0394)
(.0576)

Percentage (%) of total effect
mediated

40.97%

Panel B
Mediator Variable: Trust
Treatment Variable: Participation Score for Bridging-Linking Social Capital
Effect

Coef.

Average Causal Mediation Effect
(A2*B2)
Direct Effect (C2)
Total Effect (A2*B2+C2)

-.0421

Robust
SE
(.0358)

.1359***
.0938*

(.0346)
(.0491)

No statistically significant mediation effects
Notes: Authors assume independent causal pathways to conduct mediation analyses.
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Figure 2. 1: n-Person Game of Collective Action
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Trust

Social Capital
§ Bonding
§ Bridging
§ Linking

Institutional Rules
(Rules of the game)

Collective Action

Contextual variables
§ Past Experience
§ Future
expectations

Structural variables
§ Community
characteristics
§ Socioeconomic
variables

Figure 2. 2: Analytical Framework based on authors’ adaptation from Ostrom and Ahn (2008)
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Figure 2. 3: Levels of Collective Action Engagement
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Figure 2. 4: Path Diagram

85

CHAPTER 4
On the Dynamic Nature of Goods: Applications in Post-Disaster
Contexts
Introduction
A few days after the devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, the government
[of Nepal] released an official statement demanding that “[all] donations be channeled
into the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund”(Francis, 2015). The move, motivated by
concerns about “the number of groups in Nepal and around the world collecting
donations without the government’s permission,” had implicit goals of reducing
redundancy, precluding misallocation of funds, and curbing corruption (Nelson, 2015).
Exactly two months following the earthquake, the National Planning Commission of
Nepal organized the international conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR) to raise
funds for reconstruction, recovery, and rehabilitation efforts (Bhujel, 2017). Development
partners and donors pledged over $4 billion in disaster assistance. However, it took the
government another six months to form the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA)
and formulate a ‘comprehensive five-year plan – Post Disaster Recovery Framework
(PDRF)’ to utilize funds to address post-disaster challenges. PDRF adopted a recovery
vision of establishing “well-planned, resilient settlements, and a prosperous society” and
tasked itself with ensuring “safe structures, social cohesion, access to services, livelihood
support, and capacity building” (NRA, 2016). In short, NRA became the monocentric
governing body charged with all responsibilities of planning, implementing, and
overseeing every aspect of post-disaster reconstruction and recovery. To put it
differently, it [NRA] was the sole assessor of needs, and provider of all goods –private,

86

public, or otherwise– that are associated with rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery
from the earthquake. The lessons that Elinor Ostrom learned from rural agricultural
villages in Nepal—that heterogeneous communities across Nepal have unique challenges
and that they use a wide range of traditional norms and complex institutional rules to
govern their social and economic affairs – were conveniently ignored. Instead, a onenation-one-solution approach to post-disaster policymaking was adopted as the national
mantra to control all aspects of production and provision of all post-disaster goods and
services.

An extensive body of literature has debunked the omniscience presumption of expertguided central planning efforts to elicit and respond to information regarding postdisaster needs of people (e.g. Leeson and Sobel, 2008; Sobel and Leeson, 2006, 2007).
However, market-versus-state debates on post-disaster recovery are of limited use
without an adequate consideration of the typology and nature of goods and services. The
assessment of earthquake damages and/or reconstruction of an interstate highway
requires a very different “policy” approach than that of fulfilling household needs. In
fact, as we shift our focus away from the national economy to the needs of individuals,
households, and local communities, post-disaster challenges become increasingly
idiosyncratic. As I have stated elsewhere, disaster damages pose unique challenges to
each household, especially in communities characterized by ethnic, religious, and cultural
heterogeneity (Rayamajhee and Bohara, Forthcoming). Therefore, debates surrounding
the appropriate role of the central government or markets are misguided in that they stem
from a simplistic private-public dichotomy of goods and services. I contend that most
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goods that are naively assumed to be public by many post-disaster aid programs in
developing countries are quasi-public; they are characterized by varying degrees of
excludability and subtractability, and often fall within the “neither state nor market”
domain. On the other hand, some goods that are typically considered private may require
non-market provision mechanisms in cases where physical infrastructures or institutional
structures that make markets feasible are absent.

This chapter remains agnostic as to whether or not state-led post-disaster assistance
succeeds or fails. Without other institutions to compare performances against, empirical
studies that evaluate the welfare impacts of state-led post-disaster aid reveal very little.
The fact that one agency’s involvement in Nepal may have helped prevent worse
outcomes says nothing about alternative ways the funds could have been better allocated.
A fitting analogy is one of throwing a pebble in a still pond: Such action always brings
about ripples, but any plausible claim about its effectiveness requires comparison against
ripples from other pebbles. When disaster assistance is treated as a packageable product
with prohibitively substantial economies of scale, lumping the production and provision
of the package under the jurisdiction of one agency follows naturally, regardless of the
number of donor agencies involved and the diversity of goals. For this exercise, we begin
with an acknowledgement that national and international agencies will continue to
design, implement, control, and supervise many aspects of post-disaster relief,
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery, particularly in developing countries,
regardless of the potential perverse outcomes of such efforts. Given this reality, the
questions this chapter asks and ponders on are as follows: What are the characteristics of
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goods and services that constitute a post-disaster relief package? Are such characteristics
endogenous? Are they dynamic? The answers to these questions can then pave ways to
systematically analyze the appropriate modality(-ies) of post-disaster aid dissemination.
A thorough understanding of the nature of each good or service is a necessary first step
before we begin to formulate a framework that maps institutional types and levels to the
scale of its production and provision.

First, I begin with an analysis of the nature of goods and services from Samuelson
onwards. I briefly discuss the limitations and implications of the private-public
dichotomy that Samuelson-Musgrave forwarded. Then, Buchanan’s contributions to the
debate is reviewed. Subsequently, I examine how the Ostroms’ framework that was built
on the public choice foundation expands the narrow private-public dichotomy and
provides a realistic and inclusive taxonomy of goods and services. The third section
discusses the dynamic nature of goods and services based on their shifting degrees of
excludability and rivalrousness. Because the nature of goods is institutionally contingent,
I argue that post-disaster institutional changes can lead to changes in their nature and
their typology. The fourth section presents four case studies from different manmade and
natural disasters in Chicago, New Orleans, Nepal, and Indonesia to provide empirical
evidence for the dynamic nature of post-disaster goods and services. The section delves
into challenges that stem from shuffling of goods and services across different quadrants
within the good-classification table. Section V briefly touches on the implications of the
dynamic nature of post-disaster goods and services on disaster management. The final
section concludes.
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Beyond the Private-Public Dichotomy of Goods
Samuelson’s (1954) formal exposition of what he termed collective consumption goods
laid the foundation for the modern theory of public goods. He categorizes consumption
goods into two types – private and collective – based on their binary characterization as
either rivalrous or non-rivalrous. Samuelson, alongside Musgrave, is credited for the
textbook definition of a public good as a good that is both non-rivalrous and
nonexcludable.23 Although he viewed his theory as having “little to contribute to
discussion of the appropriate role of government,” publicness of a good has been the
theoretical justification for its public provision by the state (Hammond, 2015). Because
individuals have incentives to hide their true valuation of collective consumption goods
when opportunities to free ride on others exist, he contends that such goods are undersupplied by competitive markets. The implication of this Samuelsonian dichotomy is that
the “servant” of the “ethical observer,” the state, ought to set the optimal taxes and
subsidies to ensure optimal supply of such goods. A major deficiency with this
conceptualization of goods is that it deals only with polar cases with “little reference to
the real world” (Enke, 1955). In fact, a vast majority of goods provided by the
government are not exclusively “enjoyed in common” in that one’s consumption of such
good leads to some subtraction, either in quality or quantity, for others (Margolis, 1955).

23

Although Samuelson’s mathematical definition of public goods from his 1954 paper The Pure Theory of
Public Expenditure is the most accepted formal model of public goods, the qualitative understanding of
public goods owes more to Musgrave’s work excludability criterion (Desmarais-Tremblay, 2014).
Musgrave (1969) was the first to use both criteria (non-rivalry and non-excludability) for defining pure
public goods (Pickhardt, 2006).
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Examples include education, hospitals, highways, and even police and judicial services
(p. 347).

In an effort to close the gap between Samuelson’s “purely private” and “purely public”
goods, Buchanan develops the theory of clubs (Buchanan, 1965). While some goods and
services can be reasonably called “private” even by the strictest criteria of rivalry and
excludability, goods that satisfy the characteristics of collective consumption are hard to
find. Instead, they exhibit varying but finite degrees of “publicness”. He argues that the
utility that an individual derives from the consumption of any good or service depends,
regardless of its ultimate place on the private-public spectrum, upon the “number of other
persons with whom he must share its benefits” (3). The task he undertook was then to
determine the “membership margin” to attain the “most desirable cost and consumption
sharing arrangement” (2). Thus, by emphasizing an individual’s utility rather than the
good or service itself, he makes a subtle case for the “rivalrousness” of all goods. For
each good, a unique optimal sharing threshold, Nj can be computed which indicates the
degree of its “publicness.” Buchanan’s model relies on the possibility of exclusion to
attain optimal-sharing arrangements, which requires “flexible property arrangements”
and “excluding devices” (14). That is, for any given property rights regime and the state
of technology with considerable excludability restrictions, club good theory closes some
gap in the private-public spectrum but not all gaps. An alternate theory that does not
assume away excludability is needed to fill other gaps.
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Taking the nature of the goods and services as “the analytical entry point,” the scholars of
the Bloomington institutionalism picked up where Virginia School left off (Aligica and
Boettke, 2009). For Ostroms, the typology of a good determined by the “jointness of use
or consumption” on the abscissa and “exclusion” on the ordinate defines its nature
(Ostrom and Ostorm, 2002). This framework is a step forward towards understanding
both of these attributes (subtractability and excludability) in degrees rather than “all-ornone” categories (p. 77). Understood this way, a good belongs to a specific typology only
insofar as its degrees of subtractability and excludability place it to that specific quadrant.
In other words, when these degrees change substantially, the nature of a good defined in
terms of its publicness (or privateness) also changes. This mode of analyzing goods
reveals Ostroms’ pragmatic bend since no prior theory of goods – Samuelsonian privatepublic theory or Buchanan’s club theory – had room for rivalrous goods that are nonexcludable, namely the common pool resources (CPR).

In the case of CPR, exclusion may not be possible for a number of reasons. Aligica and
Boettke (2009) point out that technology and institutions can create forms of exclusion
and at times destroy them (p. 40). In the Turkish villages of Bodrum and the Bay of
Izmir, the lack of an overarching institutional mechanism to design appropriation rules
and address internal conflicts meant that new entrants seeking opportunities for quick
economic gains could not be excluded (E. Ostrom, 2015: 145). This led to overfishing
and rent expropriation. In fisheries in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, exclusion was
attained because many local villages devised their own rules to determine who can use
local fisheries and how resources are to be harvested (p. 144). When exclusion is viewed
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as being endogeneous as E. Ostrom does, one can then begin to think about institutional
diversity to address the heterogeneity of goods. This provides us with conceptual tools to
think about institutional diversity based on the unique position that each good occupies
within the subtractability-excludability matrix. If we are to simply follow the logic that
private goods are best suited for private provision by a number of firms competing in the
marketplace, then any good that has some degree of privateness – that is, those goods that
are not fully public – should be provided through some competitive mechanism. Even if
we overlook studies that show that public goods can be more efficiently produced by
private firms24, taking this logic seriously leads us to conclude that only purely public
goods that are definitively non-exclusive and non-rivalrous are suitable for monopolistic
provision by the state.

The challenge then can be defined as that of institutional matching (Furton and Martin,
2019). Framing the problem this way has an advantage over the market-versusgovernment-failure paradigm in that it facilitates more productive discussions, incites
more relevant research questions, and allows one to synthesize insights from public
choice and new institutional economics (p. 198). Viewed this way, the relevant question
is no longer “what is the appropriate criteria for the provision of goods by the state?” For
Ostroms, the public economy does not mean government monopoly but instead a mixed
economy with maximum participation of the private sector in the production and delivery
of public goods and services (Ostrom and Ostorm, 2002, p. 75). Even Oates’s (1972)
“decentralization theorem” that shows that “efficient public goods provision occurs at the

24

For examples of this, see Candela and Geloso (2018); Koyama (2012); Tabarrok (1998), among others.
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lowest level of government that internalizes relevant externalities” (Boettke et al., 2011)
assumes too much in that it still places all goods into two separate buckets – private
versus public. By freeing us from this private-versus-public two-bucket trap, Ostroms
open up the possibility of several potential arrangements for the supply and delivery of
public goods and services. An analysis of the nature of goods is a pre-requisite before
proceeding to the central question: What are the appropriate institutional arrangements
best catered to provide a variety of goods and services in a dynamic economy where
technology and institutions are constantly evolving?

Dynamic Nature of Goods
Despite their insistence that exclusion and rivalrousness are matters of degrees and not of
dichotomies, Ostroms frequently use a 4x4 matrix (Figure 1) to present the taxonomy of
goods25. After all, they are clear that these are not “all-or-none” categories (p.77). To
understand why, one needs to delve into their epistemic choices. First, their emphasis is
not to get the model right for the purpose of overall generalizability, but to “cut through
complexity and retain enough elements” to make sure that the model is “ realistic and
relevant for the situations under consideration26” (Aligica, 2014, 74). Secondly, the
specific taxonomy is best suited to analyze a particular class of goods they were studying

25

Source: E. Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, and Walker (1994). Different variations of the same taxonomy can
be found in Ostrom and Ostorm (2002) and elsewhere.
26
This in no way suggests that her approach was subjective and opportunistic. Aligica (2014) provides a
detailed discussion of Ostrom’s epistemic and methodological approaches in chapter 3. She makes a
distinction between frameworks, theories, and models. Frameworks use the most general set of variables to
evaluate all settings. A theory specifies relevant components of a framework to best describe a
phenomenon. Several theoretical perspectives can be consistent with a single framework. Models only
capture a narrow set of parameters and variables to illustrate or examine a theory or make predictions based
on the theory (p. 93, 94).
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that are a) difficult to exclude, and b) subtractible, namely, common pool resources.
Third, this presentation serves a distinct purpose in that it pays homage to its public
choice roots by providing a common framework to place both club goods and common
pool resources alongside private and public goods. Therefore, this taxonomy is not to be
interpreted as a rigid framework that merely expands the traditional two-box
classification of goods into a four-box one.

Figure 3. 1: Conventional Classification of Goods (Source: Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1995)

When viewed this way, the taxonomy of goods is not one with four distinct boxes that
determine a good’s “type” but instead is one defined by varying degrees of excludability
and rivalrousness. This opens up possibilities for new ways of analyzing goods that is
consistent with the dynamic economy of the real world marked by frequent technological
and institutional innovations. In other words, if the nature of goods is defined by specific
features that have no theoretical or empirical basis for remaining static, then extending
this logic to its end, we are left to conclude that a dynamic taxonomy of goods is the next
‘trivial’ step. The only intermediary task we have left is to present cases where goods and
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services shift their nature.27 Before proceeding, let us briefly discuss each of these two
features.

Exclusion
A good or service is excludable to the extent that non-purchasers can be precluded from
enjoying its benefits. It is possible to create incentives for the private provision of a
public good by bundling its consumption with another good that is excludable (Demsetz,
1970). Candela and Geloso (2018) show that such bundling arrangements can occur even
without any involvement of the state. We leave aside such possibilities and assume that
non-excludability is a qualifying criterion for the public provision of goods and services.
For our purpose, it is sufficient to show that exclusion of a good, even by the least
stringent standards, is not exogeneous. Ostrom (2003), in trying to distinguish between
public goods and common pool resources, presents arguments to this effect. Collective
action problems for these two categories of goods differ vastly “in regard to how costly
or difficult it is to devise physical and institutional means to exclude others” (p. 241). In
other words, it is possible, albeit with varying levels of difficulty, to devise “physical and
institutional means” that allow one to tinker with degrees of exclusion. It can be argued
that profit opportunities in devising such means of exclusion drives entrepreneurs to
provide private solutions to many public good problems. Cowen (1985) uses the
provision of protection services as an example of a good that has dual modes of

27

Note that the burden of proof required for the empirical validity for this claim is extremely low. We need
to only convince readers that the observed cases of the shifting nature of goods are not exception but
normal occurrences. However, to make a plausible counter-case, one needs to show that no good (n®∞)
has dynamic characteristics.
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supplying (p. 59). The same service can be supplied either by a patrolman walking the
beat or by burglar alarms. The first is a non-marketing mode with higher difficulties of
exclusion, whereas the second is a marketing mode where exclusion is feasible. Cowen
(1985) contends that the publicness of every good is institutionally contingent.28,29 That
is, any good can be made more or less public by examining it in different institutional
contexts. Movie theatre is one such example of a good where exclusion is attained by
requiring admission fees.30 Changes in existing institutions can not only alter costs of
exclusion but can also influence exclusion criteria (legal rules, cultural norms).

Rivalrousness/Subtractability
A rivalrous good is one that may be provided to an additional person at a very low
marginal cost. The quantity (or quality) of a purely non-rivalrous good is not reduced for
others because of one person’s use. Weather forecast, roads, fire station, and national
security are presented as typical examples. Critiques point out that no good satisfies such
criteria. Roads during heavy traffic is rivalrous, as additional users lead to more
congestion (Cowen, 1985). The very existence of intersections and stoplights proves that
one person’s use of the good necessarily interferes with that of another person (p. 55).
Coyne (2015) makes a similar case for the rivalrousness of national defense. Because the
same missile cannot protect two geographic areas within the nation, the use of that

28

Cowen presents seven such “institutional elements of importance”: 1) production technology, 2) quantity
of production, 3) distribution mechanism of the product, 4) intensity of demand for the product, 5)
definition of marginal unit, 6) definition of “consumption”, and 7) different meanings of exclusion (p. 53).
29
Similar arguments have been presented by Aligica and Boettke (2009). As discussed earlier, they argue
that technology and institutions can create or destroy forms of exclusion (p. 40).
30
With larger turnout, however, difficulties for exclusion increase (p. 61). It is possible for during crowded
times for a person to watch multiple shows by paying admission fees for one movie.
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missile to protect New York City necessarily subtracts from (the possibility of) its use to
protect Los Angeles (p. 374). That is not to argue that national defense is a private good,
but rather that rivalrousness itself should be viewed as a continuum and not as
dichotomies. Despite some degree of rivalrousness, it is safe to say that national defense
exhibits a higher degree of non-rivalrousness than bread or pen. More importantly,
rivalrousness of the same good is institutionally contingent. Cowen (1985), invoking
Minasian (1964), presents television as an example of a good that can be changed from a
public good into a private good by technological innovations (p. 55). Other elements of
institutional contingency include level of use, appropriate choice of marginal unit, and the
quantity or service capacity of a good (p. 55, 56). Formal and informal governing
institutions also influence the rivalrousness of goods. As a more perverse case, we may
consider Dalits in part of the Indian sub-continent who are considered “untouchables.”
Under the highly segregated, discriminatory system of untouchability, goods that are
typically deemed non-rivalrous such as schools, temples, shrines, rivers, or bazaars
become rivalrous in a sense that a Dalit’s entry to such public places make these places
‘impure,’ thereby precluding a Brahmin priest from entering them. In other words, a
good’s degree of rivalrousness is not necessarily its intrinsic feature. Various factors such
as the state of technology, or legal, political, religious, and cultural institutions can
influence its level of rivalrousness.

Nature of Goods in a Post-disaster Context
Chamlee-Wright (2010) characterizes a post-disaster context as one where “much of the
order we take for granted is shattered” (p. 4). When a covariate shock of a considerable
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magnitude strikes, infrastructures and institutions that hold communities and nations
together can collapse (Rayamajhee et al., 2019). Because the attributes that determine the
typology of goods are institutionally contingent as previously discussed, it must then be
the case that post-disaster institutional shock leads to changes in the typology of goods.
The precise direction of that change is an empirical question. However, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the direction will generally be away from the status quo. To
better understand the dynamics, let us use Ostroms’ 4x4 typology of goods presented in
Figure 1 as the starting point. For analytical simplicity, I slightly deviate from the
conventions and present a revised good-classification in Figure 2. The origin (0,0)
represents the point of maximum non-excludability and non-rivalry/non-subtractability,
where the purely public good is situated. The top-right corner is the point of maximum
excludability and rivalry, which is reserved for purely private goods.

Consider a good Ai that is to be produced and/or provided in a post-disaster context,
where i=0,1,2,3….N-1 represents a (x,y) coordinate in Figure 1 such that high x and y
values represent high degrees of subtractability and excludability respectively; N-1
indicates the number of feasible configurations that Ai can attain. Horizontal lines LHt and
vertical lines LVt indicate thresholds at period t that determine excludability and
subtractability respectively. For instance, for Ai such that i(x> LVt, y> LHt), the good is
considered private, and so on. In Figure 1, A0 is the original position of good Ai at a
specific period. Alternate positions A1, A2, A3 are other feasible configurations of good
Ai. For illustrative purposes, we assume N=4. After a shock (technological or institutional
change), Ai can move from A0 to A1, A2, and A3 with probabilities P1, P2, P3 respectively.
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On the other hand, LHt and LVt can shift from their original positions (LH0 and LV0) to
new positions (LHt and LVt , t>0) with corresponding probabilities of P4, P5, P6, and P7
respectively.31 While we have limited the number of possible positions of Ai, LHt, and LVt
to a bare minimum necessary for analysis, it should be noted that a large number of
configurations are feasible. Another crucial consideration to bear in mind is that Figure 1
represents a one-shot (n=1) representation of n ∈ [0,1,2,3,…N-1] possible sequential
moves. So, the policy challenge of production and production of goods gets increasingly
difficult as we add additional goods and services and/or increase the number of sequential
moves to n>1.

Figure 3. 2: Dynamic Nature of Post-Disaster Goods and Services

31

Note that because institutional changes can be incorporated into the analysis through changes in levels of
excludability and rivalry, shifting LHt and LVt may seem redundant. However, we allow shifts in LHt and LVt
to account for exogeneous changes in these thresholds. If we adopt a narrow definition of institutions, these
shifts can account for factors that are not accounted as institutional change. For example, shift in political
rhetoric alone can lead to differences in the precise thresholds for LHt and LVt.
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Cases of Post-disaster Reshuffling of Good Classification
Chicago Fire 1871
Skarbek (2014) provides a detailed account of the role of the Chicago Relief and Aid
Society (henceforth referred to as CRAS), which she characterizes as “a voluntary
association of agents with a stake in relief outcomes,” in post-disaster relief efforts. In the
absence of formal political or bureaucratic organization to handle disaster relief, CRAS
“leveraged organizational assets” and “constitutional rules” to effectively overcome
challenges of moral hazard and free-riding (p. 155). Skarbek argues that once aid
contributions have been made, they “exhibit features of a common pool resource” (p.
156). That is, they are rivalrous in consumption, but non-excludable to disaster victims.
Relief aid that CRAS oversaw after the Chicago fire is a bundle of goods that include
food, clothing, emergency shelter, security services, and medical services (p. 161, 167,
168). These are diverse goods of varying levels of excludability and rivalry in normal
times and are provided through different private and public institutional arrangements.
Following the Chicago Fire, CRAS was able to mobilize local knowledge, expertise, and
will-power to conduct the appropriate bundling of these goods as disaster relief. Like
many of successful CPRs that Ostrom (1990) describes, CRAS was able to devise
operational rules based on “strong pre-established principles” (p. 174). Excludability was
attained using appropriation rules that specified “who had rights to withdraw resources”
from the collected aid funds and what the eligibility criteria were for receiving aid (p.
173). Locally instituted mechanisms for detecting fraudulent claims, “credible
enforcement strategy” involving self-monitoring by fellow community members, and
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mobilization of local knowledge to assess needs and disseminate aid ensured that aid
reached those populations who were “most in need” (p. 169).
Figure 3 provides a breakdown of disaster relief bundle based on their pre-disaster
conventional classification. Goods that are traditionally deemed public such as security
and fire services, and those that are deemed private such as food, clothing, shelter and
medical services, were lumped into one disaster relief package. This re-bundling is an
institutional solution that CRAS deemed most appropriate under the circumstances where
both government and markets are non-existent or dysfunctional. Lack of private
mechanisms such as storage facilities necessary for private provision of vegetables and
other perishable items meant that a non-market, non-governmental solution was needed.
CRAS was able to use local expertise of Murray Nelson to transform a local skating rink
into a frost-proof building for storage purposes (p. 173). On the other hand, the absence
of local (and national) political and bureaucratic apparatus meant that security services
were no longer appropriate for public provision. In that sense, both private and public
goods had lost their privateness or publicness because of the changes in their degrees of
excludability and rivalry. New institutional solution was necessary to address this new
situation where the conventional static classification of goods was unable to provide a
practical framework to overcome this challenge. CRAS provided that solution.
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Figure 3. 3: Chicago Fire 1871

Hurricane Katrina 2005
Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) report the case of Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN)
community in New Orleans East after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 where the local Catholic
church utilized “a bundle of club goods” to solve social coordination problem in the wake
of the disaster. Note that this bundle is unique in that its constituents are rather diverse
and idiosyncratic. This “highly specific culturally and linguistically appropriate” bundle
of goods included: (i) Vietnamese language training, (ii) religious services, (iii)
occasional weekend markets for selling Vietnamese produce, arts and crafts, (iv) informal
social space, (v) meeting space for religious and non-religious groups, (vi) organization
structure for social coordination, (vii) community leadership for collective action, and
(viii) ethnically appropriate charitable aid (p. 440). Additionally, because church
members included local business owners and professionals, other secondary goods such
as medical, legal, and financial services also came attached alongside the church bundle.
Many of these services could be classified as private in peaceful times (e.g. ethnically
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sensitive goods or financial and medical services) that are suitable for private provision
by competing firms. However, in a post-disaster setting where infrastructures that support
private provision are interrupted, local institutions can serve as ‘clubs’ and provide many
of these services.

The diversity of these goods requires more attention. The club (MQVN church) provides
cultural services (intermediary goods) that lead to greater “Vietnameseness” (final good)
(p. 441). Vietnameseness, in this context, is analogous to “behavior conducive to upward
mobility” (Bankston and Zhou, 2000). There is a very unique type of bundling of goods
occurring here. One good (cultural services) leads to another good (Vietnameseness)
which can then lead to the final good (opportunities for upward mobility). In normal
times, Vietnameseness can be characterized as being highly non-excludable and nonrivalrous. In pre-Katrina MQVN, it would be impossible to exclude another community
member from acquiring Vietnameseness. Nor can one person’s Vietnameseness preclude
someone else from acquiring it. However, the disaster altered the nature of
Vietnameseness as a good. Because the community that made the good public is
shattered, it loses its publicness. An existential threat means that Vietnameseness is no
long as abundant. Since it has a positive value, the church can then provide it as a club
good. The ‘new’ Vietnameseness (as a good), although non-rivalrous, is now excludable
to some extent. The same analogy applies for other culturally sensitive services.
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Figure 3. 4: Hurricane Katrina 2005

Nepal Earthquake 2015
Himal Southasian’s32 “Notes from the field” page archives many journalism based
accounts of post-disaster relief and rehabilitation activities following the 2015 earthquake
in Nepal. An archived article by Rabi Thapa (2015) documents reconstruction efforts
across Kathmandu’s many cultural heritage sites destroyed by the earthquake, which he
dubs as “irreplaceable cultural teasures.” Thapa reports preservation and reconstruction
efforts from three sites in particular: the 5th century of Swayambhunath temple, 6th
century Rato Machhindranath temple, and the 19th century Kalmochan temple.
From the Kalmochan site, he reports:
Police and army personnel were silhouetted atop the ruins, and were passing bricks down,
hand to dusty hand. But I could also see scores of volunteers milling about, strapping on

32

Himal Southasian, South Asia’s first regional news and analysis outlet, describes itself as an
“independent, non-nationalist, pan-regionalist” source of news coverage and critical analysis on South
Asian affairs.
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masks and gloves. All around me, youths were stopping and entering the temple complex.
Soon, the road was half blocked by parked motorcycles, their riders joining
spontaneously in the clean-up of a beloved Kathmandu landmark.

These stupas, temples, and artifacts connect the modern, urbanized Kathmandu
metropolis to its rich Hindu-Buddhist roots. The loss of these cultural treasures would be
catastrophic to Kathmanduites. However, the publicness of these treasures means that
their restoration and preservation pose a collective action problem. No matter who
contributes towards the restoration and preservation of these efforts, once restored, these
sites are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. However, if we analyze the motivations of
many volunteers, it becomes clear that there is a sense of cultural duty to contribute
towards these efforts. This sense of duty is evident from testimonies such as this: “If we
don’t do, who will?” What that means is that the opportunity to participate in cultural
preservation is a type of desirable good with positive utility that is both rivalrous and
excludable. It is rivalrous because each site can only afford so many volunteers without
congestion. It is excludable because local clubs/groups in-charge of a particular site can
(and do) send volunteers away to a different site if they see congestion happening. In
some cases, exclusion was also attained with the help of police and government
personnel. However, in an overwhelming number of cases, locals organized daily nightwatch to “make sure nothing gets stolen.” In this particular example, although the public
good (cultural treasures) did not morph its character, the participation opportunity
emerged as a ‘new’ good with a distinctly private character (excludable and rivalrous)
from the rubbles of the ‘old’ public good.
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Figure 3. 5: Nepal Earthquake 2015

Indonesian Tsunami 2004
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami destroyed many coastal villages in Aceh, Indonesia,
sweeping away almost all physical capital. The international response was huge and
swift. For 120,000 houses destroyed, 134,000 new houses were built by 2009 (Henderson
and Lee, 2015). In a non-disaster context, house is an archetypal private good. Doors or
gates ensure that entry is restricted to members of the household. Property rights provide
protection against forceful confiscation. If one household purchases a house, that specific
house will no longer be available to another household. However, in a post-Tsunami
context where 91% of houses in Aceh were wiped out, the institutions that preserved their
privateness were no longer intact (p. 623). Henderson and Lee (2015) describe the
situation is Aceh:
Usually the basic house design is imposed by the implementer. The builder normally buy
materials and hires and supervises carpenters, plumbers, day labor, and the like. Not only
are these contracts between implementers and builders incomplete, enforcement in court
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is costly, given the slow working of the local system and the potential for corruption in
Indonesia.

Given the “slow working of the local legal system,” prohibitive costs of contract
enforcement, and rampant corruption, not only was the legitimacy of ownership (of
houses) challenged but the market for materials and labor required for reconstruction was
also dysfunctional. Henderson and Lee (2015) note that, in post-Tsunami Aceh,
“potential for contract hazards is high” (p. 620). This can lead to cases where a builder
demands more money “in an attempt to expropriate qusi-rents” when the construction is
partially complete. Because the costs of finding new builders and enforcing the original
contract are prohibitive, the implementer has no choice but to cave in. Henderson
observes that international implementers have incentives to perform regardless of
domestic hurdles because they face “reputational costs” in the context of the repeated
game of contracting in aid disasters (p. 620). However, for domestic builders, lowprobability-high-intensity shocks present one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games where
incentives are aligned in ways that shirking becomes the dominant strategy.33 When
infrastructures and institutions necessary for private transactions and contract
enforcement are stripped away as in the case of Aceh, the good loses its private nature.
Cowen’s (1985) analysis that the nature of a good depends on (a) how much of the good
is produced, and (b) how intense the demand is for the good is particularly relevant here
(p. 53). The intense, highly inelastic demand for housing leads to increased demand for

33

Henderson and Lee (2015) note that domestic implementers are likely to face this incentive because they
“do not operate internationally” and because “in Aceh many (domestic implementers) were short-lived” (p.
621). In the case of domestic builders, there is reason to think that similar incentive-structure exists,
especially when donors and implementers are international.
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plumbers, carpenters, day labor, and materials. Moreover, when private citizens, domestic
and international aid agencies, implementers, builders, and local and national
governments are all competing for the finite pool of labor and capital, the equilibrium
does not reflect the ‘true’ demand for those goods in that international aid agencies and
governments do not face realistic budget constraints.34,35 In that sense, distorted
incentives and price-indifference faced by some players means that the market is not
allowed to function normally. All these factors distort the privateness of houses. This can
be presented as a case where the good (house) mostly retains its original levels of
rivalrousness but the lines LHt shifts, thereby shrinking the domain of the private markets
because excluding devices such as property rights, contract enforcement, and ability to
freely exchange in the market place are hindered for all private goods. Note that this ‘new
publicness’ does not, however, mean that government is best equipped to provide this
good.

34

In relative terms, international aid agencies and governments have endogenous budget constraints.
Higher assessments of destruction and need is potentially positively associated with higher donations.
35
Henderson and Lee (2015) find that donor-implementers outperform international implementers,
domestic implementers, and BRR (government) because they face proper incentives.
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Figure 3. 6: Indonesian Tsunami 2004

Towards Institutional Matching
The foregoing cases emphasize the dynamic feature of post-disaster goods’
classification— that is, the typology of goods is defined by the existing technology and
institutions, both of which are constantly evolving. Disasters are exogeneous shocks that
shake existing institutions, including, in many cases, those that facilitate market
operations and the protection of property rights. Simultaneously, they also shock public
institutions and hinder public good production and provision. The cases show that, not
only do goods move across boxes/quadrants in the good classification table, but the lines
[separating the types] themselves become blurry or flexible (see Figure 6). In such
situations, a one-size-fits-all approach that does not account for the diversity and fluidity
of post-disaster goods and services, is, ineffective, if not outright detrimental to recovery
and wellbeing. Therefore, instead of adhering to a static model of good classification, I
emphasize the need to constantly reexamine the shifting nature of post-disaster goods and
services. Admittedly, this chapter provides no readymade solution that can be applied
based on bullet-point instructions. Instead, by focusing on the typology of goods, it
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provides a nuanced view of post-disaster challenges and points out that the Gargantua
approach – one that treats many aspects of post-disaster relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction, and recovery as one relief package – does not have a solid theoretical and
empirical footing. The diversity of goods and their dynamic nature means that postdisaster policy responses should be directed towards identifying and working with a
diverse set of possible institutional arrangements suited for their production and
provision. This way of understanding post-disaster challenges using the ‘institutional
matching’ paradigm as opposed to the standard optimal resource allocation view steers us
towards building a conceptual framework that matches institutional types and levels to
the nature of the good.
The Bloomington scholars emphasize ideas, but not for the sake of mere theoretical,
normative, and philosohical inquiry (Aligica, 2014). What adds weight to their ideas is
their “insistence on the fact that social scientists should try to think not only in terms of
creating theory but also of applying it” (Aligica and Boettke, 2009). The Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework that Ostrom proposed provides a
“deceptively simple” yet powerful toolkit that allows us to navigate the complexities of
the real world with multi-tiered, intertwined institutions that many technically
sophisticated models in social science even fail to recognize (p. 72). By demonstrating
through cases studies from all around the world where humans are able to craft a “wide
diversity of institutional arrangements” to “govern, provide, and manage public goods
and common-pool resources,” Ostrom asks us to take off our black-and-white glasses and
see the world in its full colorfulness (Ostrom, 2010, p. 642). The dichotomous view of
private-versus-public and market-versus-state may fit nicely into a blackboard model, but
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they cannot account for diverse institutional arrangements that communities and societies
devise to solve their problems. Nor do they adequately account for internal dynamics
within private firms (Williamson, 1975). This paper provides further evidence of the
limitations of such views in post-disaster management.
Moreover, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts following a disaster are best
characterized by co-production processes — that is, active participation of disaster
victims and other citizens is an important input into the production function. The
coordination of such co-production processes becomes increasingly difficult as the
bureaucratic hierarchy gets steeper. Sobel and Leeson (2007) attribute this difficulty to
the knowledge problem that a central planner faces in a highly idiosyncratic post-disaster
context. Another factor that exacerbates the coordination problem is one of incentive
misalignment. Regardless of how benevolent the management of a central planning
agency may be, one cannot assume that each government agent is motivated by the goals
of efficiency and equity in post-disaster aid dissemination. This is especially true when
we consider the fact that the performance of the agency is evaluated as a whole, and not
as individuals or independently mobilized teams. In light of these considerations, efforts
should be devoted to investigating polycentric approaches to post-disaster management
where a variety of adaptive institutions compete and/or cooperate in a multitude of ways
for the production and/or provision of a wide range of post-disaster goods and services.
Instead of the hopeless quest for one unified theory of human action and economic
organization that we naively assume will resolve post-disaster challenges, this paper
maintains that Ostrom’s warning that “further efforts to build a single theory are counterproductive” should be taken seriously (Ostrom, 2003)
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Conclusion
What we seek to establish in this chapter is that the typology of goods – because they are
institutionally contingent – can shift in their degrees of excludability and rivalry
following a covariate shock. Because the rationale for private or public provision of
goods stem from these two attributes, changes in the levels of these attributes must
necessarily lead to changes in institutional arrangements best suitable for their continued
provision. The foregoing cases from manmade and natural disasters demonstrate that
bottom up commercial and non-commercial institutions such as business, corporate
entities, voluntary associations, and municipal governments are better equipped to
understand the changing nature of goods during uncertain times and adjust their modes of
goods provision accordingly. CRAS and the Catholic church of MQVN are able to utilize
their rich social capital and local expertise to overcome coordination failure problems.
CRAS leveraged their organizational assets and constitutional rules in a typical
successful common-pool-resource fashion for the provision of disaster relief. The MVQN
church acted as a club to provide diverse and highly specialized goods many of which are
not typically considered club goods. Not only was the church able to provide these goods,
but it was also able to use them for the higher purpose of ensuring community return. The
case from Nepal earthquake presents a raw view into how individuals form clubs
(without even formally calling it as such) in an ad hoc basis and even coordinate with
public officials and police to rebuild their lost cultural treasures. It also presents us with
an example of how public goods can present us with private incentives that can make it
both excludable and rivalrous. In the Aceh case, although the good itself (house) only
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slightly changes its degrees of excludability and rivalrousness,36 the failure of public
institutions and the lack of market infrastructures rendered good-classification
meaningless. In this case, donor-implementers (often foreign) outperform both domestic
implementers and the government. The lack of appropriate incentives and personal stake
in the recovery process led the domestic implementers to engage in rent expropriation.
This case tells us that what may seem like local governance from outside the sheath does
not always correspond to self-governance.
Our analysis that bottom up institutions are more effective than central authorities for the
provision of local public needs is consistent with theoretical and empirical studies in
economics and public policy in a wide variety of non-disaster situations as well (Ostrom,
2015). However, those in charge of post-disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction
often present ‘bottom up’ strategies that are designed, implemented, and monitored by a
slew of experts and planners. Phrases like ‘local knowledge,’ ‘participatory approach,’
and ‘citizen science’ appear in every whitepapers and recovery plans. The cases
presented in this chapter tell us that bottom-up does not simply mean domestic or local.
The litmus test for what constitutes ‘bottom-up’ is self-governance. If the de facto rules at
the operational level are inadequate to address imminent challenges, mechanisms to make
changes in operational rules at collective-choice and constitutional levels through active
participation of self-governing citizens must be in place. Self-governance cannot be
designed as an expert-guided ‘optimal’ policy to be implemented through careful control
from benevolent rulers. Amid terror and devastation brought forth by natural disasters

36

We do not find explicit indication of excludability and rivalrouness of the good (house) changing in the
Aceh case.

114

lies an opportunity to observe, analyze, and understand diverse institutions at all levels
and of all types. Disasters have a way of presenting and amplifying the inner-workings of
all such institutions. A careful examination of post-disaster recovery processes tells us
that the entrepreneurial spirit of both private and public entrepreneurs and the sheer will
of citizens are necessary conditions for successful rebounding. Any carefully crafted
policies that threaten these conditions guide us not towards but away from recovery and
prosperity. Any successful disaster recovery is always a story of many heroes – of
private, public, and social entrepreneurs, of self-governing citizens – and never one of a
single hero, the planner-rescuer.
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CHAPTER 5
The Neither-Market-Nor-State Role of Social Entrepreneurs in PostDisaster Contexts: Evidence from the Dhurmus-Suntali Foundation’s
Giranchaur Namuna Basti Project in Nepal
Introduction
In reference to the fate of Dalits or “untouchable” communities in Sindhupalchowk,
Nepal in the aftermath of the devastating 2015 earthquake, Bownas and Bishokarma
(2018) describe the post-disaster situation as one when “the fundamental features of
society and culture and laid bare” (Oliver-Smith, 1996). That is, disasters are “crise
revalatrice” that destroy most existing infrastructures and institutions, and have
economic, social, and political ramifications that “permeate through all sectors of human
society” (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Rayamajhee et al., 2019). When a disaster strikes, it
provides social scientists a rare window into the inner-workings of all institutions, formal
and informal. Fragile institutions often cannot survive the chaos brought by disasters;
they hide, underperform, or remain dormant. Formal institutions that do not have skin-inthe-game are likely to fail, and only those with “stake in relief outcomes” stand to
succeed (Skarbek, 2014). Because voluntary organizations and informal associations
fulfill this incentive-compatibility criterion, they often play important roles in the
provision of goods and services that are critical for post-disaster recovery (Rayamajhee,
2019; Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018). However, their roles are not confined to the mere
provision of goods and services but extend to building solidarity, strengthening social
fabric, and promoting civic engagement and public participation. This is true both in
post-disaster contexts and in normal times but is more pronounced in the former context.
Often, social entrepreneurs use such organizations and associations as platforms to

116

mobilize citizens, revitalize communities, and lead to recovery and progress (ChamleeWright and Storr, 2009, 2010). However, their roles have only received meagre attention
in the academic literature (ibid.).
This article is an effort to fill that gap in the literature. Our contributions are twofold.
First, we use insights from Elinor Ostrom and the scholars of the new institutional
economics to analyze why this gap exists. We argue that the market-versus-state
dichotomous view of the economy masks the role that the ‘third sector’ plays in our
society. It isolates economics from rest of the social sciences and provides only a
parochial explanation of the broader socio-ecological and institutional foundations upon
which economic activities occur. This bipolar view deemphasizes the complex
motivational structures that characterize humans. As a result, the diverse institutional
arrangements humans devise, including private-for-profit, private-non-profit,
governmental, and community arrangements, that “operate at multiple scales to generate
productive and innovative as well as destructive and perverse outcomes” remain
unaccounted for (E. Ostrom, 2010). The purpose of this article to address that deficiency.
We build on the Ostromian arguments for institutional diversity in an attempt to situate
the ‘third sector’ within a broader framework that is unconfined by the private-public
dichotomy. We argue that the ‘third sector’ has a distinct social space that neither the
market nor the state can justifiably occupy. It is within this ‘third domain’ that citizenship
emerges and thrives. We use Ostromian insights on co-production and self-governance to
argue that social entrepreneurs operate within the ‘third domain,’ even though their roles
may often overlap with that of the private and the public sectors. While their stated
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missions often involve provision of specific goods, their activities have positive
externalities outside of the market and state.
Our second contribution is empirical. We use the case of Dhurmus Suntali Foundation’s
Namuna village project in Nepal following the 7.8 magnitude earthquake in 2015 as a
quasi-experimental set up to examine the pivotal role that social entrepreneurs play
within the ‘third sector’ domain to promote public participation, civic engagement, and
active citizenship in post-disaster contexts. We adopt Boettke and Coyne's (2009) ‘s
definition of social entrepreneurship as “entrepreneurship driven by social considerations
– peer recognition, appreciation, strengthening social ties and bonds, etc – rather than
economic (profit) or political (power) considerations” (p. 171). Dhurmus and Suntali are
actors-turned-entrepreneurs whose post-disaster entrepreneurial drive was motivated
neither by profit nor by power, so they satisfy the criteria perfectly.37 Although we have
come across a few studies in recent years that evaluate the role of social capital in
facilitating post-disaster collective action (see Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee‐Wright and Storr,
2011a; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011b; Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018; Storr et al.,
2017), the distinct role that social entrepreneurs play in such contexts remains
understudied. In a few studies that exist on this topic, the attention is overwhelmingly on
the economic or political roles of social entrepreneurs38. To the best of our knowledge, no

37

We discuss more on this in section III.

38

Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2010) and Pipa (2006) provide accounts of the role of social entrepreneurs
in post-Katrina contexts. The former’s work showcases the role that social entrepreneurs played in
resolving collective action problems; The latter’s study focuses on their roles in post-disaster relief during
the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Lacho et al. (2006) describes the role of business nonprofits
and trade associations in post-Katrina business recovery. Holcombe (2007) describes how communitybased religious congregations helped fulfill many post-disaster community needs in New Orleans.
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empirical study evaluates the distinctly ‘third sector’ role of social entrepreneurs in the
aftermath of natural disasters. Moreover, there is no academic work on the role of social
entrepreneurs in the post-disaster recovery following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. We
deem that any accounts on the post-disaster recovery of Nepal that do not adequately
highlight the role of social entrepreneurs cannot be considered thorough or accurate. This
is especially true in rural districts like Sindhulpalchowk, Gorkha, and Dolakha39, where
the government’s presence was perfunctory and private enterprises remained by and large
dysfunctional for a considerable time due to infrastructure damages (Rayamajhee and
Bohara, 2018b).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II attempts to theorize the
role of social entrepreneurs from the Ostromian perspective. Section III describes the role
that Dhurmus and Suntali played in rebuilding communities in the aftermath of the Nepal
earthquake. The section situates Dhurmus-Suntali’s contributions within the neithermarket-nor-state domain. Section IV discusses data collection, methods, and summarizes
results. Section V discusses broader implications and concludes.

Theory of Social Entrepreneurship: An Ostromian Perspective
Ostrom adopts a broad definition of institutions as: prescriptions that humans employ to
“organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 3). We
encounter institutions of varying kinds when interacting in a wide variety of complex
situations. As citizens, we expect others and are expected by others “to be able to reason
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These were also the districts most affected by the earthquake ( CRED, 2015).
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about, learn, and eventually know what to do in many diverse situations that we confront”
of which markets and states only constitute a subset (p. 4). Even among markets, there is
a great variation in rules conducive to contexts and cultures that shape the way
interactions take place. A shopping mall in Minneapolis and bazaars in Mumbai operate
with dramatically different operational rules. States are governed by widely dissimilar
constitutions and laws as well. Many of these rules governing situations and behavior are
manifested in formal documents or ratified and implemented through formal
mechanisms, organizations, and agencies. Some institutions we interact with daily
include “families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private
associations, and government at all scales” (p. 3). However, institutions can also take
tacit forms. Cultural norms, traditions, and superstitions are some common examples.
This broad view of institutions provides a special space for social entrepreneurship that
does not treat it as an aberration to the standard. In fact, one implication of the
institutional diversity perspective is that there is no single standard. Viewed this way, the
scales and distinctions that are used to characterize institutions and box them into specific
categories themselves become contestable. While scholars of other traditions may view
institutions in terms of their publicness or privateness40, Ostromian lens treats such
categorization as contestable, as merely one possible way among a multiplicity of ways to
analyze institutions. As Vincent Ostrom argues, “what constitutes the public [or private]
sector is not a matter of simple definition but is itself a contestable matter that must
necessarily be contestable in modern societies” (V. Ostrom, 2008, p. xxv). Ostroms open
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Samuelson's (1954) distinction of public goods as collective consumption goods that are non-rivalrous is
often used to make a case for the public provision of such goods because private markets are unable to
provide them due to opportunities for free-riding.
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up a crevice from within the traditional private-public dichotomy through which emerges
a space large enough to fit in a wide variety of institutional arrangements. Within that
space lies social entrepreneurship of different types – not as an exception to the rule but
as a special category of institutions with critical roles to play within the neither-marketnor-state sphere.

Two Ostromian insights are particularly useful in situating social entrepreneurship within
the institutional diversity framework – a) emergent property of institutions, and b) the
nature of goods as an analytical entry point. First, Ostrom distinguishes her treatment of
institutions from Max Black’s characterization of them as “regulations, instructions,
precepts, and principles” that are “laid down by an authority (a legislation, judge,
magistrate, board of directors, university president, parent) as required for certain
persons” (Black, 1962; E. Ostrom, 2009). While such top-down rules do fit into Ostrom’s
“list” of institutions, her understanding of institutions is exponentially more expansive41
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). In Governing the Commons, she presents cases after cases
from around the world where communities of common pool resource users have devised
and implemented rules that are not “laid down by an authority” (E. Ostrom, 1990).
Instead, many of these rules are emergent in that they address local idiosyncrasies and
sometimes peculiar local needs. Her field observations led her to conclude that, instead of
the general theory of human behavior, the focus should be in developing “more
configural approaches to the study of factors that enhance and detract from the
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Crawford and Ostrom (1995) provide a syntax for understanding diverse institutions. Their A-D-I-C-O
framework provides a comprehensive framework that can provide a systematic understanding of the roles
of all formal and informal institutions (cultural norms, values, laws, etc.) in shaping and influencing human
activities in diverse settings.
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emergence and robustness of self-organized efforts” towards the resolution of collective
action problems (E. Ostrom, 2010). Once we acknowledge the possibility of the emergent
nature of institutions (henceforth referred to as institutional emergence hypothesis), then
we can conceive of a wide diversity of institutions emerging to address infinite needs and
problems that people and communities across the world face. The mere presence of
diverse classes of problems that individuals and communities face logically dictates us to
accept that infinite institutional configurations are possible42. Among the many possible
configurations of institutions, one category is social entrepreneurship.

The institutional emergence hypothesis (IEH) discussed above reveals to us the
possibility of social entrepreneurship as a potential subset of all possible institutions.
However, not all possible institutions are feasible (Boettke and Fink, 2011). Analysis of
the institutional feasibility of social entrepreneurship requires an investigation of the
nature of goods and services it provides and the types of collective action problems it
resolves. Market-entrepreneurial theories present an entrepreneur as someone who is
‘alert to profit opportunities that already exist and are waiting to be exploited,’ (Kirzner,
1973) ‘carries out new combinations,’ and exploits ‘untapped markets,’ (Schumpeter,
1934) ‘always searches for change, responds to it and exploits an opportunity,’ (Drucker,
1985).43 We deviate from such theories in that we do not extend market-entrepreneurship
theories into the social realm. Many social entrepreneurs, including the ones this paper
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Of course, not all possible institutional configurations are feasible (Boettke and Fink, 2011).
Nonetheless, this calls for institutional plurality as the only valid framework to understand all forms of
social organizations.
43
For further details discussion of social entrepreneurs in light of market entrepreneurial theories, refer to
Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2010), pages 151-155. The authors employ such theories to discuss the role of
social entrepreneurs in post-Katrina New Orleans.
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focuses on, do not seek for profit opportunities, search for changes, or exploit
opportunities in the same way that commercial entrepreneurs may do. Moreover, often
these changes are exogeneous and unexpected. Nonetheless, one common characteristic
between social and commercial entrepreneurs is that they address needs that are not yet
(adequately) fulfilled. For instance, Austin et al. (2006) note that social entrepreneurs
fulfill social needs that are not fulfilled by markets. Based on IEH, we may also contend
that social entrepreneurs emerge not just when markets are unable to fulfill such demands
but also when the government fails to provide them. However, viewed from the
Ostromian lens, such claims fall short. If social entrepreneurs exist only to fulfill unmet
demands because other ‘legitimate’ institutions fail, then that only gives us a partial
theory of social entrepreneurship where its role is secondary. What that would imply is
that, if markets or governments function satisfactorily, the domain of social
entrepreneurship should shrink. However, the presence of well-functioning markets and
democratic governments only serve to strengthen social entrepreneurship, which is a
contradiction. Ostromian perspective forces us to reevaluate the claim. Because social
entrepreneurs operate in their own distinct realm, the fact that they provide what would
otherwise be deemed private or public goods should be viewed as positive externalities.
This begs the question: What do social entrepreneurs provide?

For Ostroms, the nature of goods and services serves as “the analytical entry point”
(Aligica and Boettke, 2009). In other words, any discussions on the appropriate roles of
the private sector or the public sector are counterproductive without adequate
consideration of the nature of goods and services that are the central to the discussion. In
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other words, questions such as “what is the good?” and “what is its nature?” need to be
answered satisfactorily before we can begin to ponder on “who should provide it?” We
contend that the “good” that social entrepreneurs provide is a platform for active
citizenship, where individuals with shared values and purpose can come together to
cultivate their common humanity. Social entrepreneurs provide a common space, – in
both physical and metaphorical sense – where citizens can practice “the science of
association and the art of associating together” (V. Ostrom, 2008, p. 94). That space is
what makes the ‘public’ possible; it is where the sense of self-governance emerges, and
seeds of democratic principles are sown. While it is often the case that social
entrepreneurs provide goods and services that can be categorized as either private or
public, they serve as intermediary goods that facilitate collective action of higher orders.
What then is the nature of that “good”? Ostromian insight on co-production is pertinent
here. As Aligica and Tarko (2013) note, the Ostroms’ extensive empirical studies
“revealed an entire series of cases wherein the collaboration between those who supplied
a service and those who used it was the factor determining the effective delivery of the
service” (p. 732). Ostromian approach places citizenship at the “center of governance
system” (Aligica, 2018, p. 3). We contend that citizenship belongs to the class of “goods
and services” that is not suitable for top-down provision because it involves a great
degree of co-production. Minus “the informed and motivated efforts of service users,”
that is, citizens’ participation in co-production processes, the service that is provided
“deteriorates into an indifferent product with insignificant value” (Aligica and Tarko,
2013; Parks et al., 1981).
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It is in the co-production of active citizenship that social entrepreneurs’ central role lies.
This is the domain that neither the private market nor the state can satisfactorily occupy.
Although the state can and does provide citizenship, it is merely formal at that level.
Social entrepreneurs provide a local platform where citizenship can be practiced, where
citizens can fulfill their part of the co-production process. Social entrepreneurs take
various roles depending on contexts. They are social activists and community organizers
for social causes, abolitionist during the times of slavery, civil and women’s rights
activists against discriminatory practices, and leaders of charitable organizations
(Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2010). When social ills exist and there is sufficient demand
for activism to eradicate such ills, social entrepreneurs fulfill that demand. When a
natural disaster strikes, and there exists a need for collective action, social entrepreneurs
work towards fulfilling that need. Often, these demands and needs may overlap with the
goods and services that markets or states typically provide. When institutions and
infrastructures necessary for their functioning are not in place, social entrepreneurs may
temporarily provide such goods and services or work towards reinstating vital
infrastructures and institutions. However, their roles are in no way “secondary,”
“tributary,” or “accidental,” but rather central to the cultivation of active citizenship
(Aligica, 2016). They occupy a vital space within the neither-market-nor-state domain
that is essential for fostering a culture of mutual assistance, charity, and solidarity upon
which formal institutions including markets or states are built.

Dhurmus-Suntali Foundation and the Giranchaur Namuna Basti
Project
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When the devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal in April 25, 2015, Sitaram
Kattel aka Dhurmus and Kunjana Ghimire aka Suntali were in Syracuse, New York as a
part of a month-long musical tour (eKantipur, 2019). The Dhurmus-Suntali duo
immediately returned to Nepal and organized relief efforts in the earthquake affected
districts. What started out as an immediate response to the devastation brought about by
the earthquake led to the establishment of the Dhurmus-Suntali Foundation (DSF). The
comedians-turned-social-entrepreneurs duo did not have a long term vision in mind when
they started, but their observations on the ground made them soon realize that there was a
dire need for reconstruction and long-term rehabilitation of earthquake victims (DSF,
2019). Immediate relief was not going to be enough. Both Dhurmus and Suntali had
become household names through their sitcom television series “Meri Bassai” that began
in 2006. Kattel remains the script writer, co-director and actor of the series. The duo was
able to mobilize their fame and public exposure to appeal for donations and acquire broad
support through social media and television outlets. After they decided that tarpaulins,
mats, noodles, and rice was not going to ensure long-run recovery, especially since entire
villages in Sindhupalchowk, Nuwakot, and Dhading were destroyed, they came up with
the idea of low-cost “integrated model villages” that would pool common resources to
rebuild settlements and necessary amenities (eKantipur, 2019). This study centers around
one such village, Giranchaur Namuna Basti (GCNB) in Sindhupalchowk.
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GCNB was the second integrated model village that DSF built for 800 people after the
Pahari Nauma Basti in Kavrepalanchowk district (DSF, 2017). 44 Dhurmus and Suntali’s
central role in the creation of Giranchaur Namuna Basti is obvious. They envisioned the
project, consolidated necessary capital, manpower and resources, and implemented it.
However, their work was only possible because of the active participation of all citizens
and input from all stakeholders. The Namuna Basti45 is emblematic of co-production
processes involved in post-disaster recovery. During the initial stages of the project,
villagers, frustrated by the lack of appropriate government response and insufficient or
unsatisfactory efforts from non-governmental agencies, were skeptical. Suntali recalls
that “Sitaram (Dhurmus) and his aides were chased away” in many instances (eKantipur,
2019). However, they soon began to form relationships with the concerned communities
and stakeholders, and were able to demonstrate that their intention was to work with the
villagers and for the villagers. As one recent study notes, both government and nongovernment agencies working towards post-disaster reconstruction “preferred to hire
outsiders” for a variety of reasons (Bownas and Bishokarma, 2018). Because outsiders
tend not to come with families to the worksite, there are less distractions. They do not
take time off for festivals or weddings and are cheaper overall (p. 8). Bownas and
Bishokarma (2018) note that Dhurmus Suntali Foundation’s integrated model village in
Giranchaur, Sindhupalchowk is a notable exception to this pattern (see fotenote 14, p. 8).
DSF’s approach was an ‘exception’ because, unlike the contractors working on behalf of
other agencies who “rarely took the effort to integrate local labor into projects,”
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GCNB comprises of 66 houses (where over a 100 families currently reside), three children parks, four
parks, three vehicle parkings, nine Child-friendly taps, four public toilets, one community hall, one view
tower, and one chautara.
45
The English translation is model village.
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Dhurmus-Suntali made active efforts to include villagers who were going to be the final
owners and caretakers of the model villages. Local participation in recovery efforts
encouraged many volunteers to join their efforts as well (Himalayan News Service,
2016a).

There is little doubt that many of the tasks that DSF shouldered, the government or
markets could deliver too, given the right set of infrastructures and institutions. However,
post-disaster situation in Sindhupalchowk was such that the infrastructures and
institutions necessary for the functioning of markets and the government were in
shambles (Rayamajhee et al., 2019). Rayamajhee (2019) also points out that institutional
changes in the aftermath of disasters create conditions where the status quo approaches
(markets or states) tend to be ineffective in the provision of goods and services. In such
cases, community-based organizations have better incentives, local knowledge, and
“stake in relief outcomes” to outperform top-down organizations and agencies (ChamleeWright and Storr, 2009; Skarbek, 2014). DSF’s success can be partly attributed to these
factors. However, large part of its success has to do with its goals that extend beyond the
provision of goods and services, that of unity, solidarity, and citizenship. Alongside
reconstruction, DSF launched what it called a unity campaign46 that had as its central
goal the unification of people for the common purpose of national reconstruction. In
Kattel’s own words, politicians’ wrongdoings “weakened unity” and further divided the
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Although DSF only officially announced its unity campaign in 2017, many of its post-disaster activities
reflect the message of unity towards nation-building. Their Namuna Basti project incorporates the HimalPahad-Tarai (Mountains-Hills-Plains) theme that is meant to unite Nepalis of diverse backgrounds spread
across three ecological belts in Nepal – the mountainous Himalayan region, the Mahabharat range, and the
fertile Terai plains.
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people of Terai (plains) and Pahad (mountains) and that there exists a dire need to
“strengthen unity and harmony”(Himalayan News Service, 2017). It is the need for
national solidarity and harmony in the time of crisis that other agencies, both private and
public, had failed to deliver that DSF addressed.

As a result, DSF was able to galvanize all sectors of the society together for its dual
mission of “uniting community” and “social development” (DSF, 2019). Dhurmus and
Suntali were able to use their fame to secure partnerships with private organizations,
corporations, government agencies. Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development
(MoFALD) provided financial (albeit nominal) and administrative support. Nepal Army
provided labor support. The newly elected Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal donated
his first salary to DSF’s campaign and noted that their campaign “has spread positive
message across the country and this is developing as a culture” (Himalayan News
Service, 2016b). Private companies donated construction materials, United Nations and
other international agencies provided vital partnerships, and other charitable
organizations joined in. Amid overwhelming attempts by all interested parties to portray
the duo as national heroes, they remained committed to their co-production model for
post-disaster recovery which puts citizens at the heart of governance. For them, citizens
were the agents of change. Dhurmus and Suntali were, and remain, mere facilitators.

Study Area and Data Collection
The dataset for our empirical analysis comes from a field survey that we conducted in
May-July, 2017 in Sindhupalchowk, Nepal. We conducted face to face interviews with
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over 500 households that were selected based on stratified randomized sampling
procedure using the conventional right-hand-rule. The 2015 earthquake claimed over
9000 Nepali lives. Sindhupalchowk district was disproportionately affected with over
3440 casualties (Shakya, 2016). The two other most affected districts are
Kavrepalanchowk and Gorkha. Following the 2015 earthquake, DSF initiated two
Namuna Basti projects, one in Pahari, Kavrepalanchowk and the second one in
Giranchaur, Sindhupalchowk. Our study area covers Giranchaur (ward 6) and all other
wards (total of 9) in the former Basbari Village Development Committee (VDC47) as well
as many wards of the surrounding Melamchi municipality. As noted in a different study
in post-earthquake Sindhupalchowk, the area went through several changes in
administrative boundaries following several regime changes (Rayamajhee and Bohara,
2018), so we used pre-2011 administrative boundaries to avoid ambiguity. Majority of
residents in Basbari and the surrounding Melamchi area rely on agriculture for their
livelihood, although remnants of the old caste-based division of labor are still visible.
Besides agricultural production, majhis48, for instance, still engage in fishing, and
pariyars49 sew clothes. Two rivers, Sindhukhola and Indrawati pass through Basbari. The
former divides Giranchaur from rest of the Basbari villages, whereas Indrawati separates
Basbari from the neighboring Koiralatar and Sipaghat. Rural villages in Nepal are
organized in clusters, with separate ethnic identities occupying separate villages. Often,
the names of these villages identify what ethnic groups/castes live there.50 Basbari is
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Each VDC, led by a VDC Chief/Chairperson, is a cluster of village units
Translated as fishermen. Majhis or danuwars are classified as Dalits.
49
Translated as tailors, also classified as Dalits.
50
For example, Koiralatar, Bhotechaur, and Sipa-Pokhare in Basbari are named after Koirala (Brahmin),
Bhotes (indigeneous), and Pokharels (Brahmin).
48
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characterized by mountainous terrain with dramatic changes in elevation in between
villages, which exacerbates post-disaster recovery challenges.

Empirical Estimation and Results
Empirical Estimation
To estimate the impact of Giranchaur Namuna Basti (GCNB) project on fostering
citizenship, the paper evaluates three measures of active citizenship (Citiz) that we deem
are relevant in post-disaster contexts: volunteering activities, community engagement,
and participation in post-disaster reconstruction efforts (PDRE). In the next section, we
show that households within the GCNB village and those living in the villages
surrounding GCNB do not have statistically significant differences insofar as metrics for
the determinants of citizenship are concerned. Nonetheless, there remain concerns that
GCNB may have had neighborhood effects in that the benefits received by GCNB could
have spilled over to neighboring villages. We cannot achieve pure randomization in that
sense. However, the fact that there may be spillover effects does not invalidate, but
instead strengthens, the case that social entrepreneurship fosters citizenship. To account
for potential differential impacts and spillover effects, we use alternate thresholds – at 10,
30, 60, 90, and 120-minute radii – to distinguish the ‘treatment’ group from ‘control’
groups.

The empirical estimation was done using the following model specification:
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"#$#%&,( = *+ + *- ."/01,& + *2 3"4& + *5 6& + *7 "4& + *8 9:;<=<>?& + *@ ABB?$&
+ *C ADD?BB& + E&

In the above set up, "#$#%&,( represents respondent i’s measure of citizenship, where m
indicates three measures: volunteering activities, community engagement, and PDRE
participation. These variables will be discussed further in the results section. ."/01,& is
our variable of interest, where r indicates different threshold levels (r) at 10, 30, 60, 90,
and 120-minute radii. For each r, GCNB takes a value of 1 if the respondent lives within
the radius and 0 if s/he lives outside the radius. Our coefficient of interest is *- . It is
possible that human capital factors (HCF) such as education, health, and occupation
could affect citizenship. Although, we shall later show that there are no statistically
significant differences across groups based on these characteristics, we include these
variables are controls in our model. Moreover, household characteristics (X) such as
household size, age of household head, as well as respondents’ gender and marital status
are included as controls. We also consider cultural factors (CF) such as caste and religion
that may explain part of the variation in outcome measures. The model also includes a
vector of disaster damage (EQ-Damage) variables (home damage, property damage and
injuries) to account for the lingering impacts of the 2015 earthquake on citizenship.
Family resources was controlled for using asset index. Additionally, we use distance to
the nearest market center to control for the access to and presence of commercial
activities (Access) that may serve to foster interaction. Participation in community-based
microfinance organizations is also included in the model. When estimating each model,
standard errors are clustered by wards (village units).
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Results
The GCNB project placement in Giranchaur was random, at least insofar as the metrics
for civic engagement and citizenship are concerned. In fact, during our conversations
with officials at the Dhulikhel Hospital’s Bahunepati clinic, we learned that several other
villages had been considered as potential sites, including Majhi-gaun and Thapa-gaun.
The choice of Giranchaur was not born out of convenience. For one, Thapa-gaun or
villages in the vicinity of Bahunepati bazaar would have been more convenient and
significantly cheaper. Giranchaur spans wards 5 and 6, which are at least an hour and a
half uphill hike away from the main road. Parts of ward 6 took us up to 2 hours (of hike)
to get to, which makes it a ‘bad choice’ in logistical terms. Also, the fact that Giranchaur
was predominantly occupied by Tamangs and Lamas, both of which are indigenous
groups, tells us that it was not due to the efforts from community leaders’ or the
community’s social capital that attracted Dhurmus-Suntali to Giranchaur. Brahmin and
Chhetris have enjoyed political and social privileges in the Hindu-dominated cultures for
centuries and are more likely to have high social and political capital than indigenous
groups or other castes (Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2019). Dhurmus and Suntali themselves
belong to Brahmin-Chhetri groups, so if their choice was based on cultural or caste
proximity, Tiwari-gaun, Thapa-gaun, or Parajuli-gaun could have been chosen. Table 1
(columns 1, 2, and 3) presents comparison between GCNB and non-GCNB households.
We find that they are not significantly different in any consequential way. Their access to
markets, participation in microfinance groups, household sizes, age of household heads,
gender composition, education levels, occupations, agricultural land, and self-assessed
health are statistically identical. We do see differences in caste and religion composition
across GCNB and non-GCNB households, a very expected scenario in consideration of
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the diverse cultural heterogeneity in Nepal (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). However, as
Varughese and Ostrom (2001) show, the wide cultural heterogeneity is “not a strong
predictor of the level of collective activity.” Their influence in that realm is limited to
birth, marriage, and funeral rituals, which is also evident from the observed differences in
marital statuses across the two groups. Moreover, the 2015 earthquake led to similar
levels of destruction across both groups, both in terms of damages to dwelling facilities
and property. So, it was not the level of destruction that determined the choice of
Giranchaur.

Volunteering Activities
We asked each household representative if they have recently engaged in any voluntary
activity (at both individual and collective levels) for the benefit of the community. We
also made sure to distinguish such activity from their engagement in the GCNB project.
The distinction is important because involvement in GCNB cannot be viewed as
volunteering, even if they may have worked without pay, because there are economic
gains to be made from such involvement. Furthermore, DSF employed (and paid) local
villagers even if they were going to be the beneficiaries of the Namuna Basti once
rebuilding was completed. We recorded their responses as either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no.’ Table 2
reports findings from logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by wards.
Columns 1 and 2 present the impact that DSF’s ‘intervention’ had on community
members’ involvement in volunteering activities. Dist0 indicates within GCNB (if
dist0=1) and without (if dist0=0). Controls (column 2) included in the model are:
participation in microfinance groups, distance to the nearest market center
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(bazaar/chowk), age of household head, education, occupation, asset, marital status,
religion, caste, and earthquake damage variables. Controlling for potential factors that
could influence volunteering activities, we find that DSF’s GCNB project has significant
impact on volunteering activities. To account for potential spillover effects, we also use
different thresholds: 10, 30, 60, 90, and 120-minute radii from the GCNB village. The
distance in time is used because geolocation-based distance can mask the ruggedness of
mountainous terrain. We deem that villagers’ ‘local knowledge’ of the relative distance is
more relevant than the absolute distance. We find evidence for the presence of spillover
effects up to an hour away from the project location (columns 3-8).51 Table 3 reports
marginal effects. Residents of the GCNB village are over 17% more likely to engage in
volunteering activities than non-residents (columns 1 and 2). As we increase the radius to
10, 30, and 60-minute distances, we see that in-group residents, compared to out-group
residents, are 12%, 8.9%, and 7.5% more likely to engage in volunteering activities, after
controlling for all the variables previously discussed.

Community Engagement
Next, we asked how involved each respondent was in her/his community. We specified
that community engagement constitutes involvement in local governments, and local
voluntary associations and organizations (both formal and informal). Each respondent
was asked to rate their community engagement on a likert-scale ranging from 1 (meaning
‘very inactive’) to 5 (meaning ‘very active’). Because only 27 and 57 responses were
recorded as 2 (‘somewhat inactive’) and 3 (‘neutral’), we reorganized the bins in a 1-3
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Appendix TableA1 presents results for dist90 and dist120.
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scale, and recoded 1 to mean ‘inactive/neutral.’ Table 3 reports results from ordered
logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by wards on community engagement.
Results from column 1 and 2 indicate that the GCNB project has positive effects on
community engagement. Columns 3-8 suggests that there exist significant spillover
effects up to an hour outside the GCBN village.52 Results are robust to inclusion or
exclusion of all control variables discussed in the previous section. Table 5 reports
average marginal effects. We find that residents of the GCNB village are 18% less likely
to remain inactive, 7% more likely to remain active, and 11% more likely to remain very
active, compared to non-residents.53 If 10-minute radius is considered as a cut-off
threshold, we find that the effect diminishes in magnitude but persists: 15% less likely to
remain inactive, 6% more likely to remain active, and 9% more likely to remain very
active. We see significant spillover effects up to an hour away. Findings on community
engagement are consistent with those on volunteering activities.

Participation in Post-disaster Reconstruction Efforts (PDRE)
Finally, we asked each respondent how much they agree that they participate in current
post-disaster reconstruction efforts. Responses were recorded in a likert-scale ranging
from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). Bins 1 (‘strongly disagree’) and 2
(‘somewhat disagree’) had insufficient responses (35 and 32), so we reorganized them as
a 3-point-likert scale and recoded them to mean a) low-1 if responses were ‘strongly
disagree,’ ‘somewhat disagree’ or ‘neutral,’ medium-2 if the response was ‘agree’ and

52
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The spillover effect dissipates outside the 60-minute radius. See Appendix Table A3 for results.
These results are from models that include control variables.
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high-3 if the response was ‘strong agree.’ Table 6 presents results from ordered logistic
regressions with standard errors clustered by wards on PDRE. Compared to results for
volunteering activities and community engagement, we find that GCNB’s impacts on
PDRE had wider spillover effects. The effects persisted up to a 90-minute radius. Even at
120-minute radius, there were lingering effects (although not robust to model
specifications with control variables). Average marginal effects reported in table 7 show
that residents of GCNB are 9% less likely to have low levels of PDRE-participation, and
7% more like to have high levels of participation.54 We find no significant marginal
effects for the medium PDRE-participation rate. Consistent with results from Table 6,
findings from Table 7 show that GCNB has consistent spillover effects on PDRE up to
90-minute radius. Unlike volunteering activities and community engagement, the effects
do not seem to systematically decline at a steady rate. Although these effects dissipate
after 90-minute radius, at cut offs below the 90-minute mark, the effects seem to depend
less on the threshold chosen.

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is not to present a heroic portrayal of Kunjana Ghimire and
Sitaram Kattel. Instead, using Dhurmus and Suntali’s social entrepreneurial roles in
fostering citizenship as one case study, we attempt to link “the problem of citizenship and
the model of social agency” with the overarching goal of placing the Ostroms’ work in
the context of the institutionalist program. This need has been articulated by several
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These numbers are based on results reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) that include all control
variables. Columns (1), (3), and (6) present model-findings without control variables.
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scholars of the Ostromian tradition, most notably and vigorously by Paul Aligica (2018).
Aligica (2018) contends that the citizenship-social agency relationship that Ostroms try to
capture “are not outliers driven by the Ostroms’ normative priors fueled by their interest
in self-governance” (p. 119). Instead it consitutes an integral part of the institutionalist
research agenda that requires further investigation on both theoretical and empirical
levels (ibid.). Viewed from this perspective, the notion of citizenship is not an
exogeneous construct with no human agency. Instead, citizenship emerges when
atomistic individuals previously stuck in the blackboard-type Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
games ‘decide’ to interact with each other (e.g. Gurven and Winking, 2008), establish
mutual bonds (e.g. Rayamajhee and Bohara, 2018), forge collective narratives (e.g.
Chamlee‐Wright and Storr, 2011), and collectively manage their common resources (e.g.
Ostrom, 2015). In each case these studies, there are social entrepreneurs, told and untold,
working to faciliate interaction and coordination in constitional, collective-choice, and
operational levels.

This renewed view of social entrepreneurship based on the centrality of human agency in
all economic and non-economic activities asks us to reconsider the prior equilibriumcentric methods of theorizing in light of a revised one characterized by “possibilism” and
“responsibility” (Aligica, 2018, 137). Possiblism, because human ingenuity and agency
always exceeds theoretical expectations, as Ostrom’s work convinces us. She asks
theorists and practitioners to imagine “a world of possibility” and not of “necessity” (E.
Ostrom 1998, 15-16). Responsibility, because no theory of human behavior or society,
“no method or algorithm,” “no operations research, systemic thinking, or expert system”
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can save us from the “troubles of judgment, analysis, and responsibility” (Aligica, 2018,
137). The role of social entrepreneurs become pivotal in political economy conceived this
way. However, it is not just a matter of perspective. Heaps of empirical studies, including
a handful ones mentioned in this paper, are consistent with that narrative. In Ostrom’s
own words, “we are neither trapped in inexorable tragedies nor free of moral
responsibility for creating and sustaining incentives that facilitate our own achievement
of mutually productive outcomes” (E. Ostrom, 1998). A diversity of social actors,
citizens and social entrepreneurs alike, have devised and will continue to devise ways that
flummoxes all theorists of human behavior and society.

Once we bring back human agency into the analysis of social processes as a vibrant
alterantive to the structural determinism perspective, social entrepreneurs occupy a
crucial spot in the polital economy space. Just as competitive markets become possible
through the ingenuity and dedication of commercial entrepreneurs, citizenship emerges
from the active human agency of social entrepreneurs. Profit opportunities in the
untapped markets do not automatically generate new players in the game. Market
entrepreneurs actively look for such opportunities, use their endowment and capabilities,
take considerable risks, overcome adversities, and introduce new products. Understood
this way, competition is an emergent outcome built on the efforts of many entrepreneurs,
and not an axiomatic premise. An analogous logic of human agency applies to social
entrepreneurs. Social entrepreneurs may not seek for profit opportunities, but they
respond to social challenges and community needs, motivate individuals and
communities to forge alliances, innovate incentive-compatible strategies for co-
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production, and find ways to overcome hurdles. In other words, citizenship emerges as
part of many co-production processes.

Elinor Ostrom’s early investigations of entrepreneurs in the public sector comparable to
those in the private markets, vis-à-vis public entrepreneurs, guided much of her later
study of public economies and commons. A social entrepreneur differs from a public
entrepreneur in one fundamental sense.55 Polycentricity and competitive governance are
“preconditions” for public entrepreneurship in that only a governance framework
characterized by multiple, overlapping jurisdictions organized across different levels of
governments can provide public entrepreneurs with appropriate incentives to engage in
entrepreneurial ventures within the public domain (Aligica, 2018, p. 21). This, however,
is not a strong precondition for a social entrepreneur. One may think of social and
political activists like Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, or a more pertinent case of
Dhurmus-Suntali where governance systems exhibit substantial monocentric tendencies.
Nonetheless, polycentricity, although not essential, can at times be catalytic to social
entrepreneurship. Other times, social entrepreneurship can emerge precisely to address
the lack of polycentric arrangements conducive to human well-being. The distinction and
interaction between formal and informal institutions will help further clarify this point.
Formal and informal institutions56 operate in conjunction, united across multiple facets

55

Social and public entrepreneurs share common features: they are both largely motivated by the goal of
solving collective action problems and social dilemmas. Their roles can often overlap, and the distinction
can appear blurry. However, they are not identical. Social entrepreneurs are from within the citizenry,
whereas public entrepreneurs work in the public sector. The latter can be bureaucrats, politicians, judges, or
police working in various areas and levels of the public sector.
56
Formal institutions include economic, political, legal institutions that typically operate according to
codified, established set of rules. Informal institutions include social norms, practices, customs, rituals,
traditions that are relatively loosely organized and codified (ibid.).
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but also fragmented by multiple sutures, at different levels and scales (p. 125). Social
entrepreneurs are the bridges between formal and informal institutions. They understand
both the de facto and the de jure rules, and are able to navigate through granular areas
where the two classes of rules do not match. Often social entrepreneurial roles involve
smoothing the granular surfaces marked by inconsistencies across the de facto and de
jure arenas. Social entrepreneurs operate in the muddy zone in between the markets and
states. They bridge the formal and the informal, and work for the people and often with
the government. Their success is contingent on their ability to recognize “local and
personal knowledge of the social actors directly involved on the ground,” adapt their
strategies constantly to cater to changing circusmtances, and work alongside citizens in
co-productive processes (p. 131). The empirical findings from our analysis of the
Dhurmus-Suntali Foundation’s work in Giranchaur solidifies this case.
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VARIABLES
Part in Microfinance
Dist. nearest market
Health (self-assesd)
Education-hhhead
Occupationagriculture
Agric. land (ropanis)
Household size
Age-hhhead
Female
Marital Status
Religion-Hindu
CasteBrahminChhetri

Table 3. 1: Means Comparisons Across Groups
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0 min radius
p-value
10 min radius
Inside
Outside
(1)-(2)
Inside
Outside
.605
(.080)
57.92
(5.21)
2.368
(.138)
1.657
(.094)
.710

.484
(.023)
47.89
(2.35)
2.260
(.038)
1.574
(.027)
.686

(.074)
9.027
(1.40)
6
(.496)
45.28
(2.170)
.5
(.082)
.736
(.072)
.184
(.063)
.0526

(.021)
7.787
(.422)
5.574
(.100)
48.16
(.652)
.559
(.022)
.847
(.016)
.756
(.019)
.449

0.1512
0.2349
0.4452
0.4018
0.7584

0.4190
0.2653
0.2285
0.4800
0.0744
0.0000
0.0000

.593
.064
52.32
3.868
2.372
.115
1.644
(.071)
.762

.48
(.023)
48.16
(2.452)
2.254
(.039)
1.572
(.028)
.678

(.055)
8.892
(1.110)
6
(.360)
46.389
(1.646)
.508
(.065)
.745
(.057)
.237
(.055)
.135

(.022)
7.746
(.433)
5.554
(.103)
48.150
(.673)
.560
(.023)
.851
(.016)
.776
(.019)
.456

(6)
p-value
(4)-(5)
0.1023
0.5485
0.3092
0.3799
0.1898

0.3626
0.1555
0.3685
0.4464
0.0378
0.0000
0.0000

(.036)
(.022)
(.044)
(.023)
House Damage
.894
.800
0.1582
.813
.807
0.9059
(.050)
(.018)
(.051)
(.018)
Property Damage
.8157
.786
0.6664
.745
.793
0.3968
(.063)
(.018)
(.057)
(.019)
Injuries
.3421
.334
0.9265
.423
.323
0.1265
(.077)
(.021)
(.064)
(.022)
Observations
38
472
59
451
Note: Means comparisons across 30, 60, 90, 120-minute radii can be made available upon request.
The differences between in- and out- groups gets further diminished (both magnitude and
significance levels) as we increase radii from 30 onwards.
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VARIABL
ES
dist0

Table 3. 2: Logit Regression Results for Volunteering
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
volunte volunte volunte volunte volunte volunte volunte
er
er
er
er
er
er
er
0.731*
**
(0.283)

0.795*
**
(0.266)

dist10

0.507*
**
(0.136)

0.551*
**
(0.189)

dist30

0.434*
**
(0.107)

0.407*
**
(0.136)

dist60

Constant

0.167
(0.122)

(8)
volunte
er

-0.589
(0.896)

0.161
(0.117)

-0.627
(0.923)

0.144
(0.116)

-0.641
(0.907)

0.384*
**
(0.0930
)
0.150
(0.111)

0.342**
*
(0.124)
-0.643
(0.888)

Observation
507
505
507
505
507
505
507
505
s
EQ Damage
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Log-346.3
-315.6
-346.9
-316.2
-346.8
-316.5
-347.1
-316.8
likelihood
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Controls
included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion,
Occupation of household head, household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage
(injury/death), home damage, property damage.
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Table 3. 3: Average Marginal Effects for Volunteering
VARS
dist0

(1)
ME

(2)
ME

0.179**

0.173*
**
(0.055)

(0.069)
dist10

(3)
ME

(4)
ME

0.124*
**
(0.034)

0.120*
**
(0.042)

dist30
dist60

(5)
ME

(6)
ME

0.106*
**
(0.026)

0.089*
**
(0.030)

(7)
ME

(8)
ME

0.094*
**
(0.023)

0.074*
**
(0.027)

N
507
505
507
505
507
505
507
505
EQNo
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Damage
Variables
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Controls included in
the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market center, age of
household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of
household head, household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death),
home damage, property damage.
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Table 3. 4: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Community Engagement
VARIABLES

dist0
dist10

(1)
Comm
Engag

(2)
Comm
Engag

(3)
Comm
Engag

(4)
Comm
Engag

0.542***
(0.176)

0.745**
(0.292)

Constant cut1
Constant cut2

(6)
Comm
Engag

(7)
Comm
Engag

(8)
Comm
Engag

0.679*** 0.873***
(0.154)
(0.289)

dist30
dist60

(5)
Comm
Engag

0.657*** 0.817***
(0.151)
(0.189)
0.613*** 0.730***
(0.139)
(0.212)
0.179**
0.420
0.192**
0.461
0.244***
0.565
0.241***
0.586
(0.0914) (0.632) (0.0831) (0.641) (0.0902) (0.621) (0.0907)
(0.616)
1.677*** 2.160*** 1.689*** 2.202*** 1.752*** 2.318*** 1.746*** 2.333***
(0.165)
(0.679)
(0.143)
(0.678)
(0.132)
(0.645)
(0.129)
(0.641)

Observations
507
505
507
505
507
505
507
505
EQ Damage
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Log-likelihood
-502.2
-451.3
-502.3
-451.2
-500
-449.1
-500.5
-450
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Controls included in the
model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market center, age of household head,
education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head, household assets.
EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage
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Table 3. 5: Average Marginal Effects for Community Engagement
VARIABLES
Inactive
Active
Very Active

dist0

(1)
-0.168***
(0.0370)

(2)
-0.181***
(0.0560)

(3)
0.0744***
(0.0245)

(4)
0.0723***
(0.0234)

(5)
0.0934***
(0.0141)

(6)
0.109***
(0.0337)

dist10

(7)
-0.134***
(0.0428)

(8)
-0.154***
(0.0583)

(9)
0.0593***
(0.0199)

(10)
0.0617***
(0.0224)

(11)
0.0745***
(0.0250)

(12)
0.0925**
(0.0366)

dist30

(13)
-0.161***
(0.0357)

(14)
-0.168***
(0.0335)

(15)
0.0712***
(0.0175)

(16)
0.0669***
(0.0117)

(17)
0.0899***
(0.0211)

(18)
0.101***
(0.0229)

dist60

(19)
-0.150***
(0.0328)

(20)
-0.150***
(0.0396)

(21)
0.0665***
(0.0153)

(22)
0.0600***
(0.0137)

(23)
0.0839***
(0.0204)

(24)
0.0904***
(0.0265)

dist90

(25)
-0.0161
(0.0681)

(26)
0.0529
(0.0756)

(27)
0.00715
(0.0296)

(28)
-0.0213
(0.0323)

(29)
0.00893
(0.0384)

(30)
-0.0316
(0.0434)

dist120

(31)
-0.0637
(0.0723)

(32)
-0.00385
(0.0648)

(33)
0.0283
(0.0322)

(34)
0.00155
(0.0261)

(35)
0.0354
(0.0405)

(36)
0.00230
(0.0387)

Observations
507
505
507
505
507
505
EQ Damage
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Variables
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Controls included in the
model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market center, age of
household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of
household head, household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death),
home damage, property damage.
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Table 3. 6: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Participation in Post-disaster Reconstruction Efforts (PDRE)
VARIABLES

(1)
PDRE

(2)
PDRE

dist0

0.598**

0.479**

(0.286)

(0.242)

dist10

(3)
PDRE

(4)
PDRE

0.568***
(0.212)

0.383*
(0.212)

dist30

(5)
PDRE

(6)
PDRE

0.749***

0.581***

(0.196)

(0.214)

dist60

(7)
PDRE

(8)
PDRE

0.779***

0.618***

(0.200)

(0.236)

dist90

(9)
PDRE

(10)
PDRE

0.778***

0.544**

(0.239)

(0.249)

dist120
-0.725*

-0.902***

-0.708*

-0.848***

-0.612

-0.840***

-0.573

-0.680***

-0.450

(11)
PDRE

(12)
PDRE

0.734**

0.485

(0.359)

(0.304)

-0.491*

-0.336

Const cut 1

-0.92***

(0.117)

(0.401)

(0.113)

(0.400)

(0.0926)

(0.426)

(0.0920)

(0.414)

(0.136)

(0.356)

(0.282)

(0.431)

Const cut 2

1.532**
*
(0.188)

1.944***

1.555***

1.960***

1.635***

2.074***

1.648***

2.116***

1.838***

2.249***

2.010***

2.347***

(0.344)

(0.186)

(0.347)

(0.166)

(0.365)

(0.169)

(0.350)

(0.237)

(0.311)

(0.398)

(0.433)

506
503
506
503
506
503
506
503
506
503
506
503
Observations
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Controls
-505.2
-474.9
-504.7
-475
-501.5
-473.1
-500.9
-472.7
-497.2
-471.8
-499
-472.9
Lg-likelihood
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups,
distance to nearest market center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets, and EQ damage variables.
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Table 3. 7: Average Marginal Effects for Participation in Post-disaster Reconstruction Efforts
VARIABLES

Low

Medium

High

dist0

(1)
-0.119**
(0.0588)

(2)
-0.0882**
(0.0438)

(3)
0.0294
(0.0249)

(4)
0.0210
(0.0129)

(5)
0.0899**
(0.0380)

(6)
0.0672**
(0.0328)

dist10

(7)
-0.113**
(0.0447)

(8)
-0.0706*
(0.0389)

(9)
0.0277
(0.0215)

(10)
0.0168
(0.0123)

(11)
0.0853***
(0.0253)

(12)
0.0538*
(0.0275)

dist30

(13)
-0.148***
(0.0395)

(14)
-0.107***
(0.0383)

(15)
0.0365*
(0.0199)

(16)
0.0255**
(0.0127)

(17)
0.112***
(0.0234)

(18)
0.0811***
(0.0274)

dist60

(19)
-0.154***
(0.0398)

(20)
-0.113***
(0.0420)

(21)
0.0381*
(0.0205)

(22)
0.0271**
(0.0135)

(23)
0.116***
(0.0233)

(24)
0.0861***
(0.0303)

dist90

(25)
-0.152***
(0.0468)

(26)
-0.0998**
(0.0447)

(27)
0.0381*
(0.0224)

(28)
0.0243*
(0.0147)

(29)
0.114***
(0.0288)

(30)
0.0755**
(0.0312)

dist120

(31)
-0.144**
(0.0703)

(32)
-0.0888
(0.0544)

(33)
0.0364
(0.0298)

(34)
0.0211
(0.0165)

(35)
0.108**
(0.0464)

(36)
0.0677*
(0.0396)

Observations
506
503
506
503
506
503
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls included in the model are:
participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market center, age of household head,
education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head, household
assets, and EQ damage variables.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
If not “Leviathan” it must be “anarchy” is the dominant dogma in post-disaster
management (E. Ostrom, 2010). All four papers (chapters 2-5) in this dissertation contest
the myopic market-state dichotomy from which the dogma emerges. First, the challenges
that stem from the failure of markets to facilitate voluntary transactions and the inability
of private associations to resolve many collective action problems during a post-disaster
situation do not automatically lend themselves to the “Leviathan” disaster management
approach. In fact, our findings in chapter 2 indicate that Nepal government’s attempt to
monitor and control post-disaster relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery has
only exacerbated the problem.

Secondly, such false dichotomy masks the critical role that voluntary associations and
social entrepreneurs play in post-disaster contexts. In chapter 3, I empirically demonstrate
that communities are able to mobilize their social capital to build trust among one another
to resolve post-disaster collective action problems. Chapter 5 presents a case from
Dhurmus-Suntali Foundation’s Giranchaur Namuna Basti Project in post-earthquake
Nepal to underscore the distinctly neither-market-nor-state role that social entrepreneurs
play in post-disaster recovery. Using DSF-GCNB’s post-disaster involvement as a quasiexperimental set up, I highlight their social entrepreneurial role in the co-production of
active citizenship. I argue that this role is uniquely social entrepreneurial in that neither
the market nor the state has appropriate incentives to address it.
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Thirdly, the Gargantua post-disaster management derives its theoretical motivation from
the “publicness” of post-disaster challenges. That is, any post-disaster challenge, when
viewed as a Prisoners’ Dilemma puzzle, can be characterized as one mired with freeriding opportunities. In a similar vein, the provision of post-disaster goods and services
towards relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction are implicitly assumed to be nonexcludable and non-rivalrous. Chapter 4 contests the pure publicness or privateness of
such goods. Using institutional-contingency of excludability and rivalrousness as a
premise, I present cases where disaster shocks lead to institutional changes thereby
changing the nature of post-disaster goods and services defined in terms of excludabilityrivalrousness attributes. The policy approach, understood from this lens, is one of
“institutional matching” rather than optimal resource allocation. Such approach provides
a better theoretical framework to account for a diverse set of institutional arrangements
suited to different contexts that individuals, households, and communities devise to
overcome many post-disaster challenges.

All four papers in this dissertation attempt to link theoretical insights from Elinor Ostrom
and the Bloomington School to post-disaster settings. Among my central contributions is
to present the relevance of Ostromian insights to non-CPR settings where the goods and
services are not necessarily non-excludable but subtractible. This work is by no means
comprehensive. In fact, I have barely scratched the surface. Readers of this dissertation
should view this work as setting up a foundation to build more robust research programs
that extend Ostromian insights from their study of common pool resources and local
public economies to understand self-governance and resilience in a wide variety of
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settings with different challenges. Rather than taking Ostromian prescriptions such as the
‘design principles’ and directly applying it to other settings, these chapters reveal to us
the possibility of employing the Ostroms’ analytical tools to generate new set of ‘design
principles’ to fit into diverse contexts. Ostromian approach is not merely one of testing an
established theory or ascertaining narrow causality. Instead, it is one that encourages
learning from individuals and communities. Blackboard theories are useful but should not
be treated as end-all-be-all of social sciences. Researchers of human behavior and
organization should keep our eyes wide open and be ever-ready to be surprised by the
‘subjects’ we are studying.
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1. Theory of Reciprocal Norms and Collective Action
In Manebhanjyang, a rural village in Basbari, village elders are considering a postearthquake collective action project involving the reconstruction of a local stupa
(Buddhist shrine) that was damaged by the 2015 earthquakes. Our representative
individual Pemba, who resides in Manebhanjyang, is contemplating whether or not to
participate in the reconstruction project. We characterize Pemba, not based on strict
rational egoist assumptions, but on characteristics consistent with norms of intrinsic
reciprocity (Sobel, 2005). That is, his volitions and actions are subject to the tribunal of
the impartial spectator, – to that of the man within the breast, – whose “jurisdiction is
founded in the desire of praise-worthiness, and in the aversion to blame-worthiness”
(Smith [1759] 1982, p. 130-131). His ill-actions, even when unnoticed by outside
spectators, haunt him, and he is angered when someone deceives him. In both instances,
he experiences a subtraction from his net utility (ψ), – by guilt in the first case and by
anger in the second. Similarly, when his good actions are reciprocated by good actions
from others, he feels a sense of approbation (“warm glow”); when he retaliates
someone’s bad action with a similar bad action unto them, he feels a sense of “getting
even.” In such cases, he experiences an increase in his overall utility (β).

To conceptualize this formally, we adopt a modified public-good game from Ferguson
(2013) and retain his notations (p. 96). Pemba’s utility (pay-off) function is given by:
(1) !" = −%" + ' (
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,
)-.

%) + *+ / − *0 ψ.

In equation (1), % is the cost of contributing towards collective action, ' < 1 is the
marginal product of %, N is the maximum number of eligible contributors in
Manebhanjyang, j=1,….N, *+ is the proportion of players who take the same action as
Pemba, and *0 is the proportion of those who take the opposite strategy. Although a
multitude of institutional arrangements can exist, independently or simultaneously, that
produce a variety of pay-off structures57, a non-overlapping institution characterized by a
social norm (SN) arrangement with no material or social sanctions is adequate for out
exposition. 58 59 In this institutional arrangement, the interconnectivity between members
in a community, that is, the community’s intrinsic social capital, directly manifests
through social norms (SN). In turn, SN shapes the payoff structure through / and ψ by
determining what constitutes a socially laudable or reprehensible behavior. Incorporating
/ > 0 and ψ > 0 into the pay-off function changes the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game of public-good provision into an assurance game, such that a possibility of a
successful collective action emerges. This is critical because models based on strict
rational egoist assumptions that do not fully explain cooperation that occurs in many

57

The institutional framework that our formal model is based upon is that of a [typical] social norm of the
A-D-I-C structure which has a deontic (D) but no or-else (O) statement. For further details on the ‘syntax’
of institutions, refer to Crawford & Ostrom (1995).
58
Ferguson defines SN as “mutually understood and expected behavioral regularity” that determines one’s
ethical worldview within the social domain ( 2013, p. 168). Bowles’s (2009) definition is similar: SN are
“ethical prescriptions governing actions towards others” (p. 97). Fehr and Gachter's (2000) experimental
findings highlight the role of punishment in reducing incidences of free-riding, but we contend that social
enforcement through explicit social or material sanction is not necessary for [social] normative
prescriptions to effectively increase cooperation levels in post-disaster settings.
59
Consideration of the underlying institutions under which the games of life are played and the pay-offs
are attained is vital to developing a fuller understanding of collective action. As William Riker (1980) puts
it, “we cannot study simply tastes and values, but must study institutions as well” (p. 444). Institutions
shape motivations, behavior, and outcomes. Our choice of intrinsic reciprocity based SN reflects a specific
social setting of a rural Nepali village as it pertains to post-disaster collective action. Many concurrent
institutional rules with stronger deontic (D) and severe or-else (O) statements can co-exist in other facets of
social life.
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CAPs in the lab and field (Gächter, 2006; Ostrom, 2000). Again, following Ferguson
(2013), we interpret the [joint] magnitude of / and ψ as reflecting mutual trust within an
institutional framework of reciprocal norms.60 We represent this by 8(:, <, =>) = / + ψ
for simplicity, where mutual trust depends on the interplay between one’s personality,
number of interactions, and the social norms that determine what constitutes propriety
and impropriety.

With all the aforementioned considerations, we now proceed to a n-person game of
assurance. Let C(n+1) and D(n) represent Pemba’s payoff functions corresponding to
strategies C (contribute to collective action) and D (do not contribute to collective action)
respectively. When Pemba cooperates (i.e. n+1 cooperators), we have:61
D

(2) @(A + 1) = [(A + 1)' − 1]% + , / −
(3) G(A) = A'% +
D

(,E.ED)

Note that we replace *+ and *0 from (1) with , and

,

,

F;

D

/ − , F.

(,E.ED)
,

(,E.ED)

in equations (2) and (3)

respectively. Also, it is assumed that the utility loss from anger and guilt are equal, and
that utility gain from “getting even” (from both C-C and D-D strategies) are also equal.
Figure 1 (in the manuscript) provides a graphical depiction of the n-person game

60

As the number of repeated interactions increase, the magnitude of |/ + ψ| increase proportionately. This
“common perception of relatively high values for / and ψ” has been characterized as reflecting mutual
trust pertaining to others’ motivations (Ferguson, 2013, p. 100).
61
Social and material sanctions (s) can incorporated into the model through an addition of a sanction term
(s) into equations (2) and (3) (For delineation on an expanded model with sanctions, refer to chapter 5 in
Ferguson (2013)). The corresponding pay-off functions take the following forms:
(,E.ED)
D
@(A + 1) = [(A + 1)' − 1]% + , / − , (F − I) − I J /F;
G(A) = A'% +
(,E.ED)
,

D

D

/ − , F − ,ED I
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represented by equations (2) and (3). Note that the dotted lines correspond to a PD-game
(with no norms of reciprocity), whereas the solid lines are payoffs associated with an
assurance game (with norms of reciprocity).

In a game of assurance like the one depicted in Figure 1, for any value of n<n*, where n*
is the point where curves C(n+1) and D(n) intersect, each participant has an incentive to
choose not to participate in collective action as D(n)> C(n+1), which means that the only
stable Nash equilibrium (s-NE) in this region is at n=0. Similarly, in the n>n* region
where C(n+1)> D(n), the choice to participate dominates that of shirking, so another
stable Nash equilibrium emerges at n=N. There is a third equilibrium in the game: at the
point where n=n*. This is, however, a highly unstable equilibrium (u-NE) because one
participant’s decision to flip leads to a landslide-effect pushing the final outcome to one
of the end-point equilibria. This u-NE occurs when D(n)=C(n+1), and the corresponding
solution for n* is:
(4) A ∗=

,[(.EM)NOP(Q,R,S,)]EP(Q,R,S,)
JP(Q,R,S,)

Equation (4) has several implications. First, an increase in the cost of participation (c)
pushes n* further right; that is, it shrinks the n>n* region making the choice to contribute
(C) less appealing. Second, as group size (N) increases, cooperative outcome becomes
increasingly difficult to attain. However, high levels of mutual trust 8(:, <, =>) results in
opposite effects; 8(:, <, =>) increases the likelihood of cooperative outcome (that is,
contribution towards collective action). Moreover, once C(n+1)> D(n) emerges,
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8(:, <, =>) generates stability as its magnitude increases with repeated interaction (t)62
(ibid., p.95).

2. Model Identification
Identification of structural equation models remains a major challenge that receives
inadequate attention. Although structural modeling software provide identification tests,
they simply rely on sample estimates of parameters (Bollen and Davis, 2009), which
cannot sufficiently, at least not on theoretical grounds, establish identification. Because
an unidentified model means that at least one parameter value is not unique, results can
be misleading. In this section, we briefly discuss order (necessary) and rank (both
necessary and sufficient) conditions for the identification of our model.
Order Condition:
To satisfy the order condition in a model of M simultaneous questions, for each equation,
the number of predetermined (exogeneous) variables excluded from the equation must be
equal to or more than the number of endogenous variables minus one in that equation
(Gujarati, 2009). That is: K-k ≥ m-1 must hold, where K and k are numbers of
predetermined variables in the model and the specific equation under consideration
respectively, and m is the number of endogenous variables in the given equation. Blockindependence implies that we can evaluate the two sets (blocks) of equations separately.
The first equation is exactly identified (K-k= 6-3, m-1=3), the second equation is
overidentified (K-k=6-1, m-1=2), the third and fourth equations are overidentified (K-

62

Repeated interactions increase the degree of familiarity among players, which in turns increases the level

of mutual trust and reciprocity: |

TP(Q∗S,;R)
TR

| > 0.
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k=2, m-1=0). The second block comprising of the measurement part of the model only
connects to the main SEM through equation 2 (V ∗ ), which is overidentified. Each
equation in the measurement model is exactly identified. The measurement model is
equivalent to factor analysis, where the latent variable (V ∗ ) captures the mutual variance
or the extent to which the three indicators of trust (V. , VJ , VW ) move together.

Rank Condition:
The order condition is necessary for identification, but the rank condition is both
necessary and sufficient. To satisfy the rank condition in a model of M simultaneous
equations (and M endogenous variables), each equation is identified if and only if one or
more nonzero determinant of order (M-1) (M-1) can be constructed from the coefficients
of the variables not included in that equation but included in other equations in the
system (Gujarati, 2009), which is in fact the case for our model. Below is a step-wise
demonstration of the rank condition compliance.

Step 1: First, we list all endogenous variables in the first row of a matrix

Step 2: For each equation in the SEM, a row is designated. In the row, each cell
corresponding to a variable that is included in the equation, we code a value of 1, and 0 is
the variable is missing. We now have the following M X K matrix of 1s and 0s.
CA
1
0
0
0

T
1
1
0
0

=@X0DY
1
1
1
0

=@XZ"YE["D\

1
1
0
1

CV
1
0
0
0
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1
0
1
1

].

1
0
1
1

]J

0
0
1
1

]W

0
0
1
1

]^

0
1
0
0

_.

Step 3: Now, to check the rank condition for each equation (say equation i), we take
columns corresponding to 0 in the ith row (for equation i), exclude the specific row (ith),
and write out the remainder as follows:
Equation 1:

0
1
1

]W

0
1
1

]^

1
0
0

_.

Equation 2:
CA
1
0
0

CV
1
0
0

1
1
1

].

1
1
1

]J

0
1
1

]W

0
1
1

]^

Equation 3:
CA
1
0
0

T
1
1
0

=@XZ"YE["D\

1
1
1

CV
1
0
0

0
1
0

_.

Equation 4:
CA
1
0
0

T
1
1
0

=@X0DY
1
1
1

CV
1
0
0

0
1
0

_.

Step 4: Finally, we check to see if any row/column is present with all elements 0. In our
case, no such row or column exists, which means each equation (and therefore the system
of equations) is identifiable.
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3. Sensitivity Analysis
A number of robustness checks were implemented to evaluate the sensitivity of our
results to modeling approaches. As discussed in the main paper with reference to Table 2,
we begin with various modeling approaches including ordinary least squares, two-stage
least squares, three-stage least squares methods. When endogeneity is ignored (in the case
of OLS), we find that the effects of social capital is overestimated whereas that of trust is
underestimated. Nonetheless, results remain consistent (in terms of signs and
significance) throughout. However, compared to our model of choice (Model 4), these
models fail to illustrate different paths of influence, which are crucial for our analysis.
Full parameter estimates for two stage regression models are provided in Appendix-3
(Table 8). Note, however, that these models do not address potential measurement issues
concerning trust, and that an observed variable Trust in people (T1) is used instead of the
latent variable Trust* in Table 3.

Another set of robustness checks include running SEM models with different variance
covariance structures presented in Table A-5. If we assume no contemporaneous
correlation across equations (Model 1), we are essentially estimating OLS (which we
discussed before). The selected model (Table 3) allows for the joint estimation of
equations for trust, and bonding and bridging/linking social capital. In Table A-5, Model
2 presents results from SEM that only allows for the joint estimation of equations for
trust and bonding social capital; Model 3 allows simultaneity across two equations for
social capital; And, Model 4 allows contemporaneous correlation across equations (2)
and (3), and (3) and (4). Note that in a variance-covariance matrix corresponding to 2
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equations (with 3 different elements), 7 var-cov structures are possible. The number
quickly balloons up when we a system of 4 equations with 10 different elements (a
triangular 4X4 matrix). We present results from a selected list of var-cov arrangements
based on where one could plausibly suspect simultaneity. Our results remain robust
throughout.
[Insert Table A-5]
Because of the ordinal (categorical) nature of our outcome variable, a case can be made
that generalized structural equation model (GSEM) would be a better modeling approach
to accommodate this non-linearity. We provide GSEM results (Table A-6) as a
robustness check to show that our results remain consistent regardless. Ultimately, we
deem that SEM is a better alternative because it serves our purpose best without adding
unnecessary interpretative complexities.
[Insert Table A-6]
Finally, we also re-ran model with and without different contextual variables. We find
that results are robust to different model specifications.
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Table 2. 5A: SEM results with alternate variance-covariance structures for Robustness Checks

Model 2
(σ23≠0)

Model 1
(σij=0 ∀ i≠j)
VARIABLES
Trust
Bonding Social Capital
Bridging-Linking Social Capital
Family Abandonment (instrument)

Log pseudo-likelihood

Collective
Action
0.785***
(0.294)
0.143***
(0.0396)
0.136***
(0.0346)
-

-13293.758

Trust
0.0203**
(0.00973)
0.0132*
(0.00748)
-0.129***
(0.0472)

Collective
Action
0.775***
(0.288)
0.143***
(0.0394)
0.136***
(0.0346)
-

-13290.176

Model 3
(σ34≠0)

Trust
0.0786**
(0.0345)
0.0108
(0.00741)
-0.122***
(0.0458)

Collective
Action
0.785***
(0.294)
0.143***
(0.0396)
0.136***
(0.0346)
-

-13256.327

Model 4
(σ23≠0; σ34≠0)

Trust
0.0203**
(0.00973)
0.0132*
(0.00748)
-0.129***
(0.0472)

Collective
Action
0.774***
(0.290)
0.144***
(0.0394)
0.136***
(0.0346)
-

Trust
0.108**
(0.0451)
-0.0195
(0.0165)
-0.119***
(0.0451)

-13251.614

Observations
506
506
506
506
506
506
506
506
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All control variables from Table 3 are included in Models 1-4. Full parameter
estimates available upon request.
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Table 2. 6A: GSEM Results

VARIABLES

Trust (T*)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Collective
Action

Trust§

Bondin
g SC

(4)
BridLink
SC

(5)

(6)

Reciproc
al ties

Generalize
d trust

(7)
Trust
in
People

-

-

-

1
(0)

1.303***
(0.259)

3.044**
*
(0.789)

-

-

-

-

-

0.0127*
(0.0074
1)

-

-

-

-

-

0.00818
(0.107)

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0530
(0.244)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.314
(0.246)

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0704

-

-

-

-

-

-

(0.210)
0.000682*
**

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.130**
*
(0.0466)

-

-

-

-

-

-0.233*

0.462**
*

-

-

-

(0.124)

(0.144)

0.00782

0.00101

-

-

-

1.655***
(0.562)

SOCIAL
CAPITAL
Bonding

0.225***
(0.0712)

BridgingLinking

0.258***

(0.0693)
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Community size
Generations in
commty.
Health damage
from EQ
Propt. damage
from EQ
Next EQ
(expected)

0.0195*
*
(0.0095
5)

(0.000248)
Family
Abandonment
(Z1)

-

Household Demographics
Female

-0.889***

-

(0.211)
Age

-0.0202**

-
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Married
Family typeJoint

(0.00810)
-0.0876
(0.245)

-

-0.0102

-

(0.186)
Socioeconomic Factors

(0.0052
0)
0.174
(0.170)
0.239*

(0.0055
5)
-0.111
(0.192)
0.00371

(0.125)

(0.144)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.00129
(0.0799)

-

0.106**
(0.0512)

0.199**
*
(0.0617)

0.291
(0.191)

-

0.180
(0.126)

0.113
(0.131)

-

-0.349*

0.429**

(0.203)
-0.210
(0.184)
0.624**
*

(0.174)
-0.0499
(0.208)
0.568**
*
(0.184)

Constant

(0.171)
1.092**

-0.556

2.584***

0.560***

2.251**
*

Observations

(0.441)
509

(0.507)
509

(0.029)
509

(0.022)
509

(0.032)
509

Education
OccupationAgri

Cultural/Religious Factors
Caste-Dalit

-

Caste-Janajati

-

-

Religion-Hindu

-

-

509

509

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Equations (3) and (4) are allowed to have
contemporaneous correlation. §Trust is a latent variable measured by three indicator variables: reciprocal ties,
generalized trust, subjective trust on people. Cut-points for equation (1) are (all significant) are omitted for
presentational simplicity.
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4. Principal Component Analysis for Social Capital
The 11 categories of community organizations include resource user groups (agriculture,
water, and forest groups), finance groups (microfinance and credit groups), awareness
groups (women’s, and health groups), youth groups (sports group), religious groups, civic
groups, and political groups. It should be noted that many of these groups (e.g. health,
sports, religious) were loosely organized and did not adhere to strict participatory and/or
membership guidelines. The inclusion of such group addresses concerns that the standard
measures of social capital “do not map onto the empirical realities” of the developing
world (Serra, 2001), while also adhering to the established measures of social capital (e.g.
Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al., 1993; Woolcock, 2001). Because participatory variables
(dummies) are prone to multicollinearity issues, and including all 11 variables into a
multi-equation system adds unwarranted complexities, we conduct principal component
analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to reduce variables to a few orthogonal
components.

When we exclude all components with factor loadings less than 0.40, we find that the
civic, political, religious, and sports groups loads into the first component, whereas
agricultural, forest, and water user groups nicely load into the second component. The
third component captures variation in microfinance, credit, and women’s group. Note that
members of the same user groups tend to belong to similar socio-economic, cultural,
ethnic, and religious backgrounds. This bond across homogeneous, like-minded
individuals within a community has been identified in the literature as “bonding” social
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capital ( Storr and Haeffele-Balch, 2012; Woolcock, 2001). On the other hand,
membership in civic and political groups often cross socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, and
religious boundaries. Such memberships are not confined to a single community or ward,
and can link individuals across entirely different social and regional settings. For
instance, a member of the local Nepali Congress village or district committee can/will act
as a local representative in the national convention of the Nepali Congress party. This
“linking” social capital can be crucial in crises as it can connect impoverished/rural
districts to the prosperous/urban ones or aid in lobbying efforts for resources (ChamleeWright and Storr, 2011; Storr and Haeffele-Balch, 2012). Finally, membership in
religious and sports groups, which are conditional upon shared interests and values,
brings individuals across heterogeneous groups together. Case in point, the local soccer
team from Manebhanjyang (ward 9) may frequently play against another team from
Bahunepati-chowk (ward 4), but their ties are weak owing to their heterogeneous ethnic
backgrounds. This type of bond can be understood as “bridging” social capital (Storr and
Haeffele-Balch, 2012). Our PCA analysis shows that memberships in bridging and
linking types have a significant overlap, and separating them would engender
multicollinearity issues. Based on these considerations, we rename the first and second
PCA components as bridging/linking and bonding social capital respectively. The third
component pertains to financial access and not to social capital, so we exclude it from our
empirical models. For robustness purposes, we also include it in all our analysis, but see
no significant illustrative gains from doing so (coefficients are not significant and original
results remain robust). PCA results are included in Appendix 1(Table 7).
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Appendix 1 (Table 2. 7A): Principal Component Analysis Results for Social Capital
(Varimax rotation)
Variables

Component 1

Component 2

Component 3

Unexplained

Microfinance group

--

--

0.5812

0.497

Agricultural user group

--

0.4332

--

0.4822

Forest user group

--

0.6583

--

0.2934

Water user group

--

0.5488

--

0.383

Women’s group

--

--

0.5874

0.4327

Credit group

--

--

0.4459

0.5734

Civic group

0.4887

--

--

0.4271

Political group

0.4358

--

--

0.5092

Religious group

0.4101

--

--

0.525

Sports group

0.4842

--

--

0.5242

Health group

--

--

--

0.5504

Participation in:

Note: Empty cells (--) in the table denote factor loadings<0.4.
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Appendix 5 (Table 2. 8): Full Parameter Estimates for Models in Table 2

VARIABLES
Trust in People
(T1)

MODEL 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

OLS

2SLS

3SLS (Full-information)

SEM (Full-information)

Collective
Action

First-stage
Trust in
People
(T1)

0.167**

-

(0.0682)

2ndStage

2nd-stage

Collectiv
e Action

First-stage
Trust in
People
(T1)

Collectiv
e Action

Trust in
People
(T1)

Collectiv
e Action

0.854*

-

0.854*

-

0.854*

(0.452)

(0.452)

(0.452)

SOCIAL
CAPITAL
Bonding
Bridging-Linking

0.148***

0.0515**

0.108**

0.0515**

0.108**

0.0515**

0.108**

(0.0397)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

(0.0254)

(0.0502)

0.139***

0.0533**

0.108**

0.0533**

0.108**

0.0533**

0.108**

(0.0355)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

(0.0228)

(0.0434)

-0.0116

-0.0361

0.0130

-0.0361

0.0130

-0.0361

0.0130

(0.0593)

(0.0380)

(0.0661)

(0.0380)

(0.0661)

(0.0380)

(0.0661)

0.0227

0.0110

0.0324

0.0110

0.0324

0.0110

0.0324

(0.145)

(0.0936)

(0.157)

(0.0936)

(0.157)

(0.0936)

(0.157)

-0.244

-0.00483

-0.217

-0.00483

-0.217

-0.00483

-0.217

(0.151)

(0.0971)

(0.164)

(0.0971)

(0.164)

(0.0971)

(0.164)

0.0289

0.0120

0.0316

0.0120

0.0316

0.0120

0.0316

(0.119)
0.000478*
**

(0.0764)
0.000364*
**

(0.129)

(0.0764)
0.000364*
**

(0.129)

(0.0764)
0.000364*
**

(0.129)

(0.000179)
-

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Community size
Generations in
commty.
Health damage
from EQ
Propt. damage
from EQ
Next EQ
(expected)
Family
Abandonment

(0.000114)

0.000204
(0.00026
3)

-0.345***

-

(0.0926)

(0.000114)

0.000204
(0.00026
3)

(0.000114)

0.000204
(0.00026
3)

-0.345***

-

-0.345***

-

(0.0926)

(0.0926)

Household Demographics
Female

Age

-0.502***

0.0126

(0.110)

(0.0708)

0.511***

0.0126

0.0126

-0.0110**

0.00182

0.00182

(0.119)
0.0125**
*

0.00182

(0.119)
0.0125**
*

(0.00428)

(0.00275)

(0.00473)

(0.00275)

(0.00473)

(0.00275)

(0.00473)

-0.104

0.00664

-0.0985

0.00664

-0.0985

0.00664

-0.0985

(0.134)

(0.0864)

(0.146)

(0.0864)

(0.146)

(0.0864)

(0.146)

0.00243

0.0931

-0.0744

0.0931

-0.0744

0.0931

-0.0744

(0.105)

(0.0672)

(0.124)

(0.0672)

(0.124)

(0.0672)

(0.124)

0.0174

-0.00686

0.0216

-0.00686

0.0216

-0.00686

0.0216

Family type-joint

(0.0708)

0.511***

(0.119)
0.0125**
*

Married

(0.0708)

0.511***

Socioeconomic factors
Education
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Occupation-Agri
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(0.0425)

(0.0273)

(0.0461)

(0.0273)

(0.0461)

(0.0273)

(0.0461)

0.171

0.107

0.0852

0.107

0.0852

0.107

0.0852

(0.106)

(0.0683)

(0.128)

(0.0683)

(0.128)

(0.0683)

(0.128)

2.648***

2.067***

1.252

2.067***

1.252

2.067***

1.252

(0.409)

(0.247)

(1.009)

(0.247)

(1.009)

(0.247)

(1.009)

508

509

508

508

508

508

508

0.206

0.096

0.043

0.098

0.043

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 5
Appendix Tables:
Table 3. 8A: Logit Regression Results for Volunteering
VARIABLES
dist90

(1)
volunteer

(2)
volunteer

0.158
(0.182)

-0.0348
(0.170)

dist120
Constant

0.156+
(0.0976)

-0.505
(0.805)

(3)
volunteer

(4)
volunteer

0.0771
(0.366)
0.168
(0.209)

-0.112
(0.367)
-0.438
(0.853)

Observations
507
505
507
505
EQ Damage Variables
No
Yes
No
Yes
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Log-likelihood
-348.1
-317.5
-348.4
-317.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, +
p<0.15. Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance
groups, distance to nearest market center, age of household head, education
level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household
head, household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage
(injury/death), home damage, property damage.
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Table 3. 9A: Average Marginal Effects for Volunteering
(1)
(2)
(3)
Marginal
Marginal
Marginal
VARIABLES
effects
effects
effects
dist90

0.0390
(0.0446)

(4)
Marginal
effects

-0.00763
(0.0373)

dist120

0.0190
(0.0901)

-0.0246
(0.0807)

Observations
507
505
507
505
EQ Damage
Variables
No
Yes
No
Yes
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Controls included
in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market center, age
of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation
of household head, household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage
(injury/death), home damage, property damage.
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Table 3. 10A: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Community Engagement

VARIABLES

dist90

(1)
Comm
Engag

(2)
Comm
Engag

0.0646
(0.274)

-0.253
(0.364)

dist120
Constant cut1
Constant cut2

0.156
(0.154)
1.642***
(0.115)

0.199
(0.596)
1.928***
(0.635)

(3)
Comm
Engag

(4)
Comm
Engag

0.257
(0.294)
0.300
(0.244)
1.790***
(0.258)

0.0184
(0.309)
0.340
(0.655)
2.063***
(0.700)

Observations
507
505
507
505
EQ Damage Variables
No
Yes
No
Yes
Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Log-likelihood
-504.4
-453.4
-503.4
-454.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to
nearest market center, age of household head, education level of household head,
marital status, religion, occupation of household head, household assets. EQ damage
variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage.
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Survey Instrument
1. Instructions for enumerators
2. Questionnaire-English
3. Questionnaire-Nepali
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INSTRUCTIONS
Enumerator Mantra:
During the final survey, it is very important to ensure that the survey guidelines are
followed.
1. Every day before going to the community for survey, make sure that:
o

you have marked household numbers in each survey booklet. Each enumerator is
assigned to complete at least 102 surveys. First enumerator will be given
numbers from 1 to 102, second will be given 103 to 204, third will be given 205
to 306, fourth will be given 307 to 408, fifth will be given 409 to 510 and so
forth. will get numbers from

o

received random bids that I will supply and fill out the numbers in each survey
booklet.

o

the survey pages are not missing and everything is legible.

o

you have all necessary materials (pens, water bottle, snacks).

o

you have gifts for the household (if applicable).

2. Before proceeding to ask survey questions, enumerators should:
o

Introduce themselves
“We are working on a survey study project conducted by Nepal Study Center at
the University of New Mexico (USA), facilitated by Kathmandu University
Hospital. A group of UNM students have been working in Bahunepati right after
the 2015 earthquake in the construction of a Women’s Community Center.”)

o

Explain the purpose of our study:
§

Assessment of the earthquake impacts in the wellbeing (wealth, health,
food security, and perception) of Bahunepati households

§

Evaluate what helps in the long-run recovery of earthquakes and similar
natural disaster shocks. What helps and what doesn’t?
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§

Evaluate the feasibility of weather indexed micro-insurance program,
effectiveness of women’s community center programs.

3. During the survey,
o

You should have already developed a thorough understanding of the survey
questionnaire. Examples of things that that enumerators should keep in mind:
§

Likert scale (e.g. you should be able to distinguish very likely from likely
and be able to explain it well to the household representative. One way of
doing that is to first explain them what these scales mean and them ask
them for a number. That way, the likelihood of enumerator’s influencing
the survey is diminished)

§

For section C (Willingness to Pay for Weather-indexed Microinsurance), make sure you understand the program/package very well
and be able to explain it. Before proceeding to ask any questions about
the micro-insurance, make sure that the respondent has a clear
understanding of the coverage (items that are covered: paddy, cows,
buffalos, etc), payoffs (how much households will receive), and how and
when the payoffs will be disseminated (e.g. rainfall index).

§

Make sure to distinguish check box answers from fill in answers.

§

For each question, give them all the options. DO NOT just ask open
ended questions when there are answer choices and pick the applicable
boxes. Variation is important (e.g. if the answer is ‘certain,’ make sure to
ask how certain: ‘certain’ versus ‘highly certain.’ This distinction is
important.)

§

Remember to map out the locations of your survey. Each chowk and
route should be labeled. If the data shows major anomalies or
confusion, this allows us to backtrack houses and confirm responses.
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4. After collecting data, make sure that you have handed in all survey booklets to the lead
enumerator (Aashish). I will work with him in compiling data. My goal is to enter the
data every day to ensure clarity and allow revisions and corrections.
5. Your primary goal is to collect quality data from the households, do not assume
information about the households and fill it out on your own (unless it is too apparent like
the type of roof, floor).
o

Be able to explain missing observations or anomalous ones. If you have any
questions, please please call me right away (Veeshan: 9818687343).

o

Respondents may find it difficult to answer some questions relating to income,
loans, etc. Be polite and ask them to provide rough estimates if they are not sure.
Do not pressure them to answer uncomfortable questions. Use your judgment.

6. Since missing observations can hinder research, try to be as thorough as possible. Be
diplomatic and amicable.
7. Be respectful and neutral to all the respondents.
8. Do not influence respondents’ answers; do not show any kind of verbal and non-verbal
sign towards their response, and most importantly read the questions just the way it is and
listen carefully.
9. Follow the protocol: especially the right-hand rule of randomization.
10. Be a team player. Collaborate, not compete!
11. Communicate with me and among each other. Share your numbers. Mine is 9818687343
(Veeshan).
6. Sample Selection
To facilitate a proper pre-post analysis, we stratify data collection process according to the
following distribution based on the 2014 data as well as sample size computation rules.
Compared to the 2014 data, we will oversample.
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Ward
no.

Sample size
(Frequency)

2014 Sample
size

Percent

Cumulative
percent

1

30

20

5.68

5.68

2

91

65

18.47

24.15

3

36

25

7.10

31.25

4

70

49

13.92

45.17

5

70

49

13.92

59.09

6

48

34

9.66

68.75

7

30

20

5.68

74.43

8

51

36

10.23

84.66

9

77

54

15.34

100.00

Other

503

352

-

-

7. Random Route Sampling
In order to select households for the survey, we will employ a Random Route Sampling method
using the conventional “right hand rule.” Step-wise explanation of the process, based on EUMIDIS (2009) is as follows:
1. From each ward (smallest population sub-administrative unit), we will select a specific
percentage of houses (refer to section 6) and enumerate house numbers. The percent
number is decided based on the population of each ward and our desired sample size. If
possible, we will acquire this information from the local Village Development Committee
office.
2. Record the GPS location of each house (or simply map out the survey area) chosen to be
in the sample, based on simple proportional sampling. This will help speed up the data
collection process.
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3. Go to the main chowk (central town) of each ward. Pick a random point as a starting
point. Stand facing one direction, say North, and start walking towards your right on the
right side of the street/path without crossing the street. Pick your sampling houses from
the same direction. In doing so, we record every 3rd house (then 6th, then 9th) or 2nd (then
5th, then 8th) and so on. Follow the process until you approach the end of the path. Then,
turn and perform the process using the right-hand rule again.
4. If we fail to acquire required sample size in the first round, we walk back to the main
chowk where we started. This time, we turn to a different direction, say South, and repeat
the same process.

Survey Plan:
1. Hiring and Training enumerators
Five enumerators (including one lead enumerator who will coordinate the other four) will be
hired and trained. The training will focus on two areas:
•

Survey Details. The lead investigator will educate enumerators on the survey details
covering:
o

Survey Introduction: objective, hypotheses and relevance

o

Survey Questions: Enumerators will be asked to interview (aloud) each other and
fill out the survey. This will help them gain familiarity with the survey materials
and eliminate any confusion or discrepancies that may exist.

•

Survey Protocol: How should the enumerators proceed to conduct the survey? We will
discuss the right-hand rule and randomization, and the risks associated with not following
the rule.
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•

Discussions about accommodation and stipend for enumerators.

Materials Required:
1. Nepali survey- 6 copies
2. English survey- 6 copies
3. Survey protocol- 6 copies
Enumerators are
2. Focus Group
A group of 8-10 participants will be brought to a place for the focus group study. This will be a
round table type discussion that will speak on the key issues of the survey. The lead investigator
will guide the discussion, but the primary focus of this event will be to get appropriate feedback
on the survey’s general theme and our information elicitation approach. Three major points will
be covered:
•

•

2015 earthquake shock and recovery (three dimensions-economic, health, psychosocial)
o

Are there other dimensions of wellbeing that are relevant?

o

Are the existing ones irrelevant?

o

Are they redundant?

Coping Strategies
o

Are the coping strategies listed in the survey pertinent to the specific context of
Sindhupalchowk and peripheral areas?

•

o

Are there other strategies that are more prevalent? More effective?

o

Is social capital enhancement an effective coping strategy?

Pre-post-Earthquake Impact Study:
o

Impacts on health status, food security, domestic violence, social capital.
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•

•

Weather-indexed micro-insurance and willingness to pay
o

Familiarity with micro-insurance and applicability.

o

Is the scheme clear?

Women’s Community Center uses

Moreover, other questions that will be discussed are:
2. Are there other forms of social capital that exist in Bahunepati?
Based on the feedback from the survey, appropriate revisions will be made to the questionnaire.
The objective is to confirm if the issues that the survey tries to address align with the ground
reality of the area.
Note: Enumerators MUST attend the focus group discussion to ensure thorough understanding of
the issues from the respondents’ perspectives. The focus group discussion will last for
approximately two hours.
Materials required:
3. Survey Questionnaire (6-8 copies)
3. Debriefing
Debriefing is conducted in one-to-one interview with household respondents. The purpose will be
to reexamine the survey based on the outcomes of the focus group discussions and make
necessary revisions to the survey questionnaire. If the findings from debriefing is contradictory to
the focus group results, it will force us to go back to the drawing board and reconcile the
differences. The debriefing can be formatted as an informal talk, which may include all the
questions as well as the additional questions relating to the study. Same questions that were asked
during the focus group discussions can be repeated. After repeatedly asking similar questions to
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people at different locations, the final questionnaires can be finalized.
The first debriefing may be conducted back to back with focus group discussions or steps 2 and 3
may be combined into one.
Samrat’s advice: Debriefing can be conducted by just reading each question out aloud slowly or
asking people to look at the survey and read each question. This will give us an idea of how long
the survey will take and whether (or not) people understand every question.
4. Pre-tests
Based on the feedback from 2 and 3, a final survey draft should be created. Then, a set of 30
households should be picked randomly to test the survey instruments. If the results reveal
anomalous or lopsided results (everyone saying yes or no while expressing their preferences) or if
they object to certain stipulation in the question, then a second round of debriefing should be
done and some adjustments should be applied. Then, a second round of pretest should be
conducted (~30 households). A final draft of the survey will be decided before sending out
enumerators for the final survey.
5. Final survey.
Upon the successful completion of pre-tests and making necessary adjustments, enumerators will
be sent out to conduct the final survey. Each enumerator is responsible for conducting at least six
interviews per day (30-45 minutes per household).
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Study Timeline
(This is a very exaggerated estimate. The actual survey may finish well within 28 days)
MM/YYYY
05/22/17
5/29/17
05/30/17
05/30/17
6/01/17
6/2/17
6/3-4/17
6/5/17
6/07/17
6/8/17
6/9-6/14/17
6/15/17
6/16-6/21/17
6/22/17
6/23-6/27/17
6/31/17

Activity Planned
Pre-Survey
Survey Design: Finalize the survey questionnaire
Translation: A designated translator from UNM (Veeshan) along with a
locally hired translator will translate the survey and other related documents
to Nepali, the local vernacular.
Revision: Review of the translated materials prior to approval of the final
draft
Meeting with survey coordinator, and enumerators. Go over the survey,
question by question.
Focus Group with a small representative sub-sample: the goal is to test the
relevance, clarity and appropriateness of the survey components before
finalizing the questionnaire.
Debriefing: conduct one-to-one discussion with a few focus group
participants to confirm the finalized questionnaire
Pre-test: 30 households (5 enumerators, 6 households each) are picked
randomly and the pre-test survey is conducted
Pre-test data analysis
Pre-test – II (if necessary)
Pre-test-II data analysis (if necessary)
Data Collection (Week 1), 5 enumerators*6 days*6 households=180
observations
Data Entry and Evaluation
Data Collection (Week 2) 180 observations
Data Entry and Evaluation
Data Collection (Week 2) 150 observations
Data Entry and Compilation of a final deliverable dataset

182

QUESTIONNAIRE-ENGLISH
Determinants of Household Resilience Against Natural Disaster Shocks:
Evidence from Bahunepati, Nepal
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2017
Namaskar, I am [Enumerator’s name: ..............................] from the Nepal Study Center at
the University of New Mexico, USA. We are conducting a survey with residents of
Bahunepati to assess the immediate and long-run impacts of the 2015 mega-earthquake
and to investigate the determinants of household resilience against natural disaster
shocks. The survey will take approximately ____ minutes.
You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey, and your household was
chosen using a random selection process from a list of households in this VDC. You will
be asked a series of questions, most of which have Yes/No answers, designed to understand
behaviors regarding the strategies you adopted to cope with climate change and natural
disaster shocks. Some questions in this survey may cause you to feel slightly
uncomfortable. In such cases, you may refuse to answer any individual question. Although
this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to the
knowledge about how to enhance the ability to protect your household against climate
change and natural disaster shocks.
All of your responses will be anonymous. Only the researchers involved in this study and
those responsible for research oversight will have access to the information you provide.
Your responses will be handwritten and stored securely at the research facility at Nepal
Study Center in the University of New Mexico. Your responses will be numbered and
coded, and your name will not be on any documents. The coding will be used on all your
documents, but will not connect to your name. So, while we know from the record of
your verbal consent that you participated in this research study, no data will be linked to
you. The primary surveys will be stored in a locked safe until coding.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate,
to end participation at any time for any reason, or, again, to refuse to answer any
individual question. Refusing to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled.
Thank you for participating in this study.
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To be filled by enumerators
SURVEY VERSION: A
Date of Interview: ___________ (dd/mm/yyyy)
Supervisor’s Name: .........................

Enumerator’s Name: .........................

Begin Time ........................

End Time ........................

About the respondent:
Full Name: Mr./Mrs./Miss..........................................
Respondent’s Age ......................................... (MUST be 18+)
Address: .......................................... Contact no. .........................................
Name of village (VDC): ..................
Ward number in VDC (1-9): ........................ Name of the community (Tole):
........................
Household Number (HHNO): ........................
Household Latitude: .........................................
Household Longitude: .........................................
1
Relationship of the respondent to the household head : ........................
1 Relation of respondent to the household head. Head=1; Husband/wife=2;
son/daughter=3; grandchild=4; father/mother=5; brother/sister=6; nephew/niece=7;
son/daughter-in-law=8; brother/sister-in-law=9; father/mother-in-law=10; other family
relative=11
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Section A: Earthquake Impact, Coping Strategies, and Recovery
In this sub-section, I am going to ask you some questions about the 2015 earthquake.
Please note that some questions pertain to immediate impacts of the earthquake, while
others concern the current level of recovery.
Your answers will help us assess the immediate impacts of the earthquake as well as
evaluate the determinants of long-run recovery.
1. How much do you agree with the following statements? Please indicate the number
corresponding to your level of agreement (lowest to highest number) with each of the
following statements by checking (ü) the appropriate number.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

i-a
i-b
ii-a
ii-b
iii-a
iii-b
iv-a
iv-b
v-a
v-b
vi-a

vi-b
vii-a
vii-b
viiia
viiib
ix-a
ix-b
x-a

My family member was injured in the disaster.
My family member has recovered from the
injuries.
The place I was living in was destroyed to the
point where I could not live in it.
I now have permanent housing.
Immediately after the disaster, I had adequate
access to food.
I now have adequate access to food.
Immediately after the disaster, I had adequate
access to clean drinking water.
I now have adequate access to clean drinking
water.
The disaster caused me to lose my ability to earn
money.
I now have a job or a source of income.
The disaster prevented me from moving about
my
community freely, such as visiting family,
friends and neighbors.
I am now able to move about my community
freely, such as visiting family, friends and
neighbors.
The disaster destroyed some of my personal
property such as home, auto, livestock, personal
effects.
I have now recovered this property or its
equivalent.
The disaster caused me emotional distress (e.g.
made me feel more anxious/afraid, or
depressed/sad).
I have recovered emotionally.
The disaster increased my experiences with
violence (including physical, emotional or
sexual abuse from a loved one or stranger.)
I am now free from such violence.
Immediately after the disaster, I was not able to
participate in disaster relief, recovery or future
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Disagree
(2)

Neutral
(3)

Agree
(4)

Strongly
Agree
(5)

x-b

community planning with neighbors, local
leaders and/or local officials.
I am now able to participate in disaster relief,
recovery or future community planning with
neighbors, local leaders and/or local officials.

2. Impact and Recovery Time: Please indicate how long the earthquake impact
lingered. Please WRITE DOWN THE NUMBER of weeks, months, and years.
After the earthquake,

TIME

Weeks
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

Months

Years

IF NOT
RECOVERED
YET, please
indicate how long
you expect the
impact to linger.
Months
Years

We spent less on food for….
We spent less on other household
goods for….
My children missed school for….
I missed work for…
Adults in my household took up extra
labor for….
Children in my household worked for
….
My family was emotionally distressed
for…..
My family recovered from injuries
for…..
Household member left village for ….
Time to recover lost property or its
equivalent for ….
Time to maintain the pre-earthquake
level income for ….

How did your household cope with the 2015 earthquake? Please check (ü) yes or
no.
In what order did you adopt the strategies? Please rank accordingly. (1=first,
2=second, 3= third, 4= fourth, 5=fifth).
Order (1Coping Strategy
Yes (1)
No (2)
5)

3.

a.

Sale/mortgage jewelry

b.

Sale of utensils/appliances

c.

Sale of crops

d.

Sale of livestock

e.

Sale of transport
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f.

Sale of agricultural tools

g.

Sale of other items

h.

Family/neighbor/patron help

i.

Borrow money (from person or
institution)

j.

Advance labor

k.

More family members in labor

l.

Use of savings

m.

Mobilize credit/Received loans

n.

Government help

o.

NGO help

p.

Aid/Relief

q.

Household members moved away

r.

Received Remittance help

s.

Other (please specify)
_____________________

4.

If your household made any distress sale/mortgage, could you estimate the value of
the distress sale/mortgage?
Rupees

5.

After the earthquake, did you TRY TO borrow from someone outside the
household or from an institution?
No, I did NOT TRY (1)

I tried but was turned
down (2)
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Yes, I borrowed (3)

6.

What was main reason for trying to obtain loan? (please check (ü) all that apply)

a.

Purchase food

g.

b.
c.

Healthcare
Purchase household
assets
Purchase livestock
Purchase agricultural
inputs
Rebuild house

h.
i.

Business startup or restart
capital
Purchase of non-farm inputs
Purchase land

j.

Other (please specify) ______

d.
e.
f.

7.

If you were able to obtain a loan, from whom or which institution? (please check
(ü) all that apply)

a.

Relative

b.

Neighbor

c.

Grocery/Local
Merchant
Employer
Religious institution

d.
e.
8.

f.

Non-governmental organization
(NGO)
g. Formal lender (bank/financial
institution)
h. Group-based microfinance
i.

Other (please specify) ______

How much was the loan?
Rupees.

9.

Is the loan repaid?
Yes (1)

No (2)

10. If yes, how many months after taking the loan did you pay it back? Please write
down the number.
Months…….…….……
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11. If not, approximately when do you expect to pay back the loan? (please check (ü)
one box)
1

In a few months

2
3

Within a year
2-3 years

4

3-5 years

5

5-10 years

6

I may not be able to pay in my lifetime

Now, I will ask you questions regarding natural disaster and other shocks, NOT
including the 2015 earthquake. These questions allow us to isolate the impact of
the earthquake from that of other household level shocks as well as to conduct a
separate evaluation of the impacts of idiosyncratic shocks. It is important that you
answer these questions as accurately as possible.
12. Has the household experienced any of the following natural disasters (NOT
including the 2015 earthquake) in the past five years? If you answer YES, also
indicate how severe each disaster was.
Natural Disaster

Yes
(1)

No (2)

How severe
was the
impact?
(1-4)

a.

Flood

b.

Landslide

c.

Heavy rainfall

d.

Storm

e.

Ice rain/snow

f.

Drought

g.

Extreme temperatures

h.

Wildfires

i.

River erosion
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Severity
Scale:
1: No
impact
2. Low
Impact
3.
Medium
Impact
4. High
Impact

j.

Other (please specify)
_______________________

13. Has the household experienced any of the following shocks in the past two years?
Shock

Yes (1)

a.

Loss of employment/business of the main
earner

b.

Loss of employment of other members

c.

Death of the main earner

d.

Abandonment by the main earner

e.

Major illness

f.

Conflict/Violence

g.

Loss of house

h.

Loss of land

i.

Loss of durable assets (tractor,
machines...)

j.

Loss of livestock/poultry

k.

Loss of crops

l.

Major pests

m.

Poor production

n.

Wedding/Funeral

n.

Other (please specify)

No (2)

_______________________
Section B: Ex-ante Risk Perception
In this section, we will ask you questions about your perception of earthquake and
other natural disaster risks. There are no right or wrong answers. Please try your best to
answer these questions as accurately as possible.
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14. In general, how afraid are you of an earthquake? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2
3
4

Not afraid at all
A little afraid
Somewhat afraid
Very afraid

5

Extremely afraid

15. In an event of a six magnitude earthquake, how much do you think your house
will be threatened? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2
3
4
5

No damage
Slightly damaged, livable after minor or no repairs
Moderately damaged, livable after major repairs
Severely damaged, not livable
Totally destroyed

16. In an event of a six-magnitude earthquake, how much do you think your property
(livestock, crops, agricultural land, etc.) will be threatened? (please check (ü) one
box)
1
2
3
4
5

No damage
Slightly damaged
Moderately damaged
Severely damaged
Totally damaged

17. In how many years do you think the next big earthquake will occur? Please write
down the number.
Number of years …….……
18. On a scale of 1 to 10, how certain are you of your answer to the previous
question? (1=highly uncertain, 10=highly certain)
Degree of Certainty (1 to 10) …….……
19. In this area, how likely is it that the following natural disaster/ climate events will
occur in the next ten years? Please indicate the number corresponding to your
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level of perception (lowest to highest number) with each of the following natural
disaster event by checking (ü) the appropriate number
Natural Disaster

a.

Flood

b.

Landslide

c.

Heavy rainfall

d.

Storm

e.

Ice rain/snow

f.

Drought

g.

Extreme temperatures

h.

Wildfire

i.

River erosion

j.

Other (please specify)

Almost
Certainly
Not (1)

Unlikely
(2)

Somewhat

likely
(3)

Highly
likely
(4)

Almost
Certain

(5)

__________________
_____
20. CLIMATE CHANGE: How likely do you think is climate change going to
continue or worsen in the next 10 years if nothing is done to prevent it? Please
check (ü) one box.
1
2
3
4
99

Not likely at all
Somewhat likely
Likely
Highly likely
I don’t know

21. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT: How much do you think climate change is
likely to cause loss of assets and income in the next 10 years (e.g. the loss of
agriculture, livestock, house, etc. ) Please check (ü) one box.
1
2
3

No impact
Low Impact
Medium Impact
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4

High Impact

22. CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSES/ATTITUDE: How much do you agree with
the following statements? Please check (ü) one box for each statement.
Strongly Disagree Neutral
disagree
(2)
(3)
(1)
a. Deforestation can
cause climate change
b. Burning fossil fuel can
cause climate change
c. Applying pesticide and
chemical fertilizer in
agriculture can lead to
climate change.

d. Forest fire can cause
climate change
e. Use of modern tools
can cause climate
change
f.

Humans are
responsible for climate
change

g. We should do
something to combat
climate change.
h. Climate change is
God’s will.
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Agree
(4)

Strongly
agree
(5)

SECTION C: WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR WEATHER-INDEXED
INSURANCE
We would like to propose a hypothetical micro-insurance program designed to
protect Bahunepati households from potential weather shocks. The weatherindexed insurance product is designed to protect farmers against deficient/excess
cumulative rainfall during a cropping season.
In what follows, you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay for the
insurance package. Note that you this is not a real insurance program, but please
answer as if it was. Also pay careful attention to the payouts, coverage, and your
willingness to pay value.
A description of the policy is provided below.
• How does it work?
This policy protects farmers against deficient/excess cumulative rainfall
during a cropping season. If there is continuous heavy rainfall for 10 days or
continuous no rainfall/little rainfall for 30 days, during the crop vegetative
phase (months March to June and July to November after sowing), a payout
would be made to the farmers. In order to make the amount of rainfall more
objective and easier to measure, the rainfall data is based on the record of the
closest weather station to your village instead of the rainfall on your fields.
(Standard: “if the rainfall for any 10 consecutive days is cumulatively above
120 millimeters or any 30 consecutive days is cumulatively below 10
millimeters”)
• What does it cover?
In additional to paddy, the insurance also covers livestock. In total, it covers
paddy, buffaloes, cows, goats, chicken and ducks.
• What is the payout?
NRs. 10000 per ropani insured, NRs. 8100 NPR per cow insured, NRs. 26000
per buffaloes insured, NRs. 3800 per goat insured, and NRs. 380 per poultry
(including ducks and chicken) insured.
• When will I get paid?
Payment would be made to farmers for paddy as long as the weather meets the
requirement described in the coverage. As to livestock, payment would be
made after evaluation of damage by experts from agriculture office. It’s
according to the number of dead livestock due to the bad weather.
23. Do you have any questions about the insurance package?
Yes (1)

No (2)

Enumerator: If the answer is NO, please make sure to explain the insurance package
carefully AGAIN before proceeding.
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Instructions to enumerator: The follow up question should be asked carefully.
• Pick the randomly generated bid value from the list provided. (Note: Before
the survey, each enumerator will be asked to fill in randomly selected bid
values in the survey).
• Ask Question#24 with the random bid value.
• If the answer is YES, go to the next HIGHER bid value and ask Question#3.
• If the answer is NO, go to the next LOWER bid value and ask Question#3.
Here are the bid amounts (per year):
Nrs. _____ _____ _____ _____

_____

______

Examples:
1) A respondent was asked if she would pay 200 Nrs for the insurance and she
said yes. Then you should ask if she would pay 500 (the next higher amount).
2) A respondent was asked if they would pay 1000 Nrs for the insurance and he
said no. Then you should ask if he would pay 500 (the next lower amount).
24. Would you be willing to pay NRs……….[Fill in a randomly generated bid
amount] per year? (please check (ü) one box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

25. What if you were instead asked to pay NRs…………[the next higher or lower bid
amount]? Would you buy the weather-indexed insurance? (please check (ü) one
box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

26. On a scale of 1 to 10, how certain are you of your answer to the previous
question? (1=highly uncertain, 10=highly certain)
Degree of Certainty (1 to 10) …….……
Section D: SOCIAL CAPITAL
In this section, we will ask you questions about your friends, relatives, neighbors, and
your community participation. The questions in this section will allow us to generate
a social capital measure and to examine its role in wellbeing. It is important that you
answer these questions as accurately as possible.
Trust and Solidarity:
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27. Which statement do you think is more accurate: (please check (ü) one box)
Most people can be trusted (1)
You can’t be too careful in dealing with people (2)
28. Would you say that you can trust the following? (please check (ü) each item)
A lot
(1)
a.

Some
(2)

Only a little
(3)

Not at all
(4)

People in your
village
Strangers
The police
The army
Government
officials
Politicians
News Media

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Interpersonal Relationship and Network:
29. How many close friends and relatives do you have whom you can freely share
private matters, call on help, or borrow money? Please write down the number
No. of friends and relatives…………
30. If you suddenly needed to borrow a small amount of money to pay for expenses
for your household for one week, are there people beyond your immediate
household and close relatives to whom you could turn and who would be willing
and able to provide this money?
1

Definitely

2

Probably

3
4

Unsure
Probably not

5

Definitely not

Neighborhood cohesion:
31. How many years have you been living in this community? (please check (ü) one
box)
1

Less than 1 year

2
3

1 to 5 years
5 to 10 years
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4

More than 10 years

32. How frequently do you visit your friends and relatives? (please check (ü) one
box)
1
2
3
4
5
6

Just about every day
Several times a week
Several times a month
Several times a year
Once a year or less
Never

33. How frequently do your friends and relatives visit you? (please check (ü) one
box)
1
2
3
4
5
6

Just about every day
Several times a week
Several times a month
Several times a year
Once a year or less
Never

Groups and Networks
34. Do you or anyone in your household participate in any of the following
community groups, organizations or cooperatives? (please check (ü) all that
apply)
Organization/Group

Yes (1)

a.

Microfinance group

b.

Agriculture group

c.

Forest group

d.

Water group (irrigation group)

e.

Women’s group

f.

Credit group

g.

Civic group

h.

Political group
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No (2)

i.

Religious group

j.

Sports group

k.

Health/Sanitation group

l.

Other groups

35. How active would you say you are in your community, such as in local
government or volunteer organizations? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2
3
4
5

Very inactive
Somewhat inactive
Neither active nor inactive
Somewhat active
Very active

36. Did you vote in the last election? (please check (ü) one box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

Collective Action and Cooperation:
37. In the past 12 months, have you worked with others in your village/neighborhood
to do
something for the benefit of the community? (please check (ü) one box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

38. Altogether, how many days in the past 12 months did you or anyone else in your
household participate in community activities?
Number of times participated…….…….……
39. After the earthquake, how actively did you participate in any disaster recovery
projects or programs in the community?
1
2

Very inactively
Somewhat inactively
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3
4
5

Neither actively nor inactively
Somewhat actively
Very actively

Section E: FOOD SECURITY
In this section, we will ask you about your food security situation. First, we will ask
you about the specific food items your family has consumed in the past week.
Subsequently, we want to examine the shortage of food that may be prevalent. This
will allow us to understand the overall food security situation in the village.
40. Could you please tell me how many days in the past 7 days your household has
eaten the following foods and what the source was (input 0 for items that were not
eaten over the last 7 days).
Food Item

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
xv.
xvi.
xvii.

a. No of days
eaten the
item in the
last 7 days

b. Food
source
(write
those all
applied
(code 1))
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,

Maize
Rice/Paddy
Millets
Roots and tubers
(potatoes, yam)
Wheat/Barley

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

(

)

,

,

Fish
White meatpoultry
Pork
Red meat-goat,
sheep
Red meat-Buffalo
Eggs
Pulses/Lentils
Vegetables
Oil/Ghee/Butter
Fresh fruits
Sugar/Salt
Milk/Curd

(
(

)
)

,
,

,
,

(
(

)
)

,
,

,
,

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
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Code 1:
Food
Source
Codes:
1=Own
production
(crops,
animal)
2=hunting,
fishing
3=gathering
4=borrowed
5=purchase
with wages
6=exchange
labor for
food
7=exchange
items for
food
8=gift (food)
from family
relatives
9=food aid
(NGOs etc.)
96=Other
(specify:
__________
_____ )

41. For the following questions, we would like to ask you how you cope with
food shortage in the last 7 days. (please check (ü) one box)
Often
(5 or
more
times) (4)

From
time to
time (2
to 3
times) –
(3)

Rarely
(once) –

Never –

(2)

(1)

a. In the past 12 months, how frequently
did you worry that your household
would not have enough food?
b. In the past 12 months, how often were
you or any household member not
able to eat the kinds of food you/he
preferred because of a lack of
resource?
c. In the past 12 months, how often did
you or any household member have to
eat a limited variety of foods due to a
lack of resources?
d. In the past 12 months, how often did
you or any household member have to
eat a smaller meal than you felt you
needed because there was not enough
food?
e. In the past 12 months, how often did
you or any household member eat
fewer meals in a day because of
resources to get food?
f. In the past 12 months, how often was
there with no food to eat of any kind
in your household because of lack of
resources to get food?
Yes (1)
g. In the past 12 months, how often did you or any
household member go to sleep at night hungry because
there was not enough food?
h. Has any member of your household received food aid
in the last 6 months?
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No (2)

Section F: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
In order for us to perform a detailed study, we need to know about you and your
family. This will help us know how different or similar our survey respondents are.
In order to cater our project to fit the needs of this community, it is important that
you answer these questions as accurately as possible.
All the survey information will be fully confidential. Your responses will be
completely anonymous.
42. How many people currently live in your household? Please write the numbers

43.

a.

Total number of household members

b.

Number of children (0 to 5 years)

c.

Number of children (6 to 18 years)

d.

Number of adults (older than 18 years)

e

Number of adult with earnings

What is your gender? (please check (ü) one box)
Male (1)

Female (2)

44.

How old are you? Please write the number

years old.

45.

How old is the head of your household?

years old.

46.

What is your current marital status? (please check (ü) one box)
1

Never Married

2
3

Married
Divorced

4

Separated

5

Widowed

47. What type of family do you live in? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2

Nuclear
Joint

48. What is your family’s primary religion? (please check (ü) one box)
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1
2
3
4
5
95

Hinduism
Buddhism
Muslim
Kirat
Christian
Other
If other, please specify:
…………………………

49. What caste do you belong to? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
95

Brahmin
Chhetri
Newar
Janajati
Madhesi, Tharu, Musalman
Pahadi Dalit
Madhesi Dalit
Other
If other, please specify:
…………………………

50. What is the highest level of education that you have attained? (please check (ü)
one box)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

No formal schooling
Grades (1-5)
Grades (6-8)
Grades (9-10)
Grades (10-12)
Bachelors
Masters or other professional degrees
Vocational training

51. What is the highest level of education that the head of your household has
completed? (please check (ü) one box)
1
2
3
4
5
6

No formal schooling
Grades (1-5)
Grades (6-8)
Grades (9-10)
Grades (10-12)
Bachelors
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7 Masters or other professional degrees
8 Vocational training
52. What is the primary occupation of your household head? (please check (ü) one
box)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Unemployed
Student
Agriculture
Daily labor
Self-employed (small business)
House work
Administrative job (government, NGOs, private
firms)
Other
If other, please specify:
…………………………

53. Please state how long it takes you to get to the nearest [……. …] from your home.
Please write down the number of minutes and/or hours.
Hours
a.

Road

b.

Market

c.

Hospital

d.

School

e.

Local administrative office

f.

Women’s Community
Center (UNM built)
Giranchaur Namuna Basti

g.

Minutes

54. Does any member in your household own any of the following items? (please
check (ü) yes or no)
Items
a.
b.
c.
d.

Yes
(1)

Radio
TV
Cellphone
Telephone
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No
(2)

e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.

Bicycle
Motorcycle/scooter
Fan
AC
Sewing Machine
Camera
Car/motor vehicle
Tractor
Refrigerator
Computer
Inverter or solar for electricity
Water pump

55. Does your household own any agricultural land? (please check (ü) one box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

56. How many ropani/bigha of agricultural land does your household own? Please
write down the number and choose (ü) the corresponding unit (1=ropani or
2=bigha).
Ropani(1)

Bigha (2)

57. How many of the following animals does your household own? (Input 0 for if
none owned)
a.

Goat

b.

Cow/Bull

c.

Sheep

d.

Buffalo

e.

Chicken

f.

Duck

g.

Pig

h.

Other (specify) _____________

58. Is anyone in your household working abroad? (please check (ü) one box)
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Yes (1)

No (2)

59. Did your household receive remittances in the past 12 months? (please check (ü)
one box)
Yes (1)

No (2)

If yes (1), please indicate amount:

Rupees.

60. What was your total household’s average monthly income (in Rupees) last year?
(Please check one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
95
96

Less than 2000
2001-4000
4001-6000
6001-8000
8001-10,000
10,001-15,000
15,001-20,000
20,001-30,000
More than 30,000
Do not know
Refused to answer
If more than 100000, please specify:
…………………………

61. What is the main material of the floor of the dwelling?
Earth/Sand (1)
Dung (2)
Wood/Planks (3)
Palm/Bamboo (4)
Parquet/Polished Wood (5)
Vinyl or Asphalt Strips (6)
Ceramic Tiles (7)
Cement (8)
Carpet (9)
Other(10)
62. What is the main material of the roof of the dwelling?
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Earth/Sand (1)
Galvanized Iron (2)
Wood/Planks (3)
Straw/Thatch (4)
Concrete/Cement (5)
Tiles/Slate (6)
Other (7)
Section G: Women’s Community Center
University of New Mexico’s team UNM4Nepal and Kathmandu University have built
a Women’s Community Center (WCC) next to the Bahunepati Clinic. In this section,
we will ask you a few questions about the potential uses of WCC. These questions will
help us restructure our future programs in this community.
63. In what specific ways do you
think WCC can better meet the
needs of women of Bahunepati?
Be as specific as you can be.
64. How often do you think you will
visit the Women’s Community
Center? (please check (ü) one box)

More than once a week (1)
Once a week (2)
Every other week (3)
Once a month (4)
Once a year (5)
Never (6)

65. From this list of the activities in
the women’s center, please rank
highest (1) to lowest (6) the
activities you find most
beneficial to you. Fill in the box
with rank numbers.

Microfinance meeting

(1)

Family Planning Meeting

(2)

Adult learning and educational classes (3)
Political discussion Fair (4)
Youth Club Activities (5)
Others (6). Please specify……..
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66. The maintenance and the
operation of the WCC will
require some monthly expenses
(electricity, water, cleaning, and
repairs). How much are you
willing to pay every month into a
fund to operate this community
center?

Rs. .....

Section H: HEALTH
In this section, we will ask you questions about your health and your perceived health
status. The questions will help us analyze the health status of the individuals and how
it is affected by different socio-economic measures. Please answer the questions as
accurately as possible.
67. Has a doctor ever diagnosed you with or
Yes (1)
confirmed that you had any chronic illness? (please
No (2)
check (ü) one box)
68. Did you have any health problem during the past 6
months (including chronic illness)? (please check (ü)
one box)

69. How often did you go to doctor for the illnesses in
the past 6 months? (please check (ü) one box)

Yes (1)
No (2)
Constantly (5)
Frequently (4)
Sometimes (3)
Rarely (2)
Never (1)

70. Overall, how do you rate your health during the
past 12 month/past month/present health status?
(please check (ü) one box)

Excellent (5)
Very Good (4)
Good (3)
Fair (2)
Poor (1)
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Mental Health
In this section, we would like to ask you questions about how you have been feeling
during the past 30 days. Please answer the questions as accurately as possible.
All of Most Some of A little None of
the
of the the time of the
the time
time
time
(3)
time (2) (1)
(5)
(4)
71. During the past 30 days,
about how often did you
feel hopeless? (please check
(ü) one box)

72. During the past 30 days,
how often did you feel so
depressed that nothing
could cheer you up? (please
check (ü) one box)

73. During the past 30 days,
about how often did you
feel restless or fidgety?
(please check (ü) one box)

74. During the past 30 days,
about how often did you
feel that everything was an
effort? (please check (ü) one
box)

75. During the past 30 days,
about how often did you
feel worthless? (please check
(ü) one box)

76. During the past 30 days,
about how often did you
feel nervous? (please check
(ü) one box)

Section I: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Note: This section is only for female married respondents. If the respondent is male
and female unmarried, please skip this section.
In this section, we will ask you questions whether you have experienced violence
from your intimate partner. If you experienced, we would like to know the reason.
You may refuse to answer the question. Please answer the questions as accurately as
possible.
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
77. Did your husband ever scold you?
(please check (ü) one box)

78. Did your husband ever push, hit, kick, or slap you? (please
check (ü) one box)
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79. Did your husband ever force you to have sex when you
didn’t want to? (please check (ü) one box)
80. Did he ever hurt you physically because you were from a
different caste? (please check (ü) one box)
81. Did he ever attack you with knife, gun, or other weapon?
(please check (ü) one box)

82. Did he ever try to choke you or burn you? (please check (ü) one
box)
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z'? ;do........................

clGtd ;do........................
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k'/f gfd : >L÷>LdtL÷;'>L ..........................................
k|ltlqmof lbg]sf] pd]/......................................... - !* jif{ k'/f ePsf][ x'g'kg]{_
7]ufgf .......................................... ;+ks{ g+ .........................................
ufFpsf] gfd –uf=la=;_ .........................................
jf8{ g+ -!–(_ ........................ ;d'bfosf] gfd ........................
3/ g+ ........................
3/sf] cIf+fz: .........................................
3/sf] b]zfGt/ .........................................
3/sf] d'nL;Fu k|ltlqmof lbg]sf] gftf !: ........................
3/sf] d'nL;Fu k|ltlqmof lbg]sf] gftf . d'nL – ! Ù>Ldfg÷>LdtL –@ Ù 5f]/f÷5f]/L –#Ù gflt÷ gfltgL–$Ù afa'÷cfdf–%Ù
bfh'÷alxgL–^, ebf–eb}÷efGhf– efGhL–&Ù 5f]/f÷a'xf/L–*Ù b]j/÷ b]j/fgL–(Ù ;f;'÷;;'/f–!)Ù cGo gft]bf/
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ख*ड क: भुक-पको /भाब, सामना गन( नीित र पुन/&ि9

यो ख$डमा म तपाईलाई २०१५ को भक
ु 3प बारे के िह 9:नह< सो>नेछु|. कृ पया >यान िदनु होला| उCलेिखत 9:न
म>ये के िह भक
ू 3पका तEकािलन 9भाबसंग स3बिHधत हJन सKनेछन भने के िह 9:नले अिहले को पनु 9MिNका तहह<
जनाउने छन.् तपाईका उQरह<ले हामीलाई भक
ू 3पका तEकािलन 9भावह< र Eयसको पनु 9MिNका कारकह< ख$डन
गनM सहयोग गनTछन् .
१. तपाई तलका कथनह, संग क01को सहमत हुनह
ु ु 5छ? (कृपया ;दएका को>ट म@ये
आफुलाई उEचत लाGने सहमHत को तह जनाई को>ट मा ;ठक Eच5ह लगाउनह
ु ोस|)
एकदमै
सहमत
छै न(१)
i-a

मेरो पNरवारको को;ह सदPय Qकोपमा घाइते हुनु भएको
Eथयो

i-b
ii-a

मेरो पNरवारको सदPयले चोट बाट पन
ु QािWत गनुX भयो |

मेरो बास Pथान भक
ू Zपले बPन पHन न[म\ने गNर @वPत
गNर;दयो |

ii-b

हाल मेरो Pथायी बास Pथान छ |

iii-a

भक
ू Zपको त^काल प_चात मसंग पयाXWत खाने कुराह,
Eथयो |

iii-b
iv-a

हाल मसंग पयाXWत खाने कुराह, छन ् |

भक
ू Zपको त^काल प_चात मसंग पयाXWत 0पउने पानी Eथयो
|

iv-b

हाल मसंग पयाXWत 0पउने पानी छ |

v-a

भक
ु Zप ले मेरो कमाउने सbने सामcयX गुमाउन बा@य
बनायो |

v-b

हाल मसंग काम वा आयको dोत छ |

vi-a

भक
ु Zपले मलाई समाजमा ख\
ु ला ;हडडुल गनX रोक लगायो
(जPतै पNरवार, साथीभाई र छरHछमेक संगको भेटघाटमा)
|

vi-b
vii-a
vii-b

हाल म समाजमा ख\
ु ला ;हडडुल गनX सgम छु |

भक
ू Zपले मेरो के;ह hयिbतगत सZपHतको नाश भयो
(जPतै घर, आफै, पशप
ु ालन इ^या;द)

हाल ती gHतह, वा ती बराबरको सZपती पन
ु QािWत
गNरसकj |

viii-a
viiib

भक
ू Zपले मलाई भावना^मक द:ु ख (जसतै डर/ nास,
Hनराशा/ उदास) महशस
ु गरायो |

मैले भावना^मक पन
ु QािWत गNरसकj |
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सहमत
छै न
(२)

िन?कृय
छु (३)

सहमत
छु (४)

एकदमै
सहमत
छु(५)

ix-a

भक
ू Zपले मेरो pव5द-rपी अनभ
ु व बढाएको छ ( जPतै माया
गनu तथा अ5जान hयिbतह, pवारा शारvNरक, भावना^मक

ix-b
x-a

र यौन अपमान बेहोनुX पनu, झगडा गनu)
म हाल ती pव5दह,बाट मb
ु त छु

भक
ु Zप प_चात म Qकोप-मिु bत, पन
ु 9MिN वा Hछमेकy/

PथाHनय अगुवा/ आEधकाNरक संग भ0व>यका योजनाह,
x-b

छलफल गनX सहभागी हुन स{कन |

म हाल Qकोप मिु bत, पन
ु 9MिN वा Hछमेकy, PथाHनय अगुवा/
आEधकाNरकसंगको भ0व>य का योजनाह, छलफल गनX
सहभागी जनाउन सbछु |

२. $भाव तथा पन
ु $ाि.त को समय: भक
ु 5पको $भाव क6त लामो समय संग र;हर=यो?
भक
ु Zप प_चात

समय

हWता
क
ख

हामीले खाने कुराह, कम खचX गय}

ग
घ
ङ

बालबा[लकाह,ले Pकूल छुटाउनु पय

च

मेरो घर पNरवारको बालबा[लकाह,ले पNरÄम गनुX पय

छ

मेरो पNरवारले भावना^मक द:ु ख भोGनु पय

ज

मेरो पNरवारले शारvNरक चोट बाट पन
ु QािWत गय

झ
ञ

घरायसी सदPयह, गाऊँ छोडेर ;हंडे

म;हना साल

यिद पनु 9ािN अिहले स3म
नभएको ख$डमा कित
लामो समय स3म िमCने
आशा रा[नु भएको छ?
म;हना

साल

हामीले घरायसी सामा~ीह,मा कम खचX गय}
मैले काम छुटाउनु पय

मेरो घर पNरवारको यव
ु ाह,ले थप पNरÄम गनुX पय

गुमाएको सZपHत वा ^यस बराबरको म\
ू य आजXन गनX
लागेको समय

ट

भक
ु Zप अHघकै सरह आय (income) QािWत गनX
लागेको समय

#= @)!% sf] e'sDk tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] s;/L ;fdgf u–of] < s[kof xf] jf xf]O{gdf -ü_

nufpg'xf[; .

tkfO{n] s:tf] pkfo ckgfpg' eof] <s'g tl/sf klxnf], bf]>f], ==============ckgfpg' eof], To;sf]
cfwf/df s[kof tx 5'§fpg'xf[; . -!– k|yd, @–l4lto, #– t[lto, $–rf}yf], %–kfrf}_
;fdgf ug]{ tl/sf

!

5 -!_

u/uxgf lwtf]÷ljlqm
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5}g -@_

tx -!–%_

@

efF8fs'8f ljlqm

#

VffwfGo ljlqm

$

ufO{j:t' ljlqm

%

;jf/L ;fwg ljlqm

^

s[lifhGo cf}hf/sf] ljlqm

&

cGo ;fdfu|L ljlqm

*

kl/jf/÷ l5d]sL ÷gft]bf/बाट ;xof]u

(

;fk6L /sd – -JolQm jf ;+:yfaf6_

!)

clu|d dhb'/L

!!

cGo kl/jf/sf] ;b:o4f/f dhb'/L

!@

Afrtsf] k|of]u

!#

C0f lnP/

!$

;/sf/L ;xof]u

!%

u}= ;=; sf] ;xof]u

!^

bfg÷;xof]u

!&

kl/jf/sf] ;b:o cGoq uP/

!*

ljk|]z0f4f/f -/]ld6\ofG;_

!(

cGo -s[kof pNn]v ug'{xf];_
_____________________

$= olb tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] ;+s6sf] ;do s'g} lwtf]÷las|L u/]sf] eP pQm lwtf]÷las|Lsf cGbfhL d'No
slt /x|of] <
?kof
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% = e'sDk kl5 s] tkfO{n] st} aflx/L cयिdaf6 jf cGo ;+:yfaf6 ;fk6L lng] sf]lz; ug{' eof] <
d}n] sf]lz; ul/g -!_

d}n] sf]lz; u/] t/ ;xof]u
kfO{g -@_

d}n] ;fk6 lnP -#_

^ = C0f lng' rfxg'sf] d'Vo sf/0f s] lyof]< - s[kof pko'Qm ;a}df -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@
#
$
%
^

Vffg]s'/f lsGg
pkrf/ ug{
3/fo;L ;fdfg lsGg
ufO{ a:t' lsGg
s[lifhGo ;fdfu|L lsGg
3/ k'gM lgdf{0f ug{

&
*
(
!)

Joj;fo ug{ jf k'g nuflg ug{
s[lif jfx]ssf ;fdfu|L lsGg
hUuf lsGg
cGo -s[kof pNn]v ug'{xf];_

& = olb tkfO{n] C0f पाउनु भएको भए को वा कुन eोतबाट पाउनु भयो? नपाउनु भएको भए को वा कुन eोतमा

कोिशश गनMभु यो]<- s[kof pko'Qm ;a}df -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@

gft]bf/
िछमेकj

^
&

# :yflgo ;fx'
$ /f]huf/bftf
% Wffld{s ;+:yf

*
(

Uf}/-;/sf/L ;+:yf
cf}krfl/s C0f bftf - j}+s, ljlQo
;+:yf_
;d'xdf cfwfl/t n3' ljQ
cGo -s[kof pNn]v ug'{xf];_

*= ऋण 9ाN गनMु भएको भए, C0f slt िथयो<
?k}ofF .
(= s] तपाईले C0f ltl/ सKनभ
ु यो<
5 -!_

5}g -@_

!)= olb ltl/ सKनभ
ु एको भए C0f lnPsf] slt dlxgfkl5 ltg{ सफल हJनभु यो< s[kof c+sdf n]Vg'xf]; .
dlxgf ….…….
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!!= olb ltg{ ;Sg' ePsf] 5}g eg] ca slt dlxgf ;Dddf ltl/;Sg] cfzf /fVg' ePsf] 5<- s[kof

Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!

s]lx dlxgf kl5

@
#

Ps jif{ kl5
@–# jif{df

$

#–% jif{df

%

%–!) jif{df

^

d d]/f] hLage/ ltg{ ;lSbg .

!@= @)&@ ;fnsf] e'sDk बाहेक 3/kl/jf/n] o:tf] cGo k|sf/sf] k|fs[lts k|sf]k ;fdgf ug{' परे को
lyof]< olb lyof] eg] slQsf] bbf{gfs k|sf]k lyof]<
lyof] -!_

s=

k|fs[lts
k|sf]k
jfl9

v=

klx/f]

u=

ef/L aiff{

3=

cfwL

ª=

cl;gf÷lxp

r=

v8]/L

5=

pRr tfkdfg

h=

आगलागी

´=

glb s6fg

`=

cGo -s[kof
v'nfpg'xf];_
===================
===========

िथएन -@_

c;/ slt ulx/f]
lyof] < -!–$_

c;/sf] dfqf
-!_ c;/ gk/]sf]
-@_ lgDg c;/
-#_ dWod c;/
-$_ pRr c;/

!#= ljut @ aif{df तपाइको पlरवारn] cGo lgDg cf3ft (shocks) dxz'; गनMपु रे को िथयो<
5 -!_
5}g -@_
cf3ft
!=
@=

/f]huf/L u'dfpg'÷ d'Vo sdfpg]sf] Joj;fo
cGo ;b:osf] /f]huf/ u'Dg'

#=

cGo sdfpg] JolQmsf] d[To' x'g'
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$=

d'Vo sdfpg] JolQmn] 5f]8|g'

%

7'nf] la/fdL x'g'

^

4Gb÷ lx;f+

&

3/ eTsg'

*

hUufsf] gf]S;fgL

(

:yfoL स3पितsf] नोKसानी -TV, 6«ofS6/, d]lzg_

!)

ufO{a:t'÷ xfF; s'v'/fsf] gf]S;fgL

!!

aflnsf] gf]S;fgL

!@

d'Vo ls6x? -बािलमा लाmने िकरा_

!#

sd pTkfbg (Low production)

!$

ljafx÷clGtd ;+:sf/

!%

cGo -s[kof v'nfpg'xf];_
_______________________

ख@ड ख: जोिखमबारे

धारणा

o; v08df xfdL tkfO{nfO{ e'sDk / भक
ू $पस$ब(धी tkfO{sf] wf/f0ff ;f]Wg] 5f} . o;df ;lx वा unt hjfkm x'g] 5}gg
. ;s] स$म o;sf] pQ/ िमलाएर lbg'xf]nf .
!$= ;fdfGotof e'sDkसंग tkfOलाई{ slt डर लाmछ ? -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@
#
$
%

s'g} 8/ लाmदैन
cln cln 8/ लाmछ
8/ लाmछ
Psbd 8/ लाmछ
Hofb} 8/ लाmछ

!%= ^ /]S6/sf] e'sDk cfPsf] v08df tkfO{nfO{ tkfO{sf] घरको कित nित x'G5 h:tf] nfU5 <- s[kof

Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!

s]lx lau|b}g

@
#

clnslt lau|g]5, ;fdfGo dd{t kZrft a:g ;lsg]5
dWod lau|g]5, d'Vo dd{t kZrft a:g ;lsg]5
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$
%

Psbd} lau|g]5, ;fdfGoतया a:g ;lsb}g
k"0f{tof gi6 x'g]5

!^= ^ /]S6/sf] e'sDk cfPsf] v08df tkfO{nfO{ tkfO{sf] ;DklQ – ufO{a:t', cGg-afln, s[lifhGo

hldg cflbdf slt c;/ k5{ h:tf] nfU5 <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@
#
$
%

lau|g]5}g
clnslt lau|g]5
dWod lau|g]5,
Psbd} lau|g]5,
k"0f{tof gi6 x'g]5

!&= tkfO{nfO{ casf] slt jif{df csf]{ 7"nf] e'sDk cfp5 h:tf] nfU5 < s[kof c+s n]Vg'xf]; .
jif{sf] सं[या

१८. तपाई आrनो उQरदेिख किQको िवs:त हJनहु JHछ? १- १० को इकाईमा वणMन गनMहु ोस् . -१ एकदमै िवs:त
छै न, १० एकदमै िवs:त छु )
िवs:तताको तह -१ देिख १०)
१९. यो छे nमा, आगामी दश वषXमा तल उ\लेÖखत QाकृHतक Qकोप घÜने वा जलवायु पNरवतXन हुने क01को
सZभावना छ? तल ;दएका को>ट म@ये आáनो अनभ
ु वले लागेको उ\लेÖखत QाकृHतक Qकोप संगमेल हुने गरv ;ठक
Eच5ह (ü)लगाउनह
ु ोस|
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QाकृHतक Qकोप

Hनस5दे ह

घÜदै न (१)

घÜदै न (२)

घÜला,

यसै भ5न

घÜछ (४)

स{क5न

Hनस5दे ह
घÜछ
(५)

(३)

क

बाढv

ख

प;हरो

ग

भारv वषाX

घ

हुरv बतास

ङ

अ[सना/ ;हउँ पनu

च

खडेरv

छ

चक तापãम

ज

डढे लो

झ

नदv नाश

`

अ5य ( कृपया उ\लेख

गनह
ुX ोस )
__________________

२०. जलवायु पFरवतGन: यिद Eयसको रोकथाम नगlरएको ख$डमा, तपाईको िवचारमा आगामी दश वषMमा जलवायु

पlरवतMन हJने वा झनै िबxने किQको स3भावना दे[नहु JHछ? कृ पया कोyमा (ü)िचHहलगाउनहु ोस |
१
२
३
४
९९

कुनै स3भावना छै न
के िह स3भावना छ
स3भावना छ
एकदमै स3भावना छ
थाहा छै न
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२१. जलवायु पKरवत&नको /भाव: तपाईको िवचारमा आगामी दश वषMमा जलवायु पlरवतMनले किQको धनजनको
nित वा स3पितको िबनाश गनT स3भावना छ (ज:तै अHनवालीको नोKसान, पशपु ालन, घर, इEयादी ) कृ पया कोyमा
(ü)िचHहलगाउनहु ोस
१
२
३
४

9भाव पानT छै न
अिलकित 9भावपानM सKछ
के िह 9भाव पानM सKछ
िनकै 9भाव पानM सKछ

२२. जलवायु पKरवत&न का कारण / /िवLी: तल उCलेिखत कथनसंग किQको सहमत हJनहु JHछ कृ पया
कोyमा(ü)िचHहलगाउनहु ोस |

एकदमै
सहमत

छै न (१)

क

वन िवनास जलवायु पlरवतMनको कारक हो

ख

िजवा|म-इHधनको 9योग जलवायु
पlरवतMनको कारक हो
कृ िषमा रसायिनक िवष तथा मलको 9योगले
जलबायु पlरवतMन गदMछ
जंगल आगलागी जलबायु पlरवतMनको कारक
हो
आधिु नक औजारको 9योग जलबायु
पlरवतMनको कारक हो
मानव-जाित जलबायु पlरवतMनको लािग
िज3मेवार छन्
जलबायु पlरवतMनसगं ज>ु न हामीले के िह
गनMपु छM
जलबायु पlरवतMन भगवानको इ~छा हो

ग
घ
ङ
च
छ
ज

सहमत

छै न (२)

Hन>कृय
छु (३)

सहमत
छु (४)

एकदमै
सहमत
छु(५)

ख*ड ग: मौसम-िनद(िशत िबमाको माग
हामी बाहुनेपाटLका घरहNमा स5भावत मौसमले हुने Pय6त रोकथाम गनGको 6नQमR काSप6नक लघु TबURय
बीमा योजना कायाGVवयन गनG गैरहे का छौ| मौसम 6नद[ Qशका बीमाको 6नमाGणले पालव
ु ा पलाउने मौसममा
खडेरL / भारL वषाGले `कसानहNमा पन[ Pय6त रोaन मदत गन[छ|
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bयसcममा, तपाई क6त बराबरको बीमा रकम 6तनG इfछुक हुनह
ु ु Vछ भVने Uवषयमा $gनहN सोhधनेछ | यो
चा;ह वाkतUवक बीमा कायGcम योजना नभए ताप6न वाkतUवक हो भ6न कृपया उRर ;दनह
ु ोला | कृपया
भरपाई, coverage र बीमा 6तनG इfछुकता बारे nयान ;दनह
ु ोला |
बीमा सZबि5धत जानकारvह, तल उ\लेÖखत छन ् |
•

यसले कसरL कायG गदG छ?

यसले खडेरv वा भारv वषाXको कारणले {कसानले बेहोनu çयHत कम गनX मदत पय
ु ाXउनेछ| य;द

पालव
ु ा पलाउने याममा १० ;दन सZम भारv वषाX भएको वा ३० ;दन सZम लगातार वषाX नभएको

खèडमा {कसानह,लाई भपाXई ;दईनेछ | वषाX भएको वा नभएको जानकारvको Hन[म1 गाउँ निजकैको
मौसम सच
ू क के5êको रे कडX हे नuछौ, जसले वषाXको माnा सिजलै पNरमाजाXन गनX मदत पय
ु ाXउनेछ | (
य;द १० ;दन सZम लगातार १२० [म[ल[मटर भ5दा बढv पानी परे को वा ३० ;दन सZम लगातार १०
[म[ल[मटर भ5दा कम पानी परे को खèडमा)
•

यसले के के ढाaछ?

बालvको gHतका साथै यसले पशह
ु ,को gHत पHन ढाbनेछ | जZमाजZमी यसले बालvनालv, गाई,
वPतु इ^या;द को çयHत ढाbनेछ
•

भपाGइ क6त गFरVछ त ?

एक रोपनी जGगा बराबर ,. १०,००० को बीमा, एक गाई बराबर ,. ८,१०० को बीमा, एक भíसी

बराबर ,. २६,००० को बीमा, एक बाîा बराबर ,. ३,८००० को बीमा,एक हाँस वा कुखरु ा बराबर ,.
३८० को बीमा पHू तX गNरनेछ |
•

तपाईले क;हले रकम पाउनु हुनेछ?

मौसम अवPथाको पNरमाजXन प_ïयात य;द तो{कए बमोिजम जानकार भएको खèडमा

{कसानह,लाई बालvमा बेहोनुX पनu çयHतको भपाXई गNरनेछ | तर पशु पालनको खèडमा, कृ0ष

0वभागका 0वशेषñpवारा गNरएको gHत सZबि5ध छान0वन प_चात माn भपाXई ;दईनेछ| यस
ãममा मौसमको खराबीको कारण भएको पशह
ु ,को çयHत भपाXई गNरनेछ |

२३. तपाईलाई बीमाको याके ज स3बिHध के िह 9Äह< सो>नछ
ु ?
छ(१)

छै न (२)

u0fs: य;द उ1र(छै न) आएमा अ, Q_नह, सो@नु अHघ कृपया बीमा योजनाको बारे @यान पवु कX बझ
ु ाउनह
ु ोला|

220

u0fsलाइ िनद(शन: पन
X सो@नु पनuछ?
ु : Q_नह, @यान पब
ु क
•

गोलाQथाpवारा HनधाXNरत रकम छा5नु होला| (नोट: सभuअHघ सबैलाई ãमर;हत ढं गले रकम छा5न
लगाइनेछ )

•
•
•

Q_न न. २४ मा ãमर;हत ढं गले रकम राखेर Q_न सो@नह
ु ोला
य;द उ1र ‘छ’ आएमा रकम बढाएर Q_न सो@नह
ु ोला

य;द उ1र ‘ छै न’ आएमा रकम घटाएर Q_न सो@नह
ु ोला
तल [ललामी रकम उ\लेÖखत छन ् ( वा0षXक) N.

………………………………………………………………………………………………….
उदाहरण
o

o

‘तपाई यो ôबमाको लाEग २०० ,पया HतनX तयार हुनह
ु ु 5छ?’ भ5ने Q_नमा 'HतछुX' भ5ने
उ1र आएमा ‘तपाई यो ôबमाको लाEग ५०० ,पया (२०० पHछको ठुलो संõया) HतनX

तयार हुनह
ु ु 5छ?’ भनेर सो@नह
ु ोला |
‘तपाई यो ôबमाको लाEग १००० ,पया HतनX तयार हुनह
ु ु 5छ?’ भ5ने Q_नमा 'Hत;दX न'
भ5ने उ1र आएमा ‘तपाई यो ôबमाको लाEग ५०० ,पया (१००० अHघको सानो संõया)
HतनX तयार हुनह
ु ु 5छ?’ भनेर सो@नह
ु ोला |

२४ के तपाई मािथ उCलेिखत िबमाको लािग एक वषMको <...................ितनM तयार हJनहु JHछ ?[गोला 9थामा

उEपHन िललामी पनु ाMराशी भनMहु ोस]् कृ पया कोyमा(ü)िचHह लगाउनहु ोस|
छ (१)

छै न (२)

२५ यदी एक वषMको तपाईलाई <...................... ितनM भिनएमा (उ~च वा कम रकम) के तपाई मौसम िनदTिशत

बीमा गनM इ~छुक हJनहु JHछ? कृ पया कोyमा(ü)िचHहलगाउनहु ोस
छ (१)

छै न (२)

२६ तपाई मािथ उCलेिखत 9Äमा कितको िवs:थ हJनहु JHछ? (१- धेरै िवs:थ नभएको, १०- धेरै िवs:थ भएको)
िवs:थको तह (१देिख१० ) ……………….……

v08 3: सामािजक-पूंजी

िवUास र सौहाद&ता
२७ तल उCलेिखत कथन म>ये तपाईलाई कुन सिटक लाmछ: कृ पया कोyमा(ü)िचHहलगाउनहु ोस
धेरै मािनसह<लाई िवsास गनM सिकHछ (१)
म धेरै मािनसह<लाई िवsास गनM सिKदन (२)
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२८ तपाई तल उCलेिखत म>ये कसलाई िव:वास गनMहु JHछ? (कृ पया कोyमा(ü)िचHह लगाउनहु ोस)
एकदमै (१)

क
ख
ग
घ
ङ
च
छ

अ[ल (२)

Hनकै कम (३)

स5
ु य (४)

गाउँका मािनस
अHजान cयिd
9हरी
आमà
सरकारी कमाMचायM
राजनीितâ
समाचार संचार मा>यम

आXतKरक स-बXध र सज
ं ाल

२९ तपाई संग कHत जना [म\ने साथीह, वा नातेदारह, छन ् जोसंग तपाई आáनो गोWय कुराह,
खल
ु ेर गनX सbनह
ु ु 5छ सहयोग माGनु हु5छ या पैसाको लेनदे न गनXसbनह
ु ु 5छ? कृ पया स6
ं या उ8लेख गन>हु ोस
साथी र नातेदार ह<को सं[या………….……

३० यदी तपाईलाई अपझMट कुनै आपत परे सानो रकम (आrनो घर कजाM एक हNा िभä ितनMपु नT हJदँ ा) आफHत र

नातेदार म>ये कसैले आफूखसु ी सहयोग गनMहु JHछ भHने लाmछ?
१

अव|य गछM न

२

स3भावना छ

३
४

थाहा छै न
स3भावना छै न

५

अव:य गदãनन्

िछमेकY-एकता र सदवाभ
३१ tkfO{ o; ;d'bfodf slxn] b]lv a:b} cfpg' ePsf] 5 <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!

Ps aif{ eGbf sd

@
#

! b]vL % aif{ ;Dd
% b]vL !) aif{ ;Dd

$

!) aif{ eGbf j9L

३२ tkfO{ cfkmGt / ;fyLx?sf]df slQsf] hfg'x'G5 <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
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!
@
#
$
%
^

k|Tos lbg
xKtfdf w]/} lbg
dlxgfdf w]/} lbg
jif{df w]/} lbg
jif{sf] Psrf]6L jf sd
slxNn}klg

३३ tkfO{sf] cfkmGt / ;fyLx? tkfO{sf]df slQsf] cfp5g < - s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@
#
$
%
^

k|Tos lbg
xKtfdf w]/} lbg
dlxgfdf w]/} lbg
jif{df w]/} lbg
jif{sf] Psrf]6L jf sd
slxNn}klg

;d'x / सामािजक ;+hfn
३४ tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/sf] s'g} ;b:o lgDg ;d'bfo, ;d'x, ;+:yf jf sf]ck]/]l6e ;+u ;+nUg
x'g'x'G5 <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
s=
v=
u=
3=
ª=
r=
5=
h=
´=
`=
6=
7=

;+u7g÷;d'x
n3'ljQ ;d'x -cfo cfh{g ;d'x_
sl[if ;d'x
jg ;d'x
kfgL ;d'x -l;+rfO{ ;d'x_
dlxnf ;d'x
C0fL ;d'x
gful/s ;d'x
/fhg}lts ;d'x
wfl{d{s ;d'x
v]ns'b ;d'x
:jf:Yo ;d'x
cGo ;d'xx?

5 (! )

5}g (@)

३५ tkfO{ आrनो] ;d'bfodf किQको ;s[o x'g'x'G5 < (h:t} :yflgo ;/sf/ jf :jod;]js

;+:yfx?) - s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
!
@
#
$

Hofb} lglis|o
s]lx lglis|o
Gf ;ls|o g lglis|o
s]lx ;ls|o
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%

Hofb} ;ls|o

३६ tkfOले अि:तको r'gfjdf ef]6 xfNg'eof]< -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];_
5 (!)

5}g (@)

सामुिहक काय& र आपसी सहयोग

३७ lat]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{n] tkfO{sf] ufp÷ l5d]sdf c?;+u ldn]/ ;d'bfosf] kmfO{bfsf] nflu
sfd ug'{ eoff] <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._

5 (!)

5}g (@)

३८ lat]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] 3/sf] ;b:on] clxn];Dd ;d'bflos sfo{df slt
k6s ;xeflutf hgfpg'eof] <- s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
;xeflutf hgfPsf] ;+Vof …….…….……
३९ e'sDk kl5 b}ljs k|sf]k k'glgdf{0f sfo{ of]hgf jf sfo{s|ddf tkfO{sf] ;d'bfodf slt ;ls|o

eP/ nfUg'eof] <
!
@
#
$
%

Hofb} lglis|o
s]lx lglis|o
Gf ;ls|o g lglis|o
s]lx ;ls|o
Hofb} ;ls|o

v08 ª M vfB z'/Iff
o; v08df xfdL vfB z'/Iffsf] cj:yf af/] ;f]Wg]5f} . klxnf xfdL tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] ljt]sf] xKtfdf pkef]u ug{'
ePsf] vfB k|sf/sf] jf/]df ;f]Wg] 5f}. To:t} xfdL vfBGgsf] cefjsf] jf/]df s'/f ug]{5f} . o;n] xfdLnfO{ ufpsf]
;du| vfB z'/Iff sf] jf/]df बåु न;lhnf] agfpg]5 .

$)= ljt]sf] & lbgdf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] lgDh vfg]s'/fx? slt k6s vfg'eof] eGg ;Sg'x'G5 /
ltlgx?sf] ;|f]t s] lyP < & lbg ;Dd gvfPsf] s'/fx? eP ) /fVg'xf]; .
Vffg]s'/fsf] k|sf/
!
@
#

ds}
Wfg
sf]bf]

s= ljt]sf] & lbgdf
vfPsf lbgx?
(
(
(

)
)
)
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v= vfg]s'/fsf] ;|f]t ;a} pNn]v ug{'xf];_ sf]8 !_
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,

-sf]8 !_ vfg]s'/fsf]
;|f]t sf]0fM
!= cfkMg} pTkfbg-afln,
hgfjf/_
@= lzsf/, df5fkfng
#= hDdf u/]sf]

$
%
^
&
*
(
!)
!!
!@
!#
!$
!%
!^
!&

h/f / sGbd'n -cfn' , t?n_
ux'F ÷hf}
df5f
;]tf] df;'– kf]N6«L (chicken)
a+u'/
/ftf] df;'– afv||f, e]8f
/ftf] df;' – e};L
c08f
uxt÷bfn
t/sf/L
t]n÷£o'÷dvg
Tffhf kmnkm'n
lrgL÷g'g
b'w÷ bxL

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,

,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,

$=;fk6L lnPsf]
%= lsg]sf]
^= aflnsf] nflu v]tnf
&= vfg]s'/f ;f6]sf]
*= -pkfx/_ kl/jf/ tyf
gft]bf/ af6
(= vfg]s'/f ;xof]u u}=;=; af6_
!)= cGo
-v'nfpg'xf];_

$!= tnsf k|Zgx?df xfdL ljt]sf] एक बस&मा vfB ;+s6nfO{ tkfO{n] s;/L ;fdgf ug{' eof] भनेर
;f]Wg]5f} . -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];_
af/Daf/
- % jf
al9
k6s_
-$_
!
@
#
$

%

^

;do
;dodf -@
b]lv #
k6s)
-#_

la/n} –
Psk6s_
-@_

slxNn}kl
g
-!_

5 -!_

5}g -@_

िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/;+u k|z:t vfBGg
x'b}g eg]/ lrlGtt x'g'eof] <
िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] vfB
;+s6sf] sf/0fn] vfg dg nfu]sf] s'/f slt k6s vfgf
kfpg' ePg <
िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] vfB
;+s6sf] sf/0fn] vfg dg nfu]sf] s'/f l;ldt dfqdf dfq
slt vfg'eof] <
िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/sf] ;b:on]]
vfB ;+s6sf] sf/0fn] कित िदन िनयिमतभHदा सानो छाक खान
खानभु यो< (size/proportion of meals)
िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/sf] ;b:on]]
vfB ;+s6sf] sf/0fn] cfkm'nfO{ cfjZos kg]{ eGbf sd
छाक खाना vfg'eof] < (Number of meals)
िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf]] vfB ;+s6sf] sf/0fn] tkfO{sf]
kl/jf/df vfg]s'/f lyPg <

& िबt]sf] !@ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] vfB ;+s6sf] sf/0fn] efsef]s}
;'Tg hfg'eof]<
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* िबt]sf] ^ dlxgfdf tkfO{ jf tkfO{sf] kl/jf/n] ;xof]u :j?k vfBGg kfpg'eof] <

v08 ` M जनसांिZयकYय जानकारी

xfdLnfO{ cWoog ug{sf] nflu tkfO{sf] kl/jf/sf] af/]df hfGg' kg]{ x'G5 . o;n] xfdLnfO{ k|ltls|of lbg]x? slt ;dfg
वा km/s 5g eg]/ a'´g ;lhnf] x'g]5 . हाçा भाबी योजनाह< यस समदु ायको आव:यकता अनसु ार िनमाMण गनM तपाइले िदनु
भएका जबाफह<ले मéत पयु ाMउने छन् . ;e]{sf ;a} ;"rgfx? Uff]Ko /xg]5g . tkfO{sf k|ltls|ofx? बेनामी x'g]5g .

$@= tkfO{sf] 3/df xfn slt hgf सद:य x'g'x'G5< s[kof c+sdf pNn]v ug'{xf];.
!

hDdf kl/jf/ ;b:o

@

jfnjRrfsf] ;+Vof - )–% jif{_

#

jfnjRrfsf] ;+Vof - ^–!* jif{_

$

jo:ssf] ;+Vof -!* jif{ dfyLsf]_

%

cfDbfgL ePsf] jo:ssf] ;+Vof

$#= tkfO{sf] ln+u s'g xf] < - s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
k'?if -!_

Dlxnf -@_

$$= tkfO{ slt jif{sf] x'g' eof] < s[kof c+sdf n]Vg'xf]; .

jif{

$%= tkfO{sf] 3/sf] d'nL slt jif{sf] x'g' eof] <

jif{

$^= tkfO{sf] jt{dfg a}aflxs cj:yf के छ? - s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];._
अिबबािहत
!
िबबािहत
@
#
;+aGw laR5]b ePsf]
$

5'l§Psf]

%

िबwjf

$&= tkfO{ s:tf] k|sf/sf] kl/jf/df a:g' x'G5< -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; ._
!
@

Psn
;+o'Qm

$*= tkfO{sf] kl/jf/sf] d'Vo wd{ s] xf] < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; ._
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!
@
#
$
%
^

lxGb'
a'l4:y
d'l:nd
ls/fFt
lqml:rog
cGo
cGo eP, pNn]v ug'{xf];
…………………………

$(= tkfO{ s'g Hfftsf] x'g'x'G5 < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; ._
!
@
#
$
%
^
&
*

afx'g
छे äी
g]jf/
जनजाती
dw]zL, yf?, d';ndfg
kxf8L blnt
dw]zL blnt
CGo
cGo eP, pNn]v ug'{xf];
…………………………

%)= tkfO{n] k|fKt ug'{ ePsf] pRr lzIff slt xf] < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; .
!
@
#
$
%
^
&
*

cf}krfl/s lzIff glnPsf]
sIff -!–%_
sIff -^–*_
sIff -(–!)_
sIff -!)–!@_
:gfts
:gfsf]Q/ jf cGo Joj;flos lzIff
Joj;flos tflnd

%!= tkfO{n] 3/sf] d'n cयिdn] k|fKt ug'{ ePsf] pRr lzIff slt xf] <-s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf];

.

!
@
#
$
%
^
&

cf}krfl/s lzIff glnPsf]
sIff -!–%_
sIff -^–*_
sIff -(–!)_
sIff -!)–!@_
:gfts
:gfsf]Q/ jf cGo Joj;flos lzIff
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* Joj;flos tflnd
%@= tkfO{n] 3/sf] d'n cयिdsf] k|d'v k]zf s] xf] < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; .
बेरोजगार
!
िबèाथà
@
#
s[lif
$
b}lgs Hofnfbf/L
%
:j/f]huf/ -;fgf Joj;fo_
^
3/sf] sfd
&
k|zfzlgs /f]huf/ -;/sf/L, Pg=lh=cf], lghL kmd{
*
CGo
cGo eP, pNn]v ug'{xf];………………
%#= tkfO{sf] 3/af6 ;a}eGbf glhssf] [……. …] slt ;do nfUb5 <

pNn]v ug{xf]; .

306f

s=

सडक बाटो

v=

ahf/

u=

xl:k6n

3=

िबèालय

ª=

:yflgo k|zfzlso sfof{no, ufla;
j8f sfof{no
dlxnf ;fd'bflos s]Gb« -बाहJनीपाटी
िKलिनक KUíारा संचािलत )

r=

s[kof 3i6f / ldg]6df
ldg]6

%$= tkfOsf] kl/jf/sf] s'g} ;b:o;+u lgDg म>ये कुन कुन सामxी छन् <-s[kof xf] jf xf]O{g Pp6fdf -

ü_ nufpg'xf]; .

हो
(!)

gd'gfx¿
s=
v=
u=
3=
ª=
r=
5=
h=

/]l8of]
l6= भी.
Dff]afOn
6]lnkmf]g
;fO{sn
df]6/;fO{sn÷ :s'6/
k+vf
P= l;=
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होइन
(@)

´=
`=
6=
7=
8=
9=
0f=
Tf=

l;nfpg] d]lzg
Sofd]/f
sf/÷df]6/ uf8L
6«ofS6/
/]lk|mh]/]6/
sDKo'6/
O{Ge6{/ jf िबh'nLsf] nflu ;f]nf/
kfgL tfGg] d]lzg

%%= tkfOsf] kl/jf/sf] s'g} s[lif hGo hUuf 5 <-s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; .
5 (!)

5}g (@)

%^= tkfOsf] kl/jf/सगं slt /f]kgL / laufx s[lif hGo hUuf /x]sf] 5 < s[kof c+sdf pNn]v ug{'xf]; /

To;} cg'?ksf] O{sfO[df (ü) nufpg'xf]; ._ (!– /f]kgL jf @– laufx)

/f]kgL -!_

%&= tkfOsf] kl/jf/;+u slt hgfjf/x? /x]sf 5g < (gePsf] eP ) pNn]v ug'{xf];)
s=

afv|f

v=

ufO{÷ uf]¿

u=

e]8f

3=

e};L

ª=

s'v'/f

r=

xfF;

5=

;'+u'/

h=

cGo -v'nfpg'xf];_ _____________

%*= tkfOsf] kl/jf/sf sf]lx lab]zdf sfd ug'{x'G5 < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_ nufpg'xf]; .
5 -!_

5}g-@_
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laufx -@_

%(= tkfOsf] kl/jf/n] lat]sf] !@ dlxgfdf /]ld6]G; k|fKt ug{' ePsf] 5 < -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_

nufpg'xf]; .
5-!_

5}g-@_

olb 5 eg] s[kof /sd pNn]v ug{'xf]; :

?k}of .

^) = सामाHयतया tkfOsf] kl/jf/sf] cf}ift dfl;s cfDbfjL -?kofdf_ slt हJHछ< -s[kof Pp6fdf -ü_

nufpg'xf]; .

!
@
#
$
%
^
&
*
(
!)
!!

@))) eGbf sd
@))!–$)))
$))!–^)))
^))!–*)))
*))!–!),)))
!),))!–!%,)))
!%,))!–@),)))
@),))!–#),)))
#),))) eGbf jl9
yfxf gePsf]
pQ/ cl:jsf/ ul/Psf]
olb !))))) eGbf jl9 eP s[kof v'nfpg'xf]; M

^!= tkfOsf] घरको] e'O{df s'g ;fdfu|L k|of]u ul/Psf] 5 <
df6f]÷ बाn'jf -!_
uf]ब/ -@_
sf7 ÷;fF3' -#_
lgofnf] ÷afF; -$_
kfs{]6÷ kfln; ul/Psf] sf7 -%_
legfO{n jf cnsqf -^_
;]/flds 6fO{n -&_
l;d]G6 -*_
sfk]{6 -(_
cGo -!)_

^@= tkfOsf] cfjf;sf] efG5fdf s'g ;fdfu|L k|of]u ul/Psf] 5 <
df6f]÷ jfn'jf -!_
h:tfkftf -@_
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sf7 ÷;fF3' -#_
k/fn÷v/ -$_
s+s[6÷ l;d]G6 -%_
6fO{n÷:n]6 -^_
cGo -&_

ख$ड च: मिहला के Hî
Hयु मेिKसको िब:विब>यालयको UMN4NEPALले काठमाडौ ँ िब:विब>यालयको सहकायMमा मिहला
सामदु ाियक के Hîको :थापना गरे को छ | य;ह स5दभXमा हामी तपाईलाई के;ह Q_नह, सो@न गैरहे का
छú| यी Q_नावलvले हामीलाई हाùा भाबी सामद
ु ाHयक कायXãम HनधाXरण गनX मpदत गनuछन|

६३

तपाईको ôबचारमा बाहुनेपाटv

समद
ु ायका म;हलाको आधारभत
ू

आव_यकता परु ा गनX के-के कायXãमले
मदत गदX छ?

६४

(स;टक उ1र ;दनह
ु ोस ्)

तपाईको ôबचारमा PथापनापPचात

हWतामा एक चोटv भ5दा बढv (१)

(Women’s Community Center) को

Q^येक हWता (३)

तपाईले म;हला सामद
ु ाHयक के5ê
ûमण क01को गनह
ुX ु नेछ?

हWतामा एक पटक माn (२)
एक म;हनामा (४)
एक बषXमा (५)

क;हले पHन होइन (६)

६५

यी कायXãमम@ये तपाईलाई कुन कुन

लघ0ु व1ीय भेटघाट (१)

ãमबpध ,पमा एक (१- माEथ\लो

बयPक [शgा र कgा (३)

कायXãम फाइदाजनक लाGछ,

Äेणी) दे Öख छ (६- त\लो Äेणी) अंक
(Rank) ;दनह
ु ोस ् |

६६

म;हला सामद
ु ाHयक के5êको Hनय[मत

ममXत-संहार गनX र कायXãम संचालन

पNरवार Hनयोजन भेटघाट (२)
राजनीHतक बहस (४)

यव
ु ा bलब कायXãमह, (५)

अ5य (६) उ\लेख गनह
ुX ोस ् ...........

,........

गनX मा[सक के;ह खचX लाGनेछ

(ôबधत
ु , पानी, सरसफाई र ममXत ) | के
तपाई यस सामद
ु ाHयक के5êलाई

Q^येक म;हना आफूखश
ु ी के;ह सानो
रकम HतनX तयार हुनह
ु ु 5छ? हुनह
ु ु 5छ
भने कHत सZम HतनX सbनह
ु ु 5छ,
अनम
ु ान लगाउनस
ु ्|
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ख@ड छ: kवाkqय
यस ख$डमा हामी तपाइह<लाई तपाईको वा:तिवक र अनमु ािनत :वा:ñयबारे 9Äह< सो>न गैरहेकाछó | यी 9Äह<ले हामीलाई तपाईको
:वा:ñय अव:थाबारे बåु न सहयोग गछM , साथै सामािजक तथा आिथMक असरह< पQा लगाउन मदत पयु ाMउछ | कृ पया 9Äह<को उQर
सके स3म िठक िदनहु ोला |
६७
के तपाईलाई डाKटरले दीघMकालीन रोग छ भनेर भHनु भएको छ? कृ पया एउटा छ (१)

६८
६९

कोठामा (ü) िच(ह लगाउनहु ोला

छै न (२)

गएको छ मिहना िभä तपाईलाई :वा:ñय स3बिHध कुनै सम:या परे को छ

छ (१ )

(दीघMकालीनरोग)? कृ पया एउटा कोठामा (ü) िच(ह लगाउनहु ोला

गएको छ मिहना िभä तपाई कित पटक :वा:ñय 9दायकमा जानभु एको छ?

कृ पया एउटा कोठामा (ü) िच(ह लगाउनहु ोला

७०

गएको१२मिहनामा आrनो :वा:ñयको औसत अव:थालाई कसरी
िनधाMरण/ मापन गनMहु JHछ? कृ पया एउटा कोठामा (ü) िच(ह

लगाउनहु ोला

छै न (२)

एकनास (५)
लगातार (४)
किहलेकाही (३)
िवरलै (२)
किहले पिन छै न (१)
उEकृ :ट (५)
धेरैराçो (४)
राçो (३)
िठकै (२)
नराçो (१)

मानिसक [वा[\य
यस खèडमा हामी तपाइह,लाइ तीस ;दन[भn कPतो महसस
ु गनभ
ुX एको छ, ब£
ु न खो§दै छौ उ1रह, स;ह ;दने
Qयास गनह
ुX ोला

७१
७२

७३

सध•
(५)

गएको तीस िदन िभä तपाई कितको हरे स
खाएको अनभु व गनMभु यो? कृपया एउटा
कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला

गएको तीस िदन िभä तपाई कित चोिट
िनरास भई खिु सहJन नसKनभु एको छ?

कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह
लगाउनुहोला

गएको तीस िदन िभä कित पटक थिकत
महससु गनMभु एको छ? कृपया एउटा
कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला
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Qाय

क;हले

gण-

क;ह\यै

जसो
(४)

काहv (३)

भर
(२)

छै न (१)

७४
७५

७६

गएको तीस िदन िभä तपाइले हरे क कामलाई
किठन ठाHनभु एको छ ? कृपया एउटा
कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला

गएको तीस िदन िभä तपाइले आफुलाई
कितको बेकार भएको महससु गनMभु यो?
कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह
लगाउनुहोला

गएको तीस ;दन [भn तपाई कHतको
आ01नु भएको महसस
ु गनभ
ुX यो?

कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह
लगाउनुहोला

ख@ड झ: आिbमय-साथी tवVद

नोट: यस खèड 0ववा;हत म;हलालाई माn सो@नु होला| यदv सहभागी प,
ु ष वा अ0ववा;हत म;हला हो भने
यस खèडलाई छो¶नह
ु ोस ् |

यस खèडमा हामी तपाईको घरे लु ;हंशा सZबि5ध QPनह, सो@नेछौ | QPन अ[ल संबेदनशील भएकोले
संयमताका साथ ् जबाफ ;दनह
ु ोला

छ (१)

७७

के तपाईको Äीमानले क;हले तपाईलाई गा[ल गनुX भएको छ?

७८

के तपाईको Äीमानले क;हले तपाईलाई धक\ने, हा5ने, 0पÜने

७९
८०

८१

८२

कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला

गनह
ुX ु 5cयो? कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला

के तपाईको Äीमानले इï®या 0वपNरत तपाईलाई जबजXिPत करनी

गनभ
ुX एको Eथयो? कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला
के तपाई अक जाती भएर तपाईको Äीमानले क;हले शारvNरक 0पडा
;दने काम गनभ
ुX एको Eथयो? कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह

लगाउनुहोला

के उहाँले तपाईलाई क;हले चbकु, ब5दक
ु अथवा धाNरलो हHतयारले
आãमण गनभ
ुX एको Eथयो? कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह

लगाउनुहोला

के उहाँले तपाईलाई क;हले घाटv 5याकेको वा िजउदै जलाउने Qयास

गनभ
ुX एको Eथयो? कृपया एउटा कोठामा (ü) माn Eच5ह लगाउनुहोला
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छै न (२)

STATA CODES
**********************************************************************************************
***********************CHAPTER 2: COPING STRATEGIES PAPER ONLY********************************
*******************************(REGRESSION RESULTS ONLY)****************************************
**********************************************************************************************
*************************************************************************************************
********Table 6.1: Impact of Coping Strategy Diversification on Recovery Rate (N=510)************
*************************************************************************************************
cd "/Users/veeshan/OneDrive/CHAPTER 1/Data Analysis/Only chapter 1/"
use 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, clear
*save 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, replace
***Determinants of Coping Strategies: dissaving, borrowing, labor adjustment, Private Transfers
local coping Cope12_saving CopS1_distsale CopS2_borrow Cope11_morlabor Cope10_advlabor Cope8_pershelp
Cope18_remit remit
foreach x in Cope12_saving CopS1_distsale CopS2_borrow Cope11_morlabor Cope10_advlabor Cope8_pershelp remit {
oprobit `x' i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage householdsize hhdage headEduc i.married i.hindu
i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using oprobbitresults.rtf, append label keep(i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage) ///
title(Table: Ordered Probit Regression Results for various coping strategies)addtext(Controls, Yes)
alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
addnote("Note: Controls included in the model are age of household head, education level of household
head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets")
}
sum Cope12_saving CopS1_distsale CopS2_borrow Cope11_morlabor Cope10_advlabor Cope8_pershelp Cope18_remit
*****************************************************************************************************
*******
*****************************************************************************************************
*******
//Dependent variable: Resilience
//Economic Resilience: income, house, household assets, consumption
//Psychosocial Resilience: emotional, violence, mobility, community participation
gen recov_econ=recov_inc+recov_propt+recov_food+recov_house
gen resilience_econ=0 if recov_econ<=4
replace resilience_econ=1 if recov_econ>4&recov_econ<=8
replace resilience_econ=2 if recov_econ>8&recov_econ<=12
replace resilience_econ=3 if recov_econ>12&recov_econ<=16
replace resilience_econ=4 if recov_econ>16&recov_econ<=20
global recov_economic recov_inc recov_propt recov_food recov_house
pca $recov_economic, blanks(0.4)
predict incomerec assetrec, score
**********************************************************************************************
*****************PCA for Coping Strategies****************************************************
global allcoping Cope1_saleJewelry Cope2_saleutensils Cope3_salecrops Cope4_livestock Cope5_saletransp ///
Cope6_agtool Cope7_saleothr Cope8_pershelp Cope9_borrow Cope10_advlabor Cope11_morlabor Cope12_saving
///
Cope13_credit Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp Cope16_reliefaid Cope17_migrate remit
pca $allcoping
screeplot, yline(1)
pca $allcoping, mineigen(1) //will estimate components with eigenvalues higher than 1 only
pca $allcoping, comp(8) blanks(.3) //I used 0.36 to discard lower loadings. The usual threshold is 0.3
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predict pc1 pc2 pc3 pc4 pc5 pc6 pc7 pc8, score
rename (pc1 pc2 pc3 pc4 pc5) (Borrowing Labor_adjust Extern_help Dissaving Migr_remit)
label var Borrowing "Borrowing_pca"
label var Labor_adjust "Labor adjustment_pca"
label var Extern_help "External help (government or NGOs)"
label var Dissaving "Dissaving: use of savings or selling liquid assets"
label var Migr_remit "Private Transfer through Migration/Remittance"
local copingmechanism Borrowing Labor_adjust Extern_help Dissaving Migr_remit
*HH coping strategy diversification index
global allcoping Cope1_saleJewelry Cope2_saleutensils Cope3_salecrops Cope4_livestock Cope5_saletransp ///
Cope6_agtool Cope7_saleothr Cope12_saving Cope9_borrow Cope13_credit Cope10_advlabor Cope11_morlabor
///
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp Cope16_reliefaid Cope8_pershelp Cope17_migrate remit
gen
n1_distsale=Cope1_saleJewelry+Cope2_saleutensils+Cope3_salecrops+Cope4_livestock+Cope5_saletransp+Cope6_agtool+
Cope7_saleothr
gen n2_usesaving=Cope12_saving
gen n3_borrow=Cope9_borrow+Cope13_credit
gen n4_labor=Cope10_advlabor+Cope11_morlabor
gen n5_pvttran=Cope8_pershelp+remit
gen n6_exter=Cope14_govhelp+Cope15_ngohelp+Cope16_reliefaid
gen CopDiv=1-((n1_distsale*(n1_distsale-1)+n2_usesaving*(n2_usesaving-1)+n3_borrow*(n3_borrow1)+n4_labor*(n4_labor-1)+n5_pvttran*(n5_pvttran-1) /*+n6_exter*(n6_exter-1)*/)/(9*8))

gen CopDiv1=.
replace CopDiv1=1 if CopDiv<0.95
replace CopDiv1=2 if CopDiv>=0.95&CopDiv<=0.99
replace CopDiv1=3 if CopDiv>0.99
recode CopDiv1 (1=0)(2=0)(3=1)
***Coping Strategies: dissaving, borrowing, labor adjustment, Private Transfers
local copingmechanism Borrowing Labor_adjust Extern_help Dissaving Migr_remit

foreach x in pc1 pc3 pc5 pc8 {
ologit resilience_econ `x' i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage householdsize hhdage hhdeduc i.married
i.hindu i.caste i.hhdprimocc, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
*outreg2 using output2.rtf, append
}
label var recov_econ "Economic Resilience"
label var recov_psysoc "Psychosocial Resilience"
label var Distsale "Sale of assets"
label var Borrow "Borrowing"
label var LaborAdj "Labor Adjustment"
label var PrivateT "Private Transfers"
label var Extern "External help (Govt, NGOs)"
label var householdsize "Household size"
label var hhdage "Age of household head"
label var Female "Female"
label var headEduc "HH Head Education"
label var married "Marital Status-married"
label var hindu "Religion-Hindu"
label var BrahminChhetri "Caste-Brahmin/Chhetri"
label var occu_agri "Occupation-Agriculture"
label var asset "Asset"
label define DamageLevel1 0 "No major damage" 1 "Major Damage"
label var housedamage "Major House Damage"
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label var proptdamage "Major Property Damage"
label var healthdamage "Major Health Damage"
label values housedamage DamageLevel1
label values proptdamage DamageLevel1
label values healthdamage DamageLevel1

gen
Distsale=Cope1_saleJewelry==1|Cope2_saleutensils==1|Cope3_salecrops==1|Cope4_livestock==1|Cope5_saletransp==1|Cop
e6_agtool==1|Cope7_saleothr==1
//Cope12_saving
gen Borrow=Cope9_borrow==1|Cope13_credit==1
gen LaborAdj=Cope10_advlabor==1|Cope11_morlabor==1
gen PrivateT=Cope8_pershelp==1|remit==1
gen Extern=Cope14_govhelp==1|Cope15_ngohelp==1|Cope16_reliefaid==1
**********************************************************************************************
//Composite:
//ER
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, replace label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp
remit) ///
title(Table: Mixed Process Regression Results for Economic Resilience)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05,
0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) eform ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital
Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets")
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu
i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp
remit)
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu
i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp
remit)
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp
remit)
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
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(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp
remit)
//PR
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp02.xls, replace label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit) ///
title(Table: Mixed Process Regression Results for Psychosocial Resilience)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05,
0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital
Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets")
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu
i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp02.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married
i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp02.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp02.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp02.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit)

*********************************************ER BREAKDOWN*************************************
*Financial Coping Strategies
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cmp (recov_econ=Distsale i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Distsale=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp04.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_econ=Borrow i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Borrow=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp04.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_econ=Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope12_saving=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize
hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp04.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
*labor adjustment Coping Strategies
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp05.xls, replace label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit) ///
title(Table: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Economic Resilience) addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
addnote("First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model are: age of
household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household
assets")
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping Cope11_morlabor Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope11_morlabor=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp05.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping Cope10_advlabor Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope10_advlabor=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp05.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
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cmp (recov_econ=FinCoping Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope17_migrate=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp05.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
**********************************PSYCHOSOCIAL RESILIENCE BREAKDOWN*************************
*Financial Coping Strategies
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp06.xls, replace label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp
Cope15_ngohelp remit) ///
title(Table: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Economic Resilience) addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
addnote("First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model are: age of
household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household
assets")
cmp (recov_psysoc=Distsale i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Distsale=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp06.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=Borrow i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Borrow=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp06.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope12_saving=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize
hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp06.xls, append label keep(FinCoping Distsale Borrow Cope12_saving i.LaborAdjustmentY
Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
*labor adjustment Coping Strategies
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
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(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp07.xls, replace label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit) ///
title(Table: Simultaneous Equation Model Results for Psychosocial Resilience) addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
addnote("First stage results are omitted for presentational simplicity. Controls included in the model are: age of
household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household
assets")
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping Cope11_morlabor Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope11_morlabor=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp07.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping Cope10_advlabor Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope10_advlabor=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp07.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(Cope17_migrate=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using Rescomp07.xls, append label keep(FinCoping i.LaborAdjustmentY Cope11_morlabor
Cope10_advlabor Cope17_migrate Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit)
************************ECONOMIC RESILIENCE************************
//Distress Sale
cmp (recov_econ=Distsale householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Distsale=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, replace label ///
title(Table: Conditional Mixed Process Regression Results for Economic Resilience)addtext(Controls, Yes)
alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
//Use of Savings
cmp (recov_econ=Cope12_saving householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri
asset) ///
(Cope12_saving=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, append label
//Borrowing
cmp (recov_econ=Borrow householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Borrow=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, append label
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//Labor Adjustment
cmp (recov_econ=LaborAdj householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(LaborAdj=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, append label
//Private Transfers
cmp (recov_econ=PrivateT householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(PrivateT=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, append label
//External Help
cmp (recov_econ=Extern householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Extern=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmpeconomic.xls, append label
********************************PSYCHOSOCIAL RESILIENCE**********************************
//Distress Sale
cmp (recov_psysoc=Distsale householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Distsale=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, replace label dec(3) ///
title(Table: Mixed Process Regression Results for Psychosocial Resilience)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05,
0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
//Use of Savings
cmp (recov_psysoc=Cope12_saving householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri
asset) ///
(Cope12_saving=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, append label dec(3)
//Borrowing
cmp (recov_psysoc=Borrow householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Borrow=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, append label dec(3)
//Labor Adjustment
cmp (recov_psysoc=LaborAdj householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset)
///
(LaborAdj=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, append label dec(3)
//Private Transfers
cmp (recov_psysoc=PrivateT householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(PrivateT=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, append label dec(3)
//External Help
cmp (recov_psysoc=Extern householdsize hhdage Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset) ///
(Extern=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri asset), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
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outreg2 using cmppsysoc.xls, append label dec(3)
**********************************************************************************************
**********************************************************************************************
cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit i.LaborAdjustmentY householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_cont) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)

cmp (recov_psysoc=FinCoping Cope14_govhelp Cope15_ngohelp remit LaborAdjustmentY householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(FinCoping=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri) ///
(LaborAdjustmentY=i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf householdsize hhdage
Female headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_cont $cmp_probit $cmp_cont) vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT) robust
outreg2 using Rescomp.xls, append label
drop FinCoping
gen FinCoping=Distsale+Borrow+Cope12_saving
gen Transfers=Cope14_govhelp+Cope15_ngohelp+Cope16_reliefaid
gen LaborAdjustment=Cope17_migrate+Cope11_morlabor+Cope10_advlabor

**SUMMARY STAT TABLE**
estpost tabstat recov_econ recov_inc recov_propt recov_house recov_food /// Economic Resilience
recov_psysoc recov_emot recov_violence recov_mobil recov_disasreliefp /// Psychosocial Resilience
Distsale Cope12_saving Borrow LaborAdj PrivateT Extern /// Coping Mechanisms
housedamage proptdamage healthdamage /// Disaster Damages
partn_microf householdsize hhdage Female headEduc married hindu BrahminChhetri occu_agri asset, ///
Household Characteristics
statistics(mean sd min max count) columns(statistics)
esttab using "SummaryTable1.rtf", replace ///
main(mean) aux(sd) nostar unstack ///
title(Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables) ///
label ///
nonote nonumber wide
**********************************************************************************************

//COping variables: CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr
COPS_any COPS_exclaid
sum CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr resilience_econ
i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage householdsize hhdage hhdeduc i.married i.hindu i.caste i.hhdprimocc, detail
foreach x in CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr {
ologit resilience_econ `x' i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage householdsize hhdage hhdeduc i.married
i.hindu i.caste i.hhdprimocc, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
*outreg2 using output2.rtf, append
}
foreach x in CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr COPS_any
COPS_exclaid{
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reg recov_econ `x' housedamage proptdamage healthdamage hhdage i.marital_status i.caste hhdeduc i.hhdprimocc i.religion
}
*************REMITTANCE ONLY**********************
global demog householdsize hhdage Female headEduc gender i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri
//Economic Resilience
ologit resilience_econ remit, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, replace label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Economic Resilience)addtext(Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1,
0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit resilience_econ remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Economic Resilience for various coping
strategies)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit resilience_econ remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Economic Resilience for various coping
strategies)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit resilience_econ remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf, vce(cluster
WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Economic Resilience for various coping
strategies)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit resilience_econ remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf $demog, vce(cluster
WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Economic Resilience for various coping
strategies)addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)

**IVPROBIT
ivprobit resilience_econ ( i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf $demog, vce(cluster
WARD_RESPONDENT)
//Psycho-social Resilience
ologit resilience_psysoc remit, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, replace label ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Psychosocial Resilience) addtext(Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05,
0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit resilience_psysoc remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label addtext(Controls, No)
ologit resilience_psysoc remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset, vce(cluster WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label addtext(Controls, Yes)
ologit resilience_psysoc remit i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset $demog, vce(cluster
WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using ologitresultsremit.rtf, append label addtext(Controls, Yes)
*************REMITTANCE ONLY**********************
gen recov_psysoc=recov_emot+recov_violence+recov_mobil+recov_disasreliefp
drop resilience_psysoc
gen resilience_psysoc=0 if recov_psysoc<=4
replace resilience_psysoc=1 if recov_psysoc>4&recov_psysoc<=8
replace resilience_psysoc=2 if recov_psysoc>8&recov_psysoc<=12
replace resilience_psysoc=3 if recov_psysoc>12&recov_psysoc<=16
replace resilience_psysoc=4 if recov_psysoc>16&recov_psysoc<=20
egen clustervar=group(ward)
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//variables CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr COPS_any
COPS_exclaid
foreach x in CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr {
quietly ologit resilience_psysoc `x' housedamage proptdamage healthdamage hhdage i.marital_status i.caste
hhdeduc i.hhdprimocc i.religion
outreg2 using output.rtf, append
}
***Determinants of Coping Strategies: The first one
foreach x in CopS01_dissave CopS2_borrow CopS03_laboradj CopS04_reducCons CopS05_pvttr CopS06_pubtr {
quietly oprobit resilience_psysoc `x' housedamage proptdamage healthdamage hhdage i.marital_status i.caste
hhdeduc i.occu_agri i.religion
outreg2 using output.rtf, append
}
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**********************************************************************************************
*****************CHAPTER 4: Determinants of Post-disaster Collective Action*******************
*******************(REGRESSION RESULTS ONLY, N=510)************************************
**********************************************************************************************
cd "/Users/veeshanrayamajhee/OneDrive/Dissertation_Ch2/0_Data Analysis"
use 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, clear
*save 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, replace
**********************************************************************************************
**********CONTROL VARIABLES ADJUSTMENT*************************************
//Other Social Capital variables
global SocCapital Trust_gen trust_ppl trust_stranger trust_police trust_army trust_govt trust_polit trust_news num_friends
frndhelp yrsincommty ///
visitfrnd frendvisitu partn_microf partn_agr partn_forest partn_water partn_women partn_cred partn_civic
partn_polit partn_relg ///
partn_sport partn_health active_comty votey
//heterogeneity variable
gen hetero_caste=38 if WARD_RESPONDENT==1
replace hetero_caste=67 if WARD_RESPONDENT==2
replace hetero_caste=83 if WARD_RESPONDENT==3
replace hetero_caste=89 if WARD_RESPONDENT==4
replace hetero_caste=73 if WARD_RESPONDENT==5
gen Dalit_Janajati=caste==4|caste==6|caste==8
gen Dalit=caste==6
recode postEQactiv (2=1)(3=1)(4=2)(5=3)
recode headEduc (1=0)(2=1)(3=1) //formal schooling
gen reciprocity=frndhelp
recode reciprocity (3=5)(4=5)(1=3)(5=1)
recode reciprocity (5=1)
gen Trust_general=Trust_gen
recode Trust_general (2=0)
recode NextEQ (.=140)
gen Communitysize=1 if
WARD_RESPONDENT==1|WARD_RESPONDENT==7|WARD_RESPONDENT==3|WARD_RESPONDENT==6|WARD
_RESPONDENT==8
replace Communitysize=2 if WARD_RESPONDENT==5|WARD_RESPONDENT==4
replace Communitysize=3 if WARD_RESPONDENT==9|WARD_RESPONDENT==2
recode Communitysize (.=2)
gen family_joint=typefamily==1
//Instrument for Trust
shock_left
**********************************************************************************************
*****************PCA for Social Capital****************************************************
global Participation partn_microf partn_agr partn_forest partn_water partn_women partn_cred partn_civic partn_polit
partn_relg partn_sport partn_health
pca $Participation, mineigen(1)
rotate, varimax kaiser blanks(0.4)
predict sc_civicpolitic sc_users sc_financial, score
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//pca for trust variables: Trust_general Trust_people Trust_str Trust_polic Trust_arm Trust_gov Trust_poli Trust_media
gen Trust_people=trust_ppl
recode Trust_people (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_people (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_str=trust_stranger
recode Trust_str (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_str (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_polic=trust_police
recode Trust_polic (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_polic (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_arm=trust_army
recode Trust_arm (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_arm (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_gov=trust_govt
recode Trust_gov (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_gov (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_poli=trust_polit
recode Trust_poli (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_poli (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
gen Trust_media=trust_news
recode Trust_media (1=13)(2=12)(3=11)(4=10)
recode Trust_media (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)(.=1)
global Trustvars Trust_general Trust_people Trust_str Trust_polic Trust_arm Trust_gov Trust_poli Trust_media
pca $Trustvars, mineigen(1) blanks(0.4)
rotate, varimax kaiser blanks(0.4)
predict Trust_armforc Trust_public Trust_politi, score
drop postEQColAct
gen postEQColAct=postEQactiv
recode postEQColAct (1=11)(.=11) (2=11)(3=11)(4=12)(5=13)
recode postEQColAct (11=1)(12=2) (13=3)
drop postEQColAct1
gen postEQColAct1=postEQactiv==4|postEQactiv==5
recode postEQColAct (2=10)(3=11)(4=12)(5=13)
recode postEQColAct (10=0)(11=1)(12=2)(13=3)
//Histogram of Collective Action
//by Gender
histogram postEQactiv2 if Female==1, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(black) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Female)
graph save CA_female.gph, replace
histogram postEQactiv2 if Female==0, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(gray) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Male)
graph save CA_male.gph, replace
//by Dalit
histogram postEQactiv2 if Dalit==1, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(black) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Dalit)
graph save CA_dalit.gph, replace
histogram postEQactiv2 if Dalit==0, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(gray) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Non-Dalit)
graph save CA_nondalit.gph, replace
//by Janajati
histogram postEQactiv2 if Janajati==1, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(black) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Janajati)
graph save CA_Janajati.gph, replace
histogram postEQactiv2 if Janajati==0, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(gray) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Non-Janajati)
graph save CA_nonJanajati.gph, replace
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//by Occuptation
histogram postEQactiv2 if occu_agri==1, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(black) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Occupation:
Agriculture)
graph save CA_agri.gph, replace
histogram postEQactiv2 if occu_agri==0, discrete width(0.5) percent fcolor(gray) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Occupation:
Non-agriculture)
graph save CA_nonagri.gph, replace
//combine caste
gr combine CA_dalit.gph CA_nondalit.gph CA_Janajati.gph CA_nonJanajati.gph, iscale(*0.8) cols(2) ycommon
/*xtitle(Collective Action)*/ title(Participation in Post-Earthquake Collective Action Efforts) subtitle((1-very inactive..4-very
active))
//combine gender and occupation
gr combine CA_male.gph CA_female.gph CA_agri.gph CA_nonagri.gph, iscale(*0.8) cols(2) ycommon /*xtitle(Collective
Action)*/ title(Participation in Post-Earthquake Collective Action Efforts) subtitle((1-very inactive..4-very active))
/*note("Source: Nepal Study Center")*/
histogram postEQactiv2 , discrete width(0.5) freq fcolor(black) xtitle(Collective Action) title(Participation in Post-Earthquake
Collective Action Efforts) subtitle((1-very inactive..4-very active))

//Dependent variable: Collective Action (postEQactiv; days_volun; volunteer)
**********************************************************************************************
***********************************BEST MODELS*******************************************
ologit postEQactiv Trust_general sc_civicpolitic sc_users sc_financial Communitysize reciprocity active_comty votey
housedamage proptdamage healthdamage NextEQ Female hhdage married Dalit hindu headEduc occu_agri, vce(robust)
drop postEQactiv1
gen postEQactiv1=postEQactiv==4|postEQactiv==5
gen trust_ppl1=trust_ppl==1|trust_ppl==2
medeff (regress Trust_people2 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people2 sc_civicpolitic sc_users sc_users reciprocity), treat(sc_users)
mediate(Trust_people2) sims(200) level(95)
//sc_users 8.8 percent mediation (indirect) effect, significant at 95% confidence interval
medeff (regress Trust_people1 sc_users) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(sc_users)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(95) vce(robust)
medsens (regress Trust_people1 sc_users) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(sc_users)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(95)
twoway rarea _med_updelta0 _med_lodelta0 _med_rho, bcolor(gs14) || line _med_delta0 _med_rho, lcolor(black)
ytitle("ACME") title("ACME({&rho})") xtitle("Sensitivity parameter: {&rho}") legend(off) scheme(sj)
//Interpretation: ACME > 0 as long as the error correlation is less than 0.39 (0.30 with 95% CI)
//reciprocal ties 16.09% percent mediation (indirect) effect, significant at 95% confidence interval
medeff (regress Trust_people1 reciprocity) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(reciprocity)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(95) vce(robust)
medsens (regress Trust_people1 reciprocity) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(reciprocity)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(95)
twoway rarea _med_updelta0 _med_lodelta0 _med_rho, bcolor(gs14) || line _med_delta0 _med_rho, lcolor(black)
ytitle("ACME") title("ACME({&rho})") xtitle("Sensitivity parameter: {&rho}") legend(off) scheme(sj)
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//sc_civicpolitic ties 5.5% percent mediation (indirect) effect, significant at 95% confidence interval
medeff (regress Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(sc_civicpolitic)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(95) vce(robust)
//Rho at which ACME = 0 is .0881
medsens (regress Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic) ///
(regress postEQactiv Trust_people1 sc_civicpolitic sc_users reciprocity), treat(sc_civicpolitic)
mediate(Trust_people1) sims(1000) level(80)
twoway rarea _med_updelta0 _med_lodelta0 _med_rho, bcolor(gs14) || line _med_delta0 _med_rho, lcolor(black)
ytitle("ACME") title("ACME({&rho})") xtitle("Sensitivity parameter: {&rho}") legend(off) scheme(sj)
//ACME > 0 as long as the error correlation is less than 0.09 (0.08 with 95% CI)

medeff (regress Trust_public sc_users) ///
(logit postEQactiv1 Trust_public sc_civicpolitic sc_users sc_financial Communitysize ///
reciprocity active_comty votey housedamage proptdamage healthdamage NextEQ Female hhdage
married Dalit hindu headEduc occu_agri), treat(sc_users) mediate(Trust_public) sims(1000) level(90)
medsens (regress Trust_public sc_users) ///
(logit postEQactiv1 Trust_public sc_civicpolitic sc_users sc_financial Communitysize ///
reciprocity active_comty votey housedamage proptdamage healthdamage NextEQ Female hhdage
married Dalit hindu headEduc occu_agri), treat(sc_users) mediate(Trust_public) sims(1000) level(90)
twoway rarea _med_updelta0 _med_lodelta0 _med_rho, bcolor(gs14) || line _med_delta0 _med_rho, lcolor(black)
ytitle("ACME") title("ACME({&rho})") xtitle("Sensitivity parameter: {&rho}") legend(off) scheme(sj)
*********************************************************************************************
*
//Generalized Structural Equation Model (GSEM)
gsem (Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (generations -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit))
///
(healthdamage -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal)
link(logit)) ///
(NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Female -> sc_users, ) (Female -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Female -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (age -> sc_users, ) (age -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(age -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (married -> sc_users, ) (married -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(married -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Dalit -> sc_users, ) (Dalit -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Dalit -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Janajati -> sc_users, ) (Janajati -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Janajati -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (hindu -> sc_users, ) (hindu -> sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(hindu -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Trust -> Trust_general, family(bernoulli) link(probit)) ///
(Trust -> Trust_people1, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Trust -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) ///
(Trust@1 -> reciprocity, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (sc_users -> Trust, ) (sc_users -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal)
link(logit)) ///
(sc_civicpolitic -> Trust, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (Education -> sc_users, ) ///
(Education -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (Education -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (occu_agri -> sc_users, ) ///
(occu_agri -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal) link(logit)) (shock_left -> Trust, ) ///
(family_joint -> sc_users, ) (family_joint -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (family_joint -> postEQactiv2, family(ordinal)
link(logit)), ///
vce(robust) latent(Trust ) cov( e.sc_users*e.sc_civicpolitic) nocapslatent
outreg2 using sem07.xls, replace title(Table 1: General Structural Equation Model Results)
//after sem
estat teffects, compact
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**********************************************************************************************
***********************************EXTRA*******************************************
ologit postEQactiv /*sc1*/ sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri, robust
ologit volunteer sc1 sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri, robust
ologit days_volun sc1 sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri, robust
ologit postEQactiv sc1 sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri, robust
ologit postEQactiv Trust_gen trust_ppl trust_stranger trust_police trust_army trust_govt trust_polit trust_news
ologit postEQactiv visitfrnd frendvisitu partn_microf partn_agr partn_forest
Trust_gen trust_ppl trust_stranger trust_police trust_army trust_govt trust_polit trust_news num_friends frndhelp
yrsincommty
///
visitfrnd frendvisitu partn_microf partn_agr partn_forest partn_water partn_women partn_cred partn_civic
partn_polit partn_relg ///
partn_sport partn_health active_comty votey
**********************************************************************************************

**********************************************************************************************
//Alternative Models
cmp (postEQactiv2=Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, iia) ///
(Trust_people1=sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity Communitysize generations, iia) ///
(sc_users=Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, iia) ///
(sc_civicpolitic=Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, iia), ind($cmp_oprobit
$cmp_oprobit $cmp_cont $cmp_cont) vce(robust)
///
*(sc_users=Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
*(sc_civicpolitic=Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri), ///
ind($cmp_oprobit $cmp_oprobit) vce(robust)
outreg2 using cmpresults.xls, replace ///
title(Table A2: Simultaneous Equation Model Results) addtext(Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +) eform ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: age of household head, education level of household head, Marital
Status, Religion, Occupation of household head, household assets")
//Instrumental variable approach. Problems: Weak instruments, fails overidentification test and ignored binary/ordinal
outcomes.
*(1) oprobit ignores endogeneity
oprobit postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust)
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(oprobit) replace
oprobit postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust)
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(oprobit1) append
oprobit postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust)
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(oprobit2) append
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*(2) IV-LPM (not appropriate)
ivregress2 2sls postEQactiv2 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1= sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), vce(robust) first
est restore first
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(tslsfirst) append
ivregress 2sls postEQactiv2 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1= sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), small vce(robust) first
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(tslssecond)append
*(3) IV-GMM (not appropriate)
ivregress2 gmm postEQactiv2 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1= sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), small vce(robust) first
est restore first
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(ivgmmfirst) append
ivregress gmm postEQactiv2 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1= sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), small vce(robust) first
outreg2 using twosls.xls, cttop(ivgmmsecond)append
*CREATE TABLES FOR ivprobit and control function method
*(4) ivprobit (for continuous endogeneous variables, not appropriate)
//two-step
ivprobit postEQactiv1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit Janajati
hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), twostep first
ivprobit postEQactiv1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit Janajati
hindu Education occu_agri (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), vce(robust) first
outreg2 using ivprobnCF.xls, cttop(ivprobit) replace
//CONTROL FUNCTION METHOD: Note that the trust variable is turned into binary (0 and 1)
*STEP 1: Run first stage regression (and store results)
probit Trust_people2 sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity, vce(robust)
*outreg2 using ivprobnCF.xls, cttop(First-CF) append
estimates store firststage_trust
*STEP 2: Calculate generalized residuals
predict trustprob
predict trustxb, xb
gen pdfoprobit=normalden(trustxb)
gen cdfoprobit=normal(trustxb)
gen IMR1=pdfoprobit/cdfoprobit
*gen generalisedresid=Trust_people2*IMR1-(1-Trust_people2)*(pdfoprobit/(1-cdfoprobit))
gen generalisedresid=cond(Trust_people2==1,pdfoprobit/cdfoprobit, -pdfoprobit/(1-cdfoprobit))
*STEP 3: Run second stage regression with generlized residuals as a predictor
oprobit postEQactiv2 Trust_people2 generalisedresid Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female
age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust)
outreg2 using ivprobnCF.xls, cttop(Second-CF) append
*oprobit postEQactiv2 Trust_people2 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust)
//NOT WORKING CURRENTLY
*(5) Special regression
sspecialreg D3 postEQactiv2, endog(Trust_people1) iv(sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity) [ exog(Communitysize
generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) /*hetero
hetv(varlist) kdens trim(real) winsor bs bsreps(integer)*/ ]
sspecialreg postEQactiv2 Trust_people1, endog(Trust_people) iv(sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity) exog(Communitysize
generations healthdamage)
//Works but I dont know what 'special regressor' means
sspecialreg postEQactiv2 NextEQ, endog(Trust_people1) iv(sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity) exog(Communitysize
generations healthdamage proptdamage) hetero
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ivreg2h postEQactiv2 Communitysize generations healthdamage (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity), small
robust
*Marginal effects after gsem
margins, dydx(Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity) force // this works..Takes hours but converges
//NOW try this:
//Run GSEM model
margins, dydx(Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic reciprocity) force post
outreg2 using marginaleff2.xls, replace
margins, dydx(Trust_people1) predict(mu fixedonly) force // works but makes no sense
margins, dydx(Trust_people1) atmeans predict (mu fixedonly)
///force //works but makes no sense
mfx, predict(outcome(1))
mfx, predict(outcome(2))
mfx, predict(outcome(3))
mfx, predict(outcome(4))
*MEDIATION ANALYSIS after GSEM:
gsem, coeflegend
*sc_users
//Indirect effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users]
//Total effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:sc_users]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users]
*Percent mediated: 16.186
nlcom
(_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users])*100/(_b[postEQactiv2:sc_users]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_peo
ple1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users])
//significant at 90%
nlcom
(_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users])*100/(_b[postEQactiv2:sc_users]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_peo
ple1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_users]), level(91)
*sc_civicpolitic
//Indirect effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_civicpolitic]
//Total effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:sc_civicpolitic]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_civicpolitic]
*Percent mediated: 6.41%
nlcom
(_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_civicpolitic])*100/(_b[postEQactiv2:sc_civicpolitic]+_b[postEQactiv
2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:sc_civicpolitic])
//Note; comma level() sets confidence interval
*reciprocal ties
//Indirect effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:reciprocity]
//total effect:
nlcom _b[postEQactiv2:reciprocity]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:reciprocity]
*Percent mediated: 42%
nlcom
(_b[postEQactiv2:Trust_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:reciprocity])*100/(_b[postEQactiv2:reciprocity]+_b[postEQactiv2:Trust
_people1]*_b[Trust_people1:reciprocity])
**************Marginsplot******************
marginsplot, horizontal xline(0) yscale(reverse) recast(scatter)
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//COMPARE MODELS (PANEL A): Limited Information IV versus SEM (with contemporaneous correlation across
equations) give same results
ivregress2 2sls postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1= sc_users) Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married ///
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust) first
est restore first
outreg2 using modelcompare.xls, cttop(first2sls) replace
ivregress 2sls postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1= sc_users) Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married ///
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, vce(robust) first
outreg2 using modelcompare.xls, cttop(second2sls) append
//2sls using reg3
reg3 (Trust_people1 = sc_users Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age
married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri), 2sls
outreg2 using modelcompare.xls, cttop(Twoslsreg3) append
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize ->
postEQactiv2, ) ///
(generations -> Trust_people1, ) (generations -> postEQactiv2, ) (Female -> Trust_people1, ) (Female ->
postEQactiv2, ) (age -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(age -> postEQactiv2, ) (Education -> Trust_people1, ) (Education -> postEQactiv2, ) (occu_agri -> Trust_people1,
) (occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Janajati -> Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) (married -> Trust_people1, ) (married -> postEQactiv2, )
(hindu -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(hindu -> postEQactiv2, ) (healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (healthdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage ->
Trust_people1, ) (proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(NextEQ -> Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) (Dalit -> Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ),
vce(robust) cov( e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2) nocapslatent
outreg2 using modelcompare.xls, cttop(SEM) append
//3sls
reg3 (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age
married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(sc_users=)
(postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age
married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri), 3sls
outreg2 using modelcompare.xls, cttop(Threesls) append
**********************************************************************************************
************COMPARE MODELS (TABLE 7): Full Information IV (3sls) versus SEM (FullInf) ********
******(with contemporaneous correlation across equations) should give same results************
**********************************************************************************************
reg3 (postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female
age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(sc_civicpolitic=partn_civic partn_polit partn_relg partn_sport) ///
(sc_users=partn_agr partn_forest partn_water), ireg3 //ireg3 uses iterative gls
outreg2 using modelcompare4Full.xls, cttop(Threesls) replace
//Run SEM_ModelComparison4eq with non(robust) errors instead of the code below
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> Trust_people1, ) (partn_civic ->
sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Communitysize -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, ) (generations -> Trust_people1, )
(generations -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
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(Female -> Trust_people1, ) (Female -> postEQactiv2, ) (age -> Trust_people1, ) (age -> postEQactiv2, )
(Education -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(Education -> postEQactiv2, ) (occu_agri -> Trust_people1, ) (occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) (Janajati ->
Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(married -> Trust_people1, ) (married -> postEQactiv2, ) (hindu -> Trust_people1, ) (hindu -> postEQactiv2, )
(healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(healthdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (NextEQ ->
Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Dalit -> Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ) (partn_polit -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_relg -> sc_civicpolitic, )
///
(partn_sport -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_agr -> sc_users, ) (partn_forest -> sc_users, ) (partn_water -> sc_users, ), ///
cov( e.Trust_people1*e.sc_users e.Trust_people1*e.sc_civicpolitic e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2
e.sc_users*e.sc_civicpolitic ///
e.sc_users*e.postEQactiv2 e.sc_civicpolitic*e.postEQactiv2) nocapslatent //maximum likelihood
outreg2 using modelcompare4Full.xls, cttop(SEM) append
**********************************************************************************************
***********************************FOR REFERENCE ONLY*****************************************
//SEM Comparison (Full information vs limited information)
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> Trust_people1, ) (partn_civic ->
sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Communitysize -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, ) (generations -> Trust_people1, )
(generations -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Female -> Trust_people1, ) (Female -> postEQactiv2, ) (age -> Trust_people1, ) (age -> postEQactiv2, )
(Education -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(Education -> postEQactiv2, ) (occu_agri -> Trust_people1, ) (occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) (Janajati ->
Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(married -> Trust_people1, ) (married -> postEQactiv2, ) (hindu -> Trust_people1, ) (hindu -> postEQactiv2, )
(healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(healthdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (NextEQ ->
Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Dalit -> Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ) (partn_polit -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_relg -> sc_civicpolitic, )
///
(partn_sport -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_agr -> sc_users, ) (partn_forest -> sc_users, ) (partn_water -> sc_users, ), ///
cov( e.Trust_people1*e.sc_users e.Trust_people1*e.sc_civicpolitic e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2
e.sc_users*e.sc_civicpolitic ///
e.sc_users*e.postEQactiv2 e.sc_civicpolitic*e.postEQactiv2) nocapslatent
outreg2 using modelcompareSEM.xls, cttop(SEMfull) replace
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> Trust_people1, ) (partn_civic ->
sc_civicpolitic, ) ///
(Communitysize -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, ) (generations -> Trust_people1, )
(generations -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Female -> Trust_people1, ) (Female -> postEQactiv2, ) (age -> Trust_people1, ) (age -> postEQactiv2, )
(Education -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(Education -> postEQactiv2, ) (occu_agri -> Trust_people1, ) (occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) (Janajati ->
Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(married -> Trust_people1, ) (married -> postEQactiv2, ) (hindu -> Trust_people1, ) (hindu -> postEQactiv2, )
(healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(healthdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (NextEQ ->
Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(Dalit -> Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ) (partn_polit -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_relg -> sc_civicpolitic, )
///
(partn_sport -> sc_civicpolitic, ) (partn_agr -> sc_users, ) (partn_forest -> sc_users, ) (partn_water -> sc_users, ), ///
cov( e.Trust_people1*e.sc_users@0 e.Trust_people1*e.sc_civicpolitic@0 e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2@0
e.sc_users*e.sc_civicpolitic@0 ///
e.sc_users*e.postEQactiv2@0 e.sc_civicpolitic*e.postEQactiv2@0) nocapslatent
outreg2 using modelcompareSEM.xls, cttop(SEMlimited) append
**********************************************************************************************
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**********************************************************************************************
//COMPARE MODELS (PANEL B1): Limited Information IV (2sls) versus SEM should give same results
reg3 (postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female
age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri), ireg3
outreg2 using modelcompare2EQ.xls, cttop(Twosls) replace
sem (Trust_people1 <- sc_users Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married Dalit
Janajati hindu Education occu_agri,) ///
(postEQactiv2 <- Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age
married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri,) ///
outreg2 using modelcompare2EQ.xls, cttop(SEM) append
**********************************************************************************************
************COMPARE MODELS (TABLE 5): LIMITED Information IV (2sls) versus SEM (FullInf) ********
******(NO contemporaneous correlation across equations) should give same results************
**********************************************************************************************
ivregress liml postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic) ///
(sc_civicpolitic=partn_civic partn_polit partn_relg partn_sport) ///
(sc_users=partn_agr partn_forest partn_water) Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage
NextEQ Female age married ///
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, first
reg3 (postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age married
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri) ///
(Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female
age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri), 2sls ireg3
reg postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri
reg Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ Female age
married Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri
*********RUN
//2sls
ivregress2 2sls postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic) Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married ///
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, first
est restore first
outreg2 using modelcompare2Limited.xls, cttop(TWOsls-first) replace
ivregress 2sls postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1 = sc_users sc_civicpolitic) Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married ///
Dalit Janajati hindu Education occu_agri, first
outreg2 using modelcompare2Limited.xls, cttop(TWOsls-second) append
//Run SEM_ModelComparison2eq with non(robust) errors instead of the code below
//SEM (limited) default cov()=0
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize ->
Trust_people1, ) ///
(Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, ) (generations -> Trust_people1, ) (generations -> postEQactiv2, ) (Female ->
Trust_people1, ) (Female -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(age -> Trust_people1, ) (age -> postEQactiv2, ) (Education -> Trust_people1, ) (Education -> postEQactiv2, )
(occu_agri -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) (Janajati -> Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) (married -> Trust_people1,
) (married -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(hindu -> Trust_people1, ) (hindu -> postEQactiv2, ) (healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (healthdamage ->
postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (NextEQ -> Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) (Dalit ->
Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ), nocapslatent
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outreg2 using modelcompare2Limited.xls, cttop(SEMcov0) append
//SEM (full) default cov()!=0
sem (Trust_people1 -> postEQactiv2, ) (sc_users -> Trust_people1, ) (sc_civicpolitic -> Trust_people1, ) (Communitysize ->
Trust_people1, ) ///
(Communitysize -> postEQactiv2, ) (generations -> Trust_people1, ) (generations -> postEQactiv2, ) (Female ->
Trust_people1, ) (Female -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(age -> Trust_people1, ) (age -> postEQactiv2, ) (Education -> Trust_people1, ) (Education -> postEQactiv2, )
(occu_agri -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(occu_agri -> postEQactiv2, ) (Janajati -> Trust_people1, ) (Janajati -> postEQactiv2, ) (married -> Trust_people1,
) (married -> postEQactiv2, ) ///
(hindu -> Trust_people1, ) (hindu -> postEQactiv2, ) (healthdamage -> Trust_people1, ) (healthdamage ->
postEQactiv2, ) (proptdamage -> Trust_people1, ) ///
(proptdamage -> postEQactiv2, ) (NextEQ -> Trust_people1, ) (NextEQ -> postEQactiv2, ) (Dalit ->
Trust_people1, ) (Dalit -> postEQactiv2, ), ///
cov(e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2) nocapslatent
outreg2 using modelcompare2Limited.xls, cttop(SEMcovNOT0) append
****NEW TABLE 2 MODEL Comparison: ols, 2sls, 3sls, SEM
//Trust variables: Trust_people1 Trust_general reciprocity
//COLUMN 1: Ordinary Least Squares
reg postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married family_joint Educ occu_agri
outreg2 using ModelCompare.xls, cttop(OLS) replace
//COLUMN 2: Two-stage least squares
*To outreg first-stage results, I just run ols
reg Trust_people1 shock_left sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri
outreg2 using ModelCompare.xls, cttop(first-stage) append
ivregress 2sls postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1 = shock_left) sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri, first
outreg2 using ModelCompare.xls, cttop(Second-stage Results) append
//COLUMN 3: Three-stage Least Sqaures
reg3 (postEQactiv2 = Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri) ///
(Trust_people1 = shock_left sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage
NextEQ Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri), ireg3 //ireg3 uses iterative gls
outreg2 using ModelCompare.xls, cttop(Three-stage Results) append
//COLUMN 4: SEM with full information
sem (postEQactiv2<-Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri) ///
(Trust_people1<-shock_left sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage
NextEQ Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri), cov(e.Trust_people1*e.postEQactiv2) nocapslatent
outreg2 using ModelCompare.xls, cttop(SEM) append

reg postEQactiv2 Trust_people1 sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage proptdamage NextEQ
Female age married family_joint Educ occu_agri
outreg2 using OLS.xls, cttop(OLS) replace
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*Alternate to using ivregress 2sls
ivreg2 postEQactiv2 (Trust_people1 = shock_left) sc_users sc_civicpolitic Communitysize generations healthdamage
proptdamage NextEQ Female age married family_joint Education occu_agri, robust savefirst
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**********************************************************************************************
***********************CHAPTER 5: DHURMUS-SUNTALI PAPER ONLY********************************
*******************************(REGRESSION RESULTS ONLY)****************************************
**********************************************************************************************
cd "/Users/veeshan/OneDrive/CHAPTER 3 - Social Entrepreneur/Data Work/"
use 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, clear
*save 2017_Bahunepati_forreg.dta, replace

*************************************************************************************************
********Table 1: Volunteering (N=510)************
*************************************************************************************************
*Independent Variables: dist10, dist30, dist60, distsquare
gen dist0=DhurmusDist<5
gen dist10=DhurmusDist<=10
gen dist30=DhurmusDist<=30
gen dist60=DhurmusDist<60
gen dist90=DhurmusDist<=90
gen dist120=DhurmusDist<=120
gen distsquare=DhurmusDist*DhurmusDist
*Controls
global controls i.housedamage i.proptdamage i.healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri
logit volunteer dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///
title(Table: Logit Regression Results for Volunteering) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage
Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables incude health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage)")
logit volunteer dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist0) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)
logit volunteer dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist10) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls,
No)
logit volunteer dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist10) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)
logit volunteer dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist30) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls,
No)
logit volunteer dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist30) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)
logit volunteer dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist60) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls,
No)
logit volunteer dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
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outreg2 using CH3T1.xls, append keep(dist60) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)

*hetprob volunteer dist0 $controls, het(i.housedamage householdsize) vce(robust)
*Appendix Table
logit volunteer dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA1.xls, replace keep(dist90) ///
title(Table: Logit Regression Results for Volunteering) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage
Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables incude health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage)")
logit volunteer dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA1.xls, append keep(dist90) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)
logit volunteer dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA1.xls, append keep(dist120) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls,
No)
logit volunteer dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA1.xls, append keep(dist120) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls,
Yes)

******************************Table 2: Marginal Effects (N=510)********************************
***********************************************************************************************
logit volunteer dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///
title(Table: Average Marginal Effects for Volunteering) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No)
alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage.")
logit volunteer dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
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outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T2ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
*Appendix Table
logit volunteer dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3TA2.xls, replace keep(dist90) ///
title(Table: Average Marginal Effects for Volunteering) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No)
alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage.")
logit volunteer dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3TA2.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3TA2.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)
logit volunteer dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3TA2.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Marginal effects)

********Table 3: Community Engagement (local politics, community events (N=510)****************
*************************************************************************************************
recode active_comty (2=1) (3=1)
recode active_comty (4=2)
recode active_comty (5=3)
ologit active_comty dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///

259

title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Community Engagement) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll))
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage")
ologit active_comty dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist0) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist10) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist10) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist30) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist30) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist60) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T3.xls, append keep(dist60) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)

*Appendix Table
ologit active_comty dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA3.xls, replace keep(dist90) ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Community Engagement) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll))
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage")
ologit active_comty dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA3.xls, append keep(dist90) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
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outreg2 using CH3TA3.xls, append keep(dist120) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)
ologit active_comty dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3TA3.xls, append keep(dist120) ctitle(Comm Engag) ///
addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)
symbol(***, **, *, +)

******************************Table 4: Marginal Effects (N=510)********************************
***********************************************************************************************
*Distance 0 minutes
ologit active_comty dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///
title(Table: Average Marginal Effects for Community Engagement) addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls,
No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-1) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets. EQ damage variables include health damage (injury/death), home damage, property damage.")
ologit active_comty dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist0 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D0ME-3)
*Distance Under 10 minutes
ologit active_comty dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
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margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist10 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D10ME-3)
*Distance Under 30 minutes
ologit active_comty dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist30 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
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margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D30ME-3)

*Distance Under 60 minutes
ologit active_comty dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist60 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D60ME-3)
*Distance Under 90 minutes
ologit active_comty dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-2)
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ologit active_comty dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist90 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D90ME-3)
*Distance Under 120 minutes
ologit active_comty dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-1)
ologit active_comty dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-2)
ologit active_comty dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, No, Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-3)
ologit active_comty dist120 $controls, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T4ME0.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(EQ Damage Variables, Yes, Controls, Yes) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) symbol(***, **, *, +) ///
ctitle(D120ME-3)
*************Table 5: Participation in Post-disaster Relief Activities (N=510)*****************
***********************************************************************************************
gen postdisrecons=1 if recov_disasreliefp==1|recov_disasreliefp==2|recov_disasreliefp==3
replace postdisrecons=2 if recov_disasreliefp==4
replace postdisrecons=3 if recov_disasreliefp==5
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*Controls
global controls1 i.housedamage i.proptdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage Female headEduc
i.married i.hindu i.BrahminChhetri i.occu_agri
ologit postdisrecons dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///
title(Table: Ordered Logit Regression Results for Post-disaster reconstruction efforts-PDRE) addstat(Loglikelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1) symbol(***, **, *) ///
ctitle(PDRE) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets, and EQ damage variables.")
ologit postdisrecons dist0 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist0) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist10) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist10 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist10) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist30) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist30 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist30) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist60) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist60 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist60) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist90) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist90 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist90) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist120) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, No) ctitle(PDRE)
ologit postdisrecons dist120 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
outreg2 using CH3T5.xls, append label keep(dist120) addstat(Log-likelihood, e(ll)) addtext(Controls, Yes) ctitle(PDRE)
******************************Table 4: Marginal Effects for PDRE (N=510)********************************
***********************************************************************************************
*Distance 0 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, replace keep(dist0) ///
title(Table: Average Marginal Effects for Participation in Post-disaster Reconstruction Efforts) addtext(Controls,
No) alpha(0.01, 0.05, 0.1) symbol(***, **, *) ///
ctitle(D0ME-1) ///
addnote("Controls included in the model are: participation in microfinance groups, distance to nearest market
center, age of household head, education level of household head, marital status, religion, occupation of household head,
household assets, and EQ damage variables.")
ologit postdisrecons dist0 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D0ME-1)
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ologit postdisrecons dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D0ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist0 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D0ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist0, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D0ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist0 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist0) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D0ME-3)
*Distance 10 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D10ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist10 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D10ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D10ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist10 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D10ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist10, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D10ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist10 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist10) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D10ME-3)
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*Distance 30 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D30ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist30 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D30ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D30ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist30 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D30ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist30, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D30ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist30 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist30) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D30ME-3)
*Distance 60 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D60ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist60 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D60ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D60ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist60 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
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addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D60ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist60, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D60ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist60 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist60) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D60ME-3)
*Distance 90 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D90ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist90 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D90ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D90ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist90 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D90ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist90, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D90ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist90 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist90) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D90ME-3)
*Distance 120 minutes
ologit postdisrecons dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D120ME-1)
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ologit postdisrecons dist120 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D120ME-1)
ologit postdisrecons dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D120ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist120 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D120ME-2)
ologit postdisrecons dist120, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, No) ///
ctitle(D120ME-3)
ologit postdisrecons dist120 $controls1, cluster(WARD_RESPONDENT)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) dydx(*) post
outreg2 using CH3T5ME.xls, append keep(dist120) ///
addtext(Controls, Yes) ///
ctitle(D120ME-3)

global controls housedamage proptdamage healthdamage asset partn_microf dist_market householdsize hhdage Female
headEduc married hindu BrahminChhetri occu_agri
*Comparison across groups
foreach var in partn_microf dist_market rate_health headEduc occu_agri agriland_valuer householdsize hhdage Female
married hindu BrahminChhetri housedamage proptdamage injuries {
sum `var'
ttest `var', by(dist0)
}
foreach var in partn_microf dist_market rate_health headEduc occu_agri agriland_valuer householdsize hhdage Female
married hindu BrahminChhetri housedamage proptdamage injuries {
sum `var'
ttest `var', by(dist10)
}
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